Moral Responsibility in Disinformation: A Study in Moral Philosophy

In this study I have tried some meta-ethical reflections on moral responsibility involving disinformation. For this purpose, the conceptual analysis and the reflective equilibrium methods were used. Then, the study was focused on the conditions that this phenomenon occurs. Thus, I first tried to examine whether committing disinformation is a moral dilemma. I used some citations to philosophers and some examples to show dilemmatic view of moral problems is logically fallacious. In the second step, it has examined that whether committing disinformation takes place in the pressure condition and then, the possibility of moral decision in pressure condition was examined. The outcome of study in second step showed that ideal morality fails to explain actions in pressure conditions and implications of care ethics and doing best practices is the best way for doing in such conditions, if the provision of “helping to elimination of poverty and bridging the gap between poor and wealthy” fulfilled. In the third step, I tried to examine disinformation in the context of akrasia and weakness of will and the possibility of them from the moral philosophical point of view. By reviewing arguments of some philosophers, I introduced will and wish as a building blocks of the akrasia and weakness of will phenomenon. Then, 8 rules were predicted for determining moral responsibility in akratic and weakness of will conditions. At the end, i proposed the Fischer’s “Moderate reasons responsiveness” idea for determining moral responsibility in the “irresistible wish” condition.