An attitude on the approach of Iran's administrative and constitutional Judge on the freedom of association in the light of Habermas' public sphere theory

Freedom of association is one of the most fundamental pillars of the realization of the public sphere in modern state. Therefore, its realization is guaranteed with the least restrictions in the constitution, and administrative and constitutional judges, as guardians of the public sphere, protect the freedom of association. on the other hand, Juridification leading to its colonization and the dissolution of the public sphere. Because, in some cases, government intervention through the enactment of positive laws in the realm of life-world may help the lower classes; But the nature of governments is such that they are often unable to respect the independence of individuals with different tastes and diversity of lifestyles. Therefore, in order to establish legitimate legal norms in the public sphere, the administrative and constitutional judges are obliged to fulfill the obstacles to the government's entry into the public sphere in their procedures through the prohibition of Juridification. this article deals with the question that does the freedom of association in Iran's legal system and in administrative and constitutional judge procedures have the necessary ability to play a role in the development of the public sphere and adapt to the standards of this sphere? Despite guarantee of freedom of association in the constitution, Iran's constitutional and administrative judges, in contradictory procedures in protecting freedom of association, have created grounds of Juridification of life-world, weakness of the public sphere and, as a result, crisis of legitimacy in norm-making. In this article, mentioned topics are studied in a descriptive-analytical way.