Criticism of Kant's problems on the proof of possibility and necessity based on the principles

In Sino's interpretation of the proof of possibility and obligation, based on the immediacy of proving reality and the refusal of the community of contradictions, and based on the possible feature of external reality, doubt is removed from the existence of obligation. According to Leibniz's reading of this proof, Kant states that it only doubts the observer's theorems. The reality and possibility of them does not make it mandatory; Because the same doubt exists in the existence of the obligation. Also, according to the field of Kant's philosophy, since it is permissible to doubt all factual propositions, a definitive proposition cannot be used as a basis for obligatory proof, and since existence, necessity, possibility, and causality express the relationship of propositions; Therefore, talking about the external possibility and proving the existence of the obligatory in the context of the flow of causality is inappropriate. In this article, we are going to criticize these problems by using the descriptive analytical method and state that in Sino’s interpretation, first of all, the meaning of possibility is the non-existence of external reality, not the permission to doubt the facts. Secondly, the principle of proof of reality and the refusal of the community of contradictions have been placed as two realistic and certain propositions as the basis of the proof. Also, based on this interpretation, existence, obligation, and possibility can benefit from foreign examples in addition to the relationship found in cases. Therefore, the interpretation of these concepts according to the ratio existing in the cases regarding the spreading of the ruling is one of the examples of the concept of Sinew’s interpretation of this proof .