The Legitimacy and Nature of Judgement in the Noble Qur’ān

Despite the common belief among the Shī‘a and Sunnī jurists about the legitimacy of judgement and arbitration, some jurists have not accepted this legitimacy, with both groups adopting some qur’ānic verses and Islamic narrations to support their stance. Since the qur’ānic principles and evidences – due to the definiteness of their chain of transmission – have been disputed less than other jurisprudential evidences, it is necessary to examine the station of the judgement institution and its nature in the noble Qur’ān and to answer the question that if the right to use judgement in the qur’ānic verses is supported or not. If yes, what is the indication manner and limits? Running the discussion around the noble verses of the Qur’ān, trying to avoid using other jurisprudential evidences, and using the two theories of commission and arbitration about the nature of judgement, the judicial nature of judgment was extracted from the verses related to the necessity of impartiality and justness of the judge as well as the “denial of conjugal rights” verse. Because of their common nature, the overlap between the “judgement” institution in law with “arbitrative judgment” in jurisprudence was derived from the verses. Moreover, deeming faulty the verses used by the proponents of the illegitimacy of arbitrative judgment, from among the verses proposed by the proponents of the legitimacy of this institution, only the indication of the “denial of conjugal rights” verse for arbitration is accepted. Moreover, by rejecting the theory that the verb “fab‘athū” in this verse is only for guidance and accepting that this verb functions as an imperative verb, the possibility to generalize it to other cases and non-conjugal disagreements was demonstrated based on intellectuals’ conduct, importance of primacy, and some related narrations.