The Investigation of the Concept of the Principle of Compensating All Damages and its Denial in the Pluralistic Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law

The examination of Iranians' writings on tort law reveals that a significant number of jurists adhere to the maxim known as "the principle of compensating all damages." This principle holds that if the other two requirements of liability, namely causation and harmful act, are satisfied, all damages, regardless of their nature, should be compensated without the need for a specific law explicitly prescribing such compensation. In essence, unless there is a law expressly prohibiting compensation, any damage ought to be duly compensated. The authors of this essay embark on an examination of the rule that mandates the payment of compensation for all damages and its connection to the pluralistic philosophical foundations of tort law. In pursuing this objective, it is crucial to establish that tort law encompasses more than merely compensating damages. By employing a more comprehensive definition, tort law can be understood as a legal discipline that bears the responsibility of responding to the phenomenon of loss. This response,  however, does not always manifest as an obligation to provide monetary compensation for the harm suffered. In the subsequent section of the article, we delve into the various interpretations of the principle of compensating all damages within Iranian legal doctrines. Through extensive research and analysis of relevant legal literature, we identify at least two distinct interpretations: the maximal and minimal interpretations. The maximal interpretation posits that the mere occurrence of a loss is sufficient for the legal system to demand compensation. Even in cases where the causes of the loss are unknown or the tortfeasor is bankrupt, the government is deemed responsible for compensating the damage. In this interpretation, responsibility is not contingent upon fault, thereby implying that individuals may be required to compensate for damages even if they have not committed any wrongdoing. On the other hand, the minimal interpretation maintains the principle of compensating all damages while incorporating fault as the criterion for establishing responsibility. However, we shed light on the unsolvable paradoxes that arise from this interpretation. One such paradox emerges from the fact that while the goal is to compensate all damages, responsibility remains dependent on fault, adhering to the general principle of tort law: no fault, no compensation. Consequently, in situations where no explicit statute mandates compensation, damages would go uncompensated, contradicting the aim purported by this interpretation. Despite the disparities between the maximal and minimal interpretations, the underlying essence of the principle can be summarized as follows: "the principle of compensating all damages when no express law exists." Although the phrase "when no express law exists" is not explicitly stated within the principle, it can be inferred from the explanations provided by proponents of this principle and the situations in which they apply it. In order to substantiate this interpretation of the principle, it becomes necessary to delve into the philosophical foundations of tort law. For the sake of brevity, we refer to this interpretation as a "foundational concept." This concept asserts that in the absence of specific legislation, an assumption must be made, calling for compensation for any type of damages. However, despite the absence of an express law endorsing such a broadly applicable theory within our legal system, some highly respected experts subscribe to this notion. Nevertheless, case law remains uncertain regarding how to respond to this principle, underscoring the ongoing debate and lack of consensus. Contrary to this prevailing belief, our exploration of the philosophical (both monistic and pluralistic theories) and juridical foundations of tort law reveals that no theory unequivocally supports the idea of compensating all kinds of damages in all circumstances while remaining impervious to strong criticism. The findings of this study unequivocally demonstrate that the belief in such a principle—compensating all damages—is not tenable either practically or theoretically. It is unfeasible in reality, as it hampers the efficacy of tort law in organizing and regulating various social activities, and it lacks theoretical justification. Therefore, in this article, we propose that jurists and courts should refrain from invoking this principle. Instead, we advocate for a flexible, binary, and pluralistic tort system that takes into account factors such as the scale of activity, economic power, or income of the actors involved. This proposed system would enhance fairness and tailor the compensation process to specific circumstances, striking a balance between societal needs and individual responsibility. In forthcoming articles, we intend to present a detailed outline and mechanism for implementing such a system, underscoring the need for a paradigm shift in the approach to compensating damages within the realm of tort law.