Logical Analysis of Allameh Tabataba'i’s Itibari Perceptions with Epistemic Pluralism

This paper is about the logical analysis of Allameh Tabataba'i’s itibari perceptions and epistemic pluralism, which examines their relationship. Allameh Tabataba'i invented the theory of itibari perceptions in the analysis of human epistemic plurals. This theory faces two different views. Some believe that there is a necessary relationship between itibari perceptions and epistemic pluralism with a relativistic interpretation of the theory, and through this theory, epistemic pluralism can be concluded. The question that arises is what is the relationship between these two theories? The author's assumes that, firstly, epistemic relativity is not accepted in the theory itself, secondly, epistemic pluralism cannot be deduced from the assumption of relativity. To prove his claim, the author of the article first explained the evidence of the lack of relativity in the theory, and after stating the differences between the two theories, he checked their necessary relationship by using logical analysis and library method. This article, which sought to evaluate the relation of these two theories, did not find any process that could result in epistemic pluralism. Dressing Allameh Tabataba'i’s intellectual field from epistemic pluralism and rejecting the attribution of itibari perceptions to epistemological relativity is the most important result of the findings of the present research.