A Comparative Approach to the Concept of Insanity and its Implications

Is insanity defined similarly in civil and criminal contexts? Is the type of insanity that leads to the exemption from criminal responsibility the same (in nature and severity) as the insanity that grants a wife the right to annul a marriage or that leads to the invalidation of transactions? In common literature of Imāmī jurisprudence and Iranian law, insanity has a single meaning in all rulings and regulations. In this approach, insanity is absolutely between being and not being; that is, a person is either insane and therefore subject to all specific rulings; or not insane, in which case none of the specific rulings are applied to him/her. The present study primarily aims at highlighting the necessity for setting aside absolutism regarding the issue of insanity, and to consider the concept of insanity as a relative and comparative concept in all its dimensions. It is possible that the insane person is only devoid of awareness in committing certain types of crimes, and yet performs the rest of his actions willingly and fully consciously. Similarly, personal transactions made by someone suffering from the most severe types of mental illness can be entirely valid and effective. The authors primarily aim at clarifying a theory titled “Comparative Approach to the Concept of Insanity”, and then providing possible foundations for it within Imāmī jurisprudence. Finally, the authors have explored the following four topics: “relative application of responsibility”, “the multiplicity of defenses related to insanity”, “the distinction between family law, criminal law, and contract law”, and “distinction between the identification criteria for insanity”. These are discussed as the four-fold implications of accepting the comparative approach. In the end, the study concludes with recommendations for further studies in research and judicial practices.