Avicennian logicians on the conversion of categorical propositions to conditional ones

In another article, I have shown that Avicenna regards categorical propositions as “different” and “not identical,” yet “equivalent” to conditional propositions. In this article, I demonstrate that Arabic logicians after him disagreed on whether categorical and conditional propositions are “identical” or merely “equivalent.” Unlike Avicenna, Suhrawardī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭusī, and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī accepted the “identicality” of categorical and conditional propositions, while Khūnajī, Samarqandī, Mīrdāmād, and Mulla Ṣadrā defended Avicenna’s theory of “equivalence” by rejecting the theory of “identicality.” Alongside these logical discussions, linguistic scholars such as Sakkākī, and following him, Taftāzānī, presented a new version of the theory of “identicality” between categorical and conditional propositions, considering the antecedent of a conditional as a part of the consequent’s predicate and as one of its adverbs or modifiers.