A Critical Examination of Physicalism as a Presupposition for Psychological Criterion in Justifying Personal Identity

Personal identity, which implies the persistence of a continuous and unified identity, is considered to be intuitive. There are various theories in philosophical and rational analysis of the criteria for the aforementioned identity.  the psychological criterion considers “psychological continuity” as the major component in one’s persistence of a unified identity. To explore this theory, it is necessary to criticize its hypotheses and foundations. In doing so, I have indicated that the psychological criterion is rooted in the physicalist explanation of mental phenomena such as the “identity of mind and brain,” “behaviorism” and “functionalism.” This article shows that the physicalist explanation of mind and mental phenomena suffers from multiple shortcomings. It demonstrates that not only the psychological criterion cannot provide a sound criterion in analyzing personal identity, but it also suffers from multiple foundational flaws. Refuting the psychological criterion in the justification of personal identity paves the way for justifying personal identity based on immaterial individual substance.