Analysis of Conflicts of Interest in Iran's Banking System: Utilizing Game Theory and Graph Models to Evaluate the Equilibrium Among Stakeholders

One of the fundamental challenges in Iran's banking system is the conflict of interest, which plays a critical role in public trust. This issue points to situations where individual personal interests are at odds with their duties and responsibilities. Without addressing the actors involved in conflicts of interest, achieving and controlling these conflicts cannot be assured. Therefore, this study employs content analysis, interviews with experts, and the identification of their desires and actions. Through the application of game theory and graph models, the equilibrium status among stakeholders such as banks, customers and borrowers, legislators and regulatory bodies, investors and market analysts, and consumer rights organizations has been identified. The equilibrium state among the actors was determined through interviews regarding their preferences and with the help of evolutionary path analysis, tracing the actors' movements from the current state to the equilibrium state. The study found that this equilibrium does not represent an ideal state for the community and policymakers, indicating a need for a shift in stakeholders' preferences. Through backward game analysis, it has been determined that legislators and regulatory bodies should strengthen oversight and transparency, and consumer rights organizations should initiate awareness campaigns and collaborate with lawmakers and supervisory bodies to enhance protective regulations, aiming to achieve an optimal state for the national economy. This research can assist the Islamic Consultative Assembly in developing more effective legislative strategies through a better understanding of the interactions between stakeholders.