An Evaluation of the Possibility of Defending the Theory of the Objectivity of God’s Essence and Attributes Based on various Theories on the Ontology of Features

Explaining the relationship between God’s essence and attributes is one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy and kalām. The objectivity of essence and attributes is one of the most important theories that is used to explain their relationship, which is consistent with believing in God’s simplicity as the most crucial or, at least, as one of the most important metaphysical attributes of God. However, accepting the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes or His simplicity depends on the theory that is presented on the ontology of features and attributes. Several theories have been introduced in this regard in Islamic philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics. By discussing such theories, the present paper demonstrates the following points: 1) defending the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes is based on a theory on the ontology of attributes; 2) not all theories on ontological attributes are useful for explaining the objectivity of His essence and attributes; 3) the theories of Brian Leftow and Mullā Ṣadrā can be used to defend the objectivity of God’s essence and attributes.