A New Attitude Towards the Ruling of the Ignorant in Matters and its Conflict with the Rule of Obligation to Declare

One of the significant issues in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is the discussion of Irshād al-Jāhil (guiding the ignorant). While the obligation to guide the ignorant in matters of religious rulings (aḥkām) is well established through widely recognized fatwas (legal opinions), only a limited number of jurists (fuqahāʾ) have extended this obligation to matters of fact or subject-matter (mawḍūʿāt). The majority, based on specific narrations (riwāyāt), maintain that guiding the ignorant is not obligatory—except in critical cases, such as those involving the preservation of life. This study employs a descriptive-analytical method to assess the validity of the arguments from both perspectives. It ultimately challenges the prevailing fatwa by arguing that it conflicts with another established principle: the rule of the obligation to inform the ignorant regarding what is given (qāʿidat wujūb iʿlām al-jāhil fīmā yuʿṭā). Although a preliminary solution to resolve this contradiction involves restricting the latter rule to cases of causation (tasbīb), this interpretation faces significant issues. These include its inconsistency with the principle that rulings depend on underlying interests and harms (qāʿidat tabaʿiyyat al-aḥkām lil-maṣāliḥ wa al-mafāsid), the obligation of goodwill toward believers (wujūb khayrkhwāhī li-l-muʾmin), and certain opposing narrations. By proposing an alternative resolution, this paper concludes that either the scope of what constitutes “critical cases” under the prevailing view should be broadened, or, more fundamentally, that the duty to guide the ignorant should be considered obligatory in all but trivial matters.