Is Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic Truths a Dogmatic One?

Distinction between analytic truths- those truths which have their roots in the meanings of the constituent words alone and do not depend on facts- and synthetic truths- which depend on facts- has caused many debates in the 20 Century. In the present article, history of this distinction will be described; then we go to clarify that why it is important for neoempiricists; finally, it will be discussed that how, according to Carnap, such a distinction is made in artificial languages. The most famous critic of this distinction, Quine, thinks that Carnap's criterion to make such a distinction is not sufficient. He thinks that to make such a distinction acceptable "the empirical criteria for viewing the world as it is" should be provided. To fulfill Quine's request, the empirical method of Carnap is introduced according to which, by observing one's linguistics behavior, it may be found that whether a particular sentence, as used by him, is analytic or not. In the present article, discussions made in this concern will be studied; then the authors will show that, in spite of Quine's claim, rejection of analytic/synthetic distinction has had no important consequences for empiricism; and many results which he thinks may be achieved if such a distinction is rejected had been either achievable without this rejection or they are consequences of his other ideas for which the distinction does not need to be rejected.Thus, we conclude that belief in distinction between analytic/synthetic truths is not dogmatic; on the contrary insistence upon such a rejection, while it may be found empirically and while it has certain practical and theoretical results, is a dogma.