فصلنامه آیین حکمت
پیاپی 22 (زمستان 1393)

In spite of a general commonsensical understanding of justice, the plurality of the considerations that are involved in its social applications has subjected the air of justice discourse to confusion. The question is whether the term justice is used univocally in such various domains as law, politics, and economy and whether semantic patterns of justice such as granting right, observing competency, equality, impartiality and balance are reducible to a single comprehensive pattern. No doubt there are opposing views on principles of justice and identification of its instances but question is whether all these themes under the title of justice deal with one and single problem and whether one can speak of the coherent ideas when they are based on different ideological principles and various epistemic foundations. The present article is to show that before entering ideological disputes on theories of justice a semantic analysis of social justice can provide answers to aforementioned questions and pave the way for adopting more reasonable standpoint among rival theories.

In the present article the most important epistemological discussions on conjectures are to be examined and explored. The history of this term as well as its definition was surveyed. The article goes on to discuss the nature of conjecture, its distinction with experience, difference with inspiration, its independence from reason, and the distinction between the conjectural and experimental in the eyes of Islamic thinkers. The self-evidence of conjectural propositions is also to be considered and the objections raised on this claim are to be reviewed and assessed. Finally it takes a short glance at the epistemic validity of the conjectures.

Ibn Sina has presented an original proof for the Essential unity of God which has been elaborated in his work The Directives and Remarks. He has briefly formulated the same demonstration in metaphysics of the Healing. The commentators of his work have provided various statements for the argument offering different interpretations and statements. The difference in these statements is mainly related to the assumptions and divisions in the argument under question. Having discussed the status of Ibn Sina’s proof among other argument, the article goes on to deal with its various formulations made by Fakhr Razi, Nasir al-Din Tusi and Qutb al-Din Shirazi with conclusion that Tusi’s statement of the argument is free from objections raised against other statements and is more consistent with the word of Ibn Sina.

Regarding fallibility of the Prophets, Nasir al-Din Tusi believes that they are infallible in theoretical domain in receiving, maintaining and conveying the revelation and no error and wrong is made by them purposefully or unpurposefully. In his view the Prophets are also infallible in in practical levels in respect with both mortal and minor sins, before and after being chosen as prophet. Thanks to the grace of Allah they are immune from any fault and mistake in their judgments and perception of the subjects of religious rulings, social problems and cognizance of interests of society as well as daily affairs of life. Tusi regards infallibility as an act of Divine grace for those are endowed with such characteristic. Although infallible man is able to commit sin, he is encouraged to do acts of obedience and avoids disobedience. The purpose of prophets is gained only if they are trustworthy and this cannot be unless they are infallible. To him infallibility is absolutely essential on both revealed and rational bases. In explaining the former, Tusi appeals to some Quranic verses which state Satan in incapable of misguiding the purified chosen men of God and that His covenence does not reach the unjust people. Necessity of having trust in prophets and disobeying them in case of their being wrong and fallible can be taken as rational arguments for the doctrine in question.

The application of imagination in theoretical mysticism and mystical visions has always drawn the attention of scholars in visionary sciences and hence of special importance. Therefore imagination plays crucial role in realization and explanation of great number of visions faced by mystics. In explaining the problem, Ibn Arabi divided imagination into two contiguous and discontiguous. In his view contiguous imagination is one of the inner faculties of human being that acts as intermediate between intellect and faculty of sense. Discontiguous imagination, however, is real and independent world in the scheme of reality which is located between world of intellect and that of senses. Since contiguous imagination is a way to discontiguous one and they are ontologically related, the imaginal forms in the discontiguous world can be seen by men of vision in both dream and awakening. This experience which is called formal vision is of different degrees the highest of which is prophetic revelation.

The correspondence of the worlds is a principle in transcendent theosophy of Mulla Sadra on which the ways worlds are relared are determined. In his view, existence is divided into four worlds of the Divine, Intellectual, Imaginal and material. Sadra characterizes the relations of these worlds in terms of shell and kernel, encompassing and encompassed, truth and its reflection and finally a correspondence relation. This type of relation indicates a sort of identity and difference to the effect that the lower worlds are present in the higher worlds in a supreme and more perfect way. According to the correspondence principle any quiddity in material world exists through a particular being and in higher worlds through its imaginal, intellectual and divine mode of being. This principle is explained and demonstrated on the bases and foundations typical of this philosophical school. These are purity and simplicity of being, gradational nature of existence, analysis of the very being of effect as copula a relational one and finally the reduction of causality to manifestation. These principles and foundations led transcendent philosophy to demonstration of individual unity of being. As a result and in the last analysis Mulla Sadra speaks of effects not as modes of being but as manifestations of Being and thus he substitutes the correspondence of worlds of manifestation for that of worlds of existence.