نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 1 (بهار و تابستان 1395)

Theists philosophers not only believe in God, but also see Him as a necessary being. Moreover, they believe that at least some of His attributes, such as knowledge and power, are necessary, in the sense that He is Omnipotent and Omniscient. The opponents however rejecting the existence of God, deny any
Divine necessity. Regarding the diversity of interpretations of the modal concepts, including necessity, one may ask whether there is an interpretation about the concept of ‘necessity’ which is reasonably applicable to God’s existence and His attributes. This paper addresses the problem of Divine necessity through a semantical approach and then elaborates the two interpretations which are proposed by Muslim philosophers, namely the essential necessity (darūrat bi-dhāt) and the eternal necessity (drūrat azalī) are applicable to God’s existence and His attributes respectively. The paper will also argue that by appealing to the modal logic based on possible worlds semantics and applying the notion of metaphysical necessity, we can endorse de re and de dicto necessity of God’s existence and de re necessity of His attributes.

The problem of truth is as a philosophical, logical and epistemological issue has both significant epistemological and ontological implications. As for the epistemology, foundationalist believes in the correspondence theory of truth i.e. correspondence between mental and extra-mental existence, but the crucial issue is to distinguish between the two realms. From the epistemological viewpoint the complexity is how to perceive the truth and, from the ontological standpoint the problem is about the nature of truth. This paper will attempt to explain that epistemologically the accuracy of the theory of truth depends on a correct inference rules and premises in arguments, especially the rudiments, because the other axioms are based on them and they are self-evident through the principle of non-contradiction which is itself a primary principle. The paper then conclude that ontologically the correspondence theory of truth is correct if
in the case the proposition would transfer to the extra-mental, it would be the very reality. Also if the reality would transfer to the mind, they would be identical too. Generally, numen is correspondent to the truth, which according to the principality of existence intellect will coin it emergently in two phases.

This article will provide a solution for one of the most challenging problems in ethics; objectivity or subjectivity of moral properties. This has been done by a new explanation of ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles’ in an ethical context. In order to address this delicate issue, the paper has presented an investigate concerning ethical principles through reinterpreting the philosophy of the human soul (‘ilm al-nafs) and major ontological principles in transcendental philosophy. Also by using these principles, the article attempts to demonstrate that the moral properties are neither objective nor subjective in the sense the objectivists and subjectivists explain, rather under the concept of ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles’ they are quasi subjective-objective reality’. This explanation in a systematic manner is supported by MullaSadra’s theories such as the existential perfections of human upraised from his ethical attitudes, substantial motion of the soul, and the role of the subjective reflections in a moral agent.

This article with a semantical approach attempts to elaborates Suhrawardi’s discussions on the concept of ‘existence’, his assertion of ‘abstractedness of existence’ and his doctrine of ‘the extra-mentality of Quiddity’ along with its different borderline to the hypothesis of ‘extra-mentality of existence’. Having presented an analytical discussion about Suhrawardi’s few argumentson the abstractedness of existence, the article will explain why Suhrawardi perceives the existence as an mental and abstract concept his opponent, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra do not disagree with his thought about the reality of existence. Through a semantic approach, the paper will also address Suhrawardi’s own peculiar understanding of the the concept of ‘existence in itself’ and that it is merely a mental reality that is compatible with the primacy and extra-mentality of Quiddity.

Although Alvin Plantinga's epistemological theory of justification is different from classical foundationalism, it is categorized under the foundationalist theories. This article first discusses the foundationalism of justification. Having made briefly reviewed classical foundationalism, Plantinga's criticism against this kind of foundationalism will be addressed. Since the Plantinga's view about the justification is both externalistic and reliabilistic, the article will discuss the two and then examine the Plantinga's theory of foundationalism as well. Few criticisms against his views by the critics of externalistic and reliabilistic theories have been studied which will be analytically reviewed at the end of this paper.

Using a new classification of philosophy, Richard Rorty divides philosophy to systematic philosophy and edifying philosophy. In his view, there is a common analogy in systematic philosophy: the mirror analogy. He believes that building philosophy on the foundation of this analogy suffers from many deficiencies such as considering the knowledge and not the education as the center of philosophy, essentialism, philosophical passivity, and philosophical generalization. Looking at Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, we find that he has also made use of this analogy, but his philosophy does not have these deficiencies. Mulla Sadra’ philosophy has the character of truth centrality as a good character of systematic philosophy and at the same time possesses the characteristics of edifying philosophy. In this paper having addressed Rorty’s thoughts about the mirror analogy in systematic philosophy, by using Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, the problems of Rorty’s theories will be examined.

The focus of this paper is ‘egoism’ and its validity. Having reviewed a couple of criticisms against egoism, the paper asserts that the advocates of it are incapable of finding any supporting arguments for its claims. Nevertheless the author attempts to find a way to defend a kind of egoism in Mulla Sadra’s thought and suggests that. according to Mulla Sadra human being is naturally egoistic, but in transcendental philosophy in order to achieve a valid interpretation for egoism, one must first bear in mind the key factors such as types of pleasure, real ultimate perfection of man , true meaning of self-love, characteristics of human existence and its levels in some of which the concept of egoism can be applicable. The authors have shown that according to Sadra’s version of egoism, all human beings keep trying to obtain the greatest attributes of perfection. This does not in any way in contradiction with altruism and actually it is a kind of egoism.