فصلنامه الهیات هنر
پیاپی 7 (زمستان 1395)

In this article, the importance of the mozaf jurisprudence is discussed first. With the difference that, in this article mozaf jurisprudence has been revised by new methods of jurisprudential sources; provided that this revise has no implication for devastating the heritage. This new method has not been customary in previous Shiite jurisprudential literature. For instance, in this method we’ve particularized some of commons by human particularizers and we haven’t particularized the common by a particularizer which fully interpretable and we’ve performed according to the common to not commit inhuman theory. In the following, the difference in this method will be expressed by the view of making the jurisprudence common. The making common which is avoided is fully leaving the scale for common and total closure of Wisdom. Finally, it will be proved that this is a new method in looking at the sources of jurisprudence and has major differences with the making common of jurisprudence. Dealing with the special place of art in human society and proving that this issue is not a created-in-time is another case addressed in this article. According to the author, the present art is the same as the old art which has only changed its artistic style. The totality of art is a historical debate and is not dedicated to a specific time. The life of art is related to human life. In this method, when the jurisprudent considers resources and doubles with care and looks more closely at the issue finds out that these issues are not associated with the essence of art at all. Separating the essences from the accidental qualities in the jurisprudence of art is another requirement of jurisprudence of art in this method that the innovator jurisprudent should reinvestigate the heritage. In this article, we will review examples of artistic cases to explain the necessity of this method and its different outcomes. In fact, the person who takes the law to the essence must make a reason for being intrinsic.
In sculpture, if we review reasons beside historical events, we will come to the conclusion that the sculpture was forbidden since that it was a kind of polytheism because of being worshiped, and this art had been somehow a permission for propagation of polytheism. Now, at the present time, sculpture, which has nothing to do with idolatry and polytheism, its rule should change because the rule was extrinsic.
Separating the essences from the accidental qualities resolves any problem in art. Expressing the reason and philosophy of rules is an issue in which rules are made by adhering to thematic wisdom. Now, if wisdom (not the reason) of an issue changes, basically the rule must change. The final section of this paper addresses this issue and how it is inferred.

Displaying of an artistic creation does not itself have an independent title in law and for legal analysis, it is necessary to find a legal position by analyzing artistic activity. The substantive analysis of artistic activity is a philosophical activity that has been dealt with in the initial part of the article. There are several possibilities in this section. Additionally, recognizing the common legal titles that artistic activity can bring under them will help to find a legal order. In this regard, the three titles of "Displaying", "Participation in Cultural Life" and "Creative Activity" within different natures are able to cover artistic activity. With regard to these three titles, the legal order and its nature can be verified. Given the principle of freedom in all three, and of course the difference in nature, their limitations must also be based on precise criteria and with existence of exceptions, reasons causing elimination of exceptions should also be considered. The attempt of this paper is to provide a matrix or initial model for a variety of possible approaches to obtain a legal order on the freedom of displaying artistic creation and its limits.

"The possibility of aesthetic experience" is one of the inalienable, innate or natural rights of human. Providing the possibility of rational, moral, spiritual, emotional and aesthetic evolution in human life is one of the tasks of every civil and social system. The possibility of drowning in a kind of divine-human experience, known as aesthetic experience, which has a history as human history, is one of the dimensions of the individual and collective evolution of human beings. The emergence and expansion of this mode of perfection in accepting this natural and innate right of human beings is possible by proper caring about art and aesthetic. The Whole-oriented or holistic jurisprudence should deal with explaining this right and its theoretical and practical results and concomitants and clarify the relationship between religion, religious institutions and sovereignty by providing this right. The theological presupposition of this innate right is based on the definition of jurisprudence from God, morality and perfection. If God is "beautiful" and "creator of beauty", and according to the interpretation of the Islamic transcendental wisdom his infinite existence of God is equal to beauty, the theological basis of this network interpretation of natural rights would provide in the aesthetic dimension. On the other hand, wisdom in principles of Imamiah jurisprudence comes to the good and evil inherent of some ethical concepts and truths and accepts it as the principles governing all theoretical systems. Jurisprudential rulings should not be contradictory to natural rights, and this will be achieved by the affirmation of wisdom and religious rationality arising from the rational absolute topic. Individual and social horizons of human beings are achieving the evolution and expanding of divine spirituality and scientific and objective realization of human innate capacities. If the desire for beauty and the creation of beauty in the form of art would be considered as an existential configuration and inalienable human rights, it will be necessary to create its cultural, social and legal bases. The tolerance of artistic creativity, the development of spirituality through the creation of artistic work, the consideration of the art economy, as well as intellectual and artistic possession rights, are among those bases. Providing this right among the innate rights is the cause for the exaltation of existence and the evolution of human beings, and neglecting it, in addition to accepting ethical relativism, closes the goals of the jurisprudence and the intentions directed towards the benefits and the corruptions.

Legislation - making general, generic and imperative rules- is of aspects of governance, and governments use this tool to regulate social relations as well as to achieve their goals, intentions, and ideals. The question that arises is whether art can also be the subject of legislation? And if the answer is positive, how far is this range of generic rules to be made?
In the sphere of artistic legislation, we must accept that the principle is based on the non-interference of the state in the establishment of rules unless the expedient of intervening for this society would be more than the loss of avoiding the sovereignty to interfere in this issue, as the legislature must accept that the areas of "freedom" in art should be wider than the controlled domains and these legislative restrictions on art should not be such as to be the case of this principle "Particularizing of the most is evil."
In the scope of the entry of the sovereignty for legislation in the subject of art, some principles also should be accepted by legislative institutions, including the fact that legislating of art must be more reliant on "support", and the legislative support aspects must be much enough, and the "post-control" principle in art must minimize he prior art controls as far as possible, and according to the principle of "flexibility", the field of art is not worthy of rigid and non-flexible laws. Also, based on the principle of audition, artists' "participation" in the making, interpretation, and implementation of laws is crucial, especially in the stage of the legislative initiative, where non-participation of artists can challenge the relevant law.

The use of the arts of architecture, handicrafts, calligraphy, poetry, painting, etc. has long been customary in the establishment, promotion and development of Islamic sites, such as the mosques, the holy shrines of the Imams (as) and sons of Imams. The main jurisprudential justification by the jurisprudents who have addressed this subject, for permission, preference and, in some circumstances, the necessity of the use of the aforementioned arts has been the principle of honoring symbols of the religion, but the proofs of this rule haven't been in contrast to subjectology of art and its determinations to clarify What is the rule of using the determinations of art based on the principle of honoring symbols of the religion in these places, and beyond, in the absolute promotion and defense of Islamic symbols.
Furthermore, the proportion of the proofs of Islamic places, which, in addition to the reasons of honoring of symbols, also includes the reasons of the mosque, has not been studied with the subjectology of art and its determinations. In this article, we have tried to take a step towards filling this gap. For this purpose, within a brief subjectology of art, its determinants and a reference to the history of these determinations in Islamic sites and symbols, proportion of reasons of Islamic symbols and mosques is addressed by using determinations of art in subject of either Islamic sites or symbols.

Art for the child is very important and essential in terms of its importance in education, nurture, and upbringing, as well as its impact on intellectual development and creativity. No child should be deprived of this important factor in learning, maturity, and apprenticeship.
In the international system of child rights, although it has been referred to art as a right to the child, but the components and the range of this right have not been properly identified; in some cases art for children has been misused and misunderstood, as sometimes a contemplation of this right has led to the neglect of expediency and encouragement in the education of children.
Undoubtedly, there are many important questions in this regard; such as what is the jurisprudential basis of this right for children, how is the freedom of expression and the privacy of children in this area, and what are the responsibilities of the family and government? But the most important question is, what determines the basis and scope of the right of art for children?
In this paper, it is tried to study the principles of art for children as a right based on the Islamic Sharia law and the jurisprudence of the Ahlul-Bayt (as), and the explanation of its rules and its scope based on the jurisprudential system of the child, and clearly respond the question based on the principle of envy and axial expediency.