نشریه پژوهشهای معرفت شناختی
سال هشتم شماره 1 (پیاپی 17، بهار و تابستان 1398)

In his two articles, J. E. Moore refers to two sentences in each one there is contradiction between the starting part of the sentence and the ending part of it and this is named Moor’s paradox: “I went to the pictures last Tuesday, but I don’t believe that I did” “I believe that he has gone out, but he has not”. The paradox, Moore thinks, is in the controversy between the paradoxical and absurdly speech one says on himself in one side and the truthfulness of that speech in the other. There are several problems about this paradox and one of them is that this paradox is related to not only the assertion but also the belief, thought and desires. The other problem is that in relation to the paradox we have to distinct the omissive version of it: “p but I don’t believe that p” from the commissive version of it: “I believe that p but ~p”. the discovery of this paradox is regarded by Wittgenstein as the most important act of Moore in which a certain meaningless and absurdity has been revealed and he speaks of the deeply impact of it on him. This research will assess Moore’s paradox regarding his commentator’s views notably Wittgenstein.

The structure of Bergson's philosophy is divided into two distinct parts of the truth and the permissible, or the spirit and matter, which, by invoking the intuition, are actually the same, but by referring to intelligence, the specter of this dichotomy is subjectively applied to our minds. According to Bergson, the intrinsic nature of all things in the universe is so late that it is only objectively perceived by invoking the intuitive knowledge. But intelligence is inadequate to comprehend it, and thus imposes the duality of spirit and matter on the mind. By appealing to the intuition, it is late in the universe, in the ascending, spirit, and in the course of descending, makes matter. both spirit and matter are derived from a single substance called Duration, but at the same time, two separate reality facts are separate. Bergson explains the relationship between the soul and the body experimentally with the help of his theory of perception. In such a way that perception consists of two flows of pure perception and recollection, it is assumed that due to the lack of similarity of these two flows, a two-way point is called in the name of souvenir-image, because of the sensory-Spiritual attribute, is capable to link between pure perception and pure memory. but since Bergson has an ontological concern, his explanation of the relationship between the soul and the body with the help of the souvenir-images, in this sense, failed to solve the complex mystery beyond the achievement of Descartes.

The theory of the reference of conceptual knowledge to the intuitive knowledge is rooted in the views of philosophers such as Mulla Sadra and has been developed in the works of later thinkers such as Mesbah Yazdi. The purpose of this article is to explain the epistemological part of this view based on the Mulla Sadra’s works. This will be done by designing four questions and answering them. These four questions have focused on the four basic characteristics of basic self-evidents and their origins (three of these four characteristics) in the context of the presence sciences. The first feature is the realization of basic self-evidents, the second feature is their totality, the third one is the necessity of the first theorems, and the fourth characteristic is the basis of these cases. We must find the roots of these four features in the context of the intuitive knowledge, which is a personal reality and apparently lacking in necessity. So that what we say is not the kind of argument and inference, otherwise we do not observe the fourth characteristic (basic axiomatic) of the basic self-evidents.

Rationalism, in contrast to empiricism, means believing in priori knowledge and theorems. Sadr's two books, our philosophy and logical basis of induction have made a detailed analysis of epistemological perspectives, especially in the context of the rationalism-empiricism challenge. Sadr introduces his epistemological doctrine as an inherent doctrine which is agree on belief to priori knowledge with rationalists, and believes the principle of refusal of contradictions priori, he based on realisem and abstraction teory , belives the principles of mathematics are priori too, but about causality, by expressing the distinction between rational and experimental causality, he statement rational causality at least is possible, but he don’t accept the self-explaining of the priori principle of induction, or the principle of non-repetition of the accident, and separates himself from the Aristotelian rationalists. Despite the differences between Sadr on some priori principles and epistemological reasoning with the rationalists, Consequently, he is a rational foundationalist.

Assessing of theoretical and practical rationality of religious beliefs system is of the most significant duties and functions of philosophy of religion which is led to common rational understanding of religions. In this case, in this paper, is selected comprehensive approach in which inductively is used different criterions for evaluating the rationality of religious beliefs. Some of these criterions are included of possibility to argue them based on logical proofs, universality and being global, stability and changeability, internal coherency, simplicity and complexity, having suitable practical results, independent of religious texts authority, being under influences of epistemic and social factors and so on that have their own magnificence. Using these criterions in our comprehensive approach indicates that the totality of religious beliefs system have different levels of theoretical and practical rationality. Based on this fact, we can divide religious beliefs system into three groups, including fundamental, intermediate and marginal beliefs, that in this division, fundamental beliefs have the highest levels of rationality, marginal beliefs have the lowest levels of rationality, and intermediate beliefs are places between them. Now by considering the central place of fundamental beliefs, and then intermediate ones in second place is recommended to focus mostly on fundamental ones regarding interfaith dialogues and extending coexistence and peace between followers of divine religions and Islamic denominations, since most of divine religions believers and theists have common understanding concerning them. Regarding interfaith dialogue among Islamic denominations, of course, it should be extend believers common understanding of intermediate beliefs.

Illuminative disclosure and intuition are one important way to gain knowledge (episteme) in Islamic philosophy. And permanently one of Islamic philosophy element in method was depending on knowledge gain by intuitions. In this essay, we tried to explain the clear meaning of intuition and explain its characteristics . it seems that these characteristics are in falliability, particularity and equivocal that will be cleared in this essay. One other thing that has been mentioned is the usage and effections of intuitions in one famous schools of Islamic philosophy I mean mullasadra school, with referring to main books of schools. As intuition has varieties and classifications, we explained about this in philosophical school, transcendental wisdom and illuminative philosophy (wisdom of the orient of light). its been cleared that the classifications of intuition are not inductive determination. Therefor these classifications can plus and minus. Common basis of intuition in some philosophy schools and mystics is another thing that we mentioned in this essay and believe that as much as res cogitans we have intuitions, so we have varieties of intuition in the world. Finally authoritativeness of intuition is mentioned in this essay.

Abstract The relationship between reason and religion is one of the issues that Islamic scholars have been focusing on for a long time. The present essay examines this issue from the perspective of Al-Ghazali and Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid as two major Islamic thinkers and theologians. The results obtained in Al-Ghazali's writings indicate that he has mentioned four meanings for reason, which are theoretical and practical reason and acquired and instinctive intellect. Al-Ghazali sees religious sciences precedent over intellectual sciences and prioritizes sharia over wisdom. And believes that reason is incapable of seeking divine knowledge. But Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid is a theologian with Intellectual foundation who explains theological and jurisprudential propositions through rational reasoning, and invites thinkers to argumentative faith. In his view, reason is considered as a source for defending the teachings of revelation. In addition to using wisdom in theological topics, he believes that in the narrative discussions, the conformity and opposition of the provisions of the hadith with reason is the criterion for the authenticity of the hadith. Since Al-Shaykh Al-Mufid finds the understanding of the hadith subject to careful and deep-seated rational attention, he has been opposed to “people of narrations” as a superficial intellectual current.

The Phenomenology of Religion was introduced as an academic discipline since the early twentieth century. Therefore, it is a new discipline, and researchers are disagree about its exact meaning. According to Bleeker, the phenomenology of religion is used in three ways: 1) the regulation and systematization of religious phenomena. 2) Typology of different types of religions. 3) Research in the structures and meanings of religious phenomena. In his opinion, the third meaning more accurately reveals the phenomenological nature of religion. Also, it is necessary to distinguish between the phenomenology of religion as a method and phenomenology of religion as an independent discipline. Phenomenology as a method is based on two principles of epoché and the eidetic vision, and is applicable in other disciplines. Phenomenology as an independent science pursuing a triple 1) Theōria, which shows the religious implications of various phenomena. 2) Logos, which reveals the internal logic of religious beliefs and practices. 3) Entelecheia, which explains how religions change in a certain direction. Contrary to the views of phenomenologists of religion, including Bleeker, their approach is faced with serious challenges and doubts, and their consolidation requires critical rethinking.

Quine emphasizes the exclusion of non-scientific questions, which have important role in traditional epistemology, from his naturalized epistemology. He presents his epistemology as a science or as a chapter of empirical psychology, so to speak. Jaegwon Kim raises the objection to Quine's epistemology: Quine's approach requires losing every normative elements from epistemology, which in turn requires, since according to Kim the very concept of knowledge -and also belief- is a normative concept, losing knowledge from epistemology, that is Quin's naturalized epistemology could not have knowledge -and also belief- as a subject matter. Here I argue that two meanings of normative element are defendable in accordance with Quine's naturalized epistemology, but this defense seems incompatible with Quine's verificationism. Finally, I try to construe Quine's verificationism in such a way that this incompatibility disappears.