فصلنامه پژوهش های فلسفی - کلامی
سال بیست و یکم شماره 2 (پیاپی 80، تابستان 1398)

In contemporary analytic philosophy, the principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has been attacked due to its controversial results. Among these results, necessarianism (modal collapse) is the most significant one. Indeed, our intuition indicates that there are some things around us which are contingent which means that they could be in another way. Accepting the PSR seems to conflict with this common intuition; if all things have a sufficient reason, is it possible to have contingency or would all things be necessary? In response to this problem, several answers have been presented which we will recount briefly in this paper , nevertheless the main points that we have emphasized in this paper are: 1. explaining the problem of necessarianism based on the text of one of the pioneer thinkers in this regard (Van Inwagen) who refuted the principle and 2. an answer to this problem from one of the most important researchers on the issue (Pruss) who tries to solve the problem by denying causal necessity. Finally, we examine the solution of Muslim philosophers especially Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) who solved the problem without refuting causal necessity.

From the beginning of the 21st century, a new field of cognitive science called "cognitive science of religion" (CSR) has attracted the attention of many scholars. Researchers in this branch seek to explore cognitive mechanisms that produce or reinforce religious beliefs in man. Theories and empirical evidence of CSR have led to many philosophical and theological questions. One of the most important questions is whether these findings show that belief in the existence of God is unjustified. Some philosophers respond positively to this question. They believe that the cognitive mechanisms studied in this area are a threat to the belief in God. Their reasons for this are largely based on the fact that these mechanisms are prone to substantial error, and the insensitivity of these mechanisms in relation to truth. Our aim in this paper is to show that none of the above reasons can show that religious beliefs are unjustified, especially belief in God. Our argument in this regard is based on the fact that natural and supernatural explanations are not mutually exclusive, and the fundamental limitation of cognitive mechanisms.

The logic of understanding religion is a set of methodical rules which if adhered to can protect the mind of a religious exegete from errors in understanding. The necessity of such logic is clear to the intellectuals. Avicenna is one such intellectual in this regard. The concern of this study is “Avicenna and the logic of understanding religion”. This study is foundational, historical, analytical and concern-centered and has been conducted using a library method and authentic sources. The findings of this study are that Avicenna’s philosophical-scientific perceptions are not consistent with religious texts and this has resulted in him determining that there is a disharmony between rational premises and religious, revelation premises. The Prophet was a unique being and exalted in estimation, imagination and intellect. A large part of his perceptions of realities was not consistent with the general level of understanding. Presenting the bare findings has not been possible or useful. Accordingly, he presented it to people in the form of coded language, metaphors and parables so that they become familiar with the minimum of intellectual and human happiness. According to Avicenna, understanding the real meaning of texts is only possible through ontology. Ontology enables the exegete to become familiar with the writer of the text and his intent from the text and allows him to decode the text. He himself has done this and this is what has caused serious criticisms to be raised against him.

The open-question argument is a connecting point in contemporary Analytical Ethics, in response to which many new views were addressed as positive or negative reactions to this argument. In this article, we strive to study and critique the open-question argument and its semantic suppositions and to show that this argument is an application of paradox of analysis and descriptive theory of meaning on ethical concepts. According to the paradox of analysis, the constituents of things contribute to their concepts and therefore, the real definitions which include the constitutents elements are tautological and lack new information. Going forward, we address the semantic views of Frege, logical positivism, Suhravardi-Locke and Kripke-Putnam in order to resolve the paradox of analysis and show that none of these views can be applied to ethical concepts and cannot be considered as a satisfactory answer to open-argument paradox. Finally, we have explained that another solution can be suggested for the paradox of analysis by taking inspiration from the Kripke-Putnam theory and linguistic inspiration. According to this solution, the primary reference of ethical terms to external instances happens without the mediation of concepts and through common intuitions of the linguistics and the precise concept of these terms is gradually addressed and formed in the process of analysis and by considering primary intuitions

My goal in this paper is to analyze the relationship The Principle of Correlation maintains between reason and religion. I have not discussed any of the arguments put forward by various thinkers. Furthermore, I have refrained from any exegetical discussion of the Principle. I have raised and discussed three principal questions: first, is it the case that “whatever reason dictates religion does so too”? Second, what is to be done if dictates of reason and religion turn out to be different or incompatible? Third, how are we to ascertain that dictates of reason or inferences made by reason are Satanic/impure/vicious? Some of the 1. To find out whether any particular reason is or isn’t Satanic/impure/vicious we have no choice but to evaluate the dictates of reason which in turn leads us into a series of intractable problems. 2. Calling reason virtuous or vicious does not solve the problem of evaluating each and every dictate or inference of reason. This approach is utterly futile and is effectively useless. These difficulties finally lead to The Problem of the Principle of Correlation which cannot be solved unless we somehow give up the independent authority of reason.

One of the views Mulla Sadra holds is that apart from the evolution of the soul, the body also has an intensifying journey ahead and can intensify from material level to the level of essential sufficiency and achieve a state known as spiritualization in which, although it remains in the material level, it becomes so subtle and takes on spiritual characteristics to the extent that it is as suitable as the soul to be present in the Hereafter. Accordingly, in the same way the soul initially only has a real albeit dependent constitution with the body and ultimately is one with it and in fact, becomes corporeal while preserving its spiritual identity; the body too can ultimately become spiritual and become one with the soul while preserving its corporeal identity. This theory (the spiritualization of man’s body in the Hereafter) has been adopted from the mystics’ views regarding the spiritualization of perfect human beings, which has been analyzed in his article and Mulla Sadra’s view has been explained based on that. According to this theory, better and alternative explanations and solutions can be offered for a part of philosophical concepts and theories like material and immaterial, corporeal resurrection, the dependence of the soul on the body and the relation between the two etc.

One of the intellectual foundations of the human sciences is its human dimension. In defining the normative system and the philosophy of value also, philosophical, verbal, and experimental anthropological findings are very determinative. In this article, which deals with part of this research program, the main question is: what is the role and effect of the theoretical and practical faculties of the rational soul, in the formation of the legal system of rights and human duties? The purpose of this article is to provide an answer to this question; on the one hand, it is linked to philosophical-theological studies, and on the other hand to the philosophy of value, and in particular to ethical and legal values. This review will inevitably be done in an analytical and comparative way. Given the widespread scope of this question, its territory is therefore limited to the view points of the three prominent theoreticiants: Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allamah Hilli, and Mulla Sadra. A logical sequencedictates that, after the problem is firstly explained, its conceptual foundations should be explained, and then the reasons and the circumstances for basing each right and duty on the theoretical and practical faculties of the human soul are separately explained. The result of this study proves that without the the abovementioned faculties in the human soul, the legal system does of rights and responsibilities does not have an external referent and is not justifiable.

The semantics of complex demonstratives is one of the most important and controversial topics in philosophy of language which has never been ceased to attract philosophers’ interest and attention. In this article, we will examine the most fundamental problems regarding complex demonstratives including the question of whether complex demonstratives are rigid designators and directly referential or rather, are quantified expressions. We will also examine the question that in a demonstrative like “That F”, does F play any role in a successful designation of the demonstrative. The last question is whether F has any share in the proposition of the content of the sentence in which the complex demonstrative has been used. Our answer to the first question is that complex demonstratives are directly referential and rigid designators. In response to the second question we will defend the idea that having the property F is a necessary condition for the referent if the complex demonstrative is to successfully refer to it, otherwise it won’t refer to anything. Lastly, our answer to the third question is that F has no share in the proposition or the content of the sentence.