نشریه اخلاق پژوهی
پیاپی 4 (پاییز 1398)

Abortion is a controversial issue—various arguments have been presented for or against its moral permissibility. An argument against its moral permissibility is the species essence argument. According to Francis Beckwith, this argument is superior to other arguments since it regards the human species as being essentially valuable. In his view, the human life is valuable in virtue of its species and essence, even if it has no function or motion. Thus, since a fetus belongs to the human species, it is essentially valuable, even if it has no functions or activities. In light of this argument, he sees the human fetus as having the right to live and moral status since the moment of conception, concluding that it is wrong to abort unless the mother’s life is in danger. In this paper, we deploy the descriptive-analytic and critical method, formulating Beckwith’s argument, which is founded on a materialistic view of humans. We then explicate and criticize examples deployed by Beckwith to reinforce his argument. We finally present another version of the species essence argument based on soul-body dualism.

Virtue ethics is a moral theory that is particularly focused on the agent’s character and characteristics. Virtue ethics is contrasted with act-based theories (deontological and teleological theories) . It seems necessary to identify the Quranic perspective on normative moral theories, since the Quran is the most important source of Islamic beliefs and acts. Thus, in this paper, we seek to precisely formulate virtue ethics and its properties, and then look for the Quranic view of such ethics. The view gleaned from the bulk of Quranic evidence is an endorsement of virtue ethics with an orientation to the subject’s virtue (agent-based), but no evidence can be found for virtue-based, subject-based approaches. Quranic ethics is very close to virtue ethics because it assigns a central place to one’s heart and soul as opposed to external acts, and faith as opposed to righteous actions. Moreover, it offers a “role-model” (uswa) as the criterion for morality.

Actions are not ethically equal, and it is particularly important to understand priorities among them in cases such as moral dilemmas. To find such priorities, it is helpful to consult religious statements in which “origins, ” “keys, ” “peaks, ” and “heads” of superior values are introduced. When we examine their instances, however, we face the question of how to reconcile these apparently inconsistent statements. To answer the question, we have deployed the descriptive-analytic method, and after the introduction of their instances in hadiths, we have reconciled these seemingly inconsistent instances by drawing upon explications within these or other hadiths, as well as rational analyses. As to “keys, ” each instance is in some respect significant for reasoning and action; instances of “origins” count as roots of other moral propositions from different perspectives; and as to “peaks” and “heads, ” the inconsistency can be interpreted away by considering different aspects. In general, it turns out that a reconciliation can be made among these apparently inconsistent instances by elaborating different aspects considered by them.

Training is said to have different purposes. Within the philosophical framework of John White—the contemporary philosopher of education—the ultimate goal of training lies in “individual wellbeing which owes to the wellbeing of others. ” White, who has succeeded to accommodate his goal of the training system within national curricula in the UK, believes that in order for trainees to development morality, they need to target two things within their educational system: every child should achieve a flourishing life and should help others to do the same. This approach rejects the traditional view of education according to which only moral training is directed at others and other kinds of training and education are directed at one’s own interests. On this approach, all kinds of training are directed both at oneself and at others. It offers a solution to the philosophical dispute of self and other, and can formulate the basic problem of moral training—that of trainees coming to develop moral characteristics. In this paper, we elaborate the core of White’s theory, and then consider ideas of “egoism” and “altruism” as well as their relations to moral training, particularly in White’s view. We have deployed the descriptive-analytic method and library sources in order to examine propositions and uncover the relation between altruism and moral training. [1] [1] .This research is derived from the PhD dissertation: “The Place of Altruism in Moral Training: A Comparative Study of the Views of John White and Mortaza Motahhari.

Since very long ago people grappled with how to train a progeny that adheres to social and moral norms, can live among other human beings as an effective and adaptable member, and being capable of transcendence, can draw on social interactions for their individual development. The first step towards achieving such a historical goal is to identify factors of moral development as well as mechanisms for the effectiveness of such factors. This paper seeks to overview the findings of moral psychology and to draw upon a documentary method to introduce factors of the moral development of children in families. These factors affect social ethics. The paper deals with nuclear families which consist of parents and children—it does not deal with extended families. I seek to identify factors affecting mutual relations of parents and children. I do not deal with other factors, including those relevant to relations between siblings. The paper is a survey study, and thus, it does have a thesis.

From 1937 to 2018, the Walt Disney Company produced animations about princesses that represented the feminist mentality and discourse of their time. These animations challenged traditional ethics and provided a feminist ethics that fitted dominant theories of the American community of the time. Thus, we see liberal and radical tendencies in 18 such animations. In this paper, we consider and analyze developments of the feminist ethics of Disney princesses in the last 80 years. In order to consider the message and extract the feminist ethics in these animations, we have deployed the method of content analysis. We conclude that ethics of care was the main theme of the female ethics of the Disney cinema in 1990s. In the first decade of the 21st century, this faded and in the second decade of the 21st century, the care aspect turned into the protection of women by women. Similarly, women’s agency increased in the second decade of the 21st century, and in addition to their supportiveness, they undertook the task of guidance as well. The free course of such animations moved from resistance towards the tradition to the presentation of a choice (a course of life) and the flourishing of talents.