پژوهشنامه متین
پیاپی 87 (تابستان 1399)

The sphere of religion is one of the serious discussions among the religious scholars and thinkers since ancient past. The focus of the debates is more on the possibility of its realization with time requirements, because the majority of Muslim scholars have no doubt in Islam’s perfection and comprehensiveness and its inclusion of material and spiritual demands. They have unanimously accepted comprehensiveness of Islam although there are differences of opinions on the definition of comprehensiveness and its scope. Therefore, in this paper, developed through a descriptive-analytical approach and by a documentation method, we have first presented a definition of Islam, hierarchies, types and theories on comprehensiveness. Working with an all-out comprehensive approach, we have presented a framework for its realization and the possibility of meeting intellectual and social demands of contemporary humans based on the views of Imam Khomeini and Javadi Amoli.

Hodud punishment is one of the most complete penal laws in Islam in line with realization of penal justice. There should be a strong and secure sanction for realization of Hodud, otherwise the society, and consequently justice, will be at risk. The need for implementing Hodud punishment is an indisputable fact and a requirement for the post of Vali-ye Faqih or Guardian Islamic Jurist who is in charge of implementing Islam’s penal precepts such as Hodud punishment in line with observing the rights of Allah, the rights of people and preventing violations of government laws. Following an analytical-descriptive approach, this paper intends to provide an appropriate answer to the question of whether Vali-ye Faqih holds the authority to make changes in Hodud punishment in Islamic government. A contemplation on the meaning of Vilayat indicates that the word is synonymous with Imamate in a Muslim society and thus it is not an expression of Divine precepts only. An examination of the rational and narrative reasoning with an emphasis on the narrations underlining the authority of Vali-ye Faqih in Islamic government in the absence of the Imam of the Time, will prove that upon expediency or any reason of important foundation Vali-e Faqih can reduce or moderate Hodud punishment

The objective of this paper is to analyze the pragmatic fundamentals of Messianic thought and Shia-Islamic Messianism (belief in the coming of Imam Mahdi) in Imam Khomeini’s foreign policy discourse.  On this basis, the main question of this paper is: How and on what basis, with what components and procedures has the belief in Messianism been articulated in Imam Khomeini’s foreign policy discourse and how this articulation has exerted its influence on the macrostructure of the I. R. of Iran’s foreign policy? In response, the preliminary hypothesis states that Imam Khomeini’s foreign policy discourse chiefly addresses the pragmatic aspect of the belief in Messianism. On this basis and in the light of the oppressed-the oppressor dichotomy, it articulates three ideological (fundamentals and basic identity resources), strategic (field of hard power, security and national development), and diplomatic (based on realization of national interests) levels for the foreign policy of the I. R. of Iran. In this approach, which maybe called idealistic realism, Shia Messianism or the philosophy of Mahdaviyyat (belief in the coming of Imam Mahdi) is understood in between a historical issue and religious text and a social issue. The theoretical and methodological framework of this paper is based on a combination of semiology of Essex School of discourse and theory of critical discourse analysis of Norman Fairclough

Based on an approach presented by some jurists, any act with religious authorization does not need any guarantee or liability. To reject the need for guarantee, they have created a principle known as “Religious authorization is immune from Liability”. On the contrary, some other jurists have denounced interdependence of authorization and no liability. To prove their claim, they have attested to instances of the juxtaposition of authorization and liability. At the first glance, it seems that Imam Khomeini has both approved interdependence and non-interdependence of authorization and liability in his works. However, a second review reveals that Imam Khomeini by reason has rejected interdependence. In this paper, the theory of non-interdependence between the authorization and liability has been confirmed after a thorough review of the relations between instances of authorization and liability as well as conceptual analysis of the two. Therefore, it has been proven that resorting to the principle of “Religious authorization is immune from Liability” in rejecting the liabilities for the damages incurred through a legitimate act is not legally right; rather, applicability of liability in each case depends upon the investigation of the related ways and means in that case.

Article 1133 of the Civil Code of the I. R. of Iran has given the right of divorce to men. A contemplation into the right of divorce for men is not affirmative of its legal nature, but also it shows strains of court verdict. Therefore, since the hypothesis may result in a change in the family rights, it requires careful review of the authentic sources. To that end, the two concepts of “right” and “verdict” must be first defined to make it clear that, first, what divorce would be like in either of the cases; and secondly, on what bases are the jurists’ theories regarding this debate. Each reason will be then analyzed and finally the principles governing the family will be presented based on the Holy Quran words and Imam Khomeini’s views on the issue to clarify the degree of divergence between the rightful theory and other views. Finally, it is necessary to present the results in the form of proposals to the legislature, apparently with an option to withdraw the above-said law. This paper has used a descriptive-analytical method and contains in its approach jurisprudential depth along with innovation in reasoning.

Much has been written about the nature of and relations between reason and love (compassion). Some believe in lack of any relation between reason and love and define the two as opposites. They say with the emergence of reason in man, there will be no chance for love to appear and also when love governs human heart and mind, there will be no place for reason. The author of these lines is of the opinion that although reason and love are the two instruments for cognition or the two means for human perfection, they are indeed manifestations of a single truth embedded in human nature. This inborn quality distinguishes him from other creatures, assuming different names at the time of emergence and in each stage of man’s existence. It is called “love” when considered from a creature perspective and “reason” when in the light of the zeal of love its creature perspective is overshadowed by something above love. Therefore, the dichotomy between the two is like the contradiction between unity and plurality, i.e. as plurality is manifestation of unity, love is full manifestation of reason. Although Imam Khomeini, like his predecessors, has written much about incapacity of reason for intuition of truth and proximity to the Absolute Being, in another aspect he considers reason as the first manifestation of the Absolute Volition that serves as the basis and starting point for human perfection. According to Imam Khomeini, man needs both the light of reason and the zeal of love to realize ascension from the material being specific to creatures to the non-material aspect as a perfect human.

According to forensic medicine departments and judiciary organs, in the majority of murder cases, the death of the wounded victim does not happen immediately after injury; rather, the time lapse between the time of injury and death causes deterioration of the wound and ends in the death of the victim. The important factor that makes the preliminary wound difficult or impossible to heal is lack of medical care of the first wound. This abandoning of medical treatment may be committed by the patient himself, the perpetrator or the third party. In tandem with the majority of jurists, Imam Khomeini attributes the absolute liability of the resulting death to the first perpetrator, considering the murder on occasion first-degree intentional homicide or reckless homicide. This paper, developed through a descriptive-analytical method, investigates abandoning treatment by the patient, perpetrator and physician to study the liability of these people in cases the injury results in the death of the patient. Apparently the injury by first perpetrator on the victim cannot be considered the one and only cause of death without paying attention to the other factors involved in the death of the patient, in particular, lack of treatment to prevent injury death. Consequently, the criminal liability of the patient’s death cannot be fully imposed on the perpetrator.