نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 11 (بهار و تابستان 1400)

The difference between realism and anti-realism occurs in the world of being and its relation to the human mind. Nelson Goodman does not consider this difference to be a real and genuine difference, and in the meantime he has chosen a third view and calls it "Irrealism". Goodman's view of unrealism is fully reflected in his theory of "globalization." According to this theory, there is no world independent of the mind, but man creates descriptions and versions with his own mind and language, and these versions each create their own world. This article first examines Goodman's general views on the subject of realism -anti-realism and the motives and roots of his unrealism. In elucidating Goodman's view, we have shown that he is influenced by the principles of pragmatism and that his position does not fit into the realism - anti-realism dichotomy. Then, by explaining the theory of globalization and the criticisms made against it, we have tried to respond to these criticisms as far as possible. Although Goodman does not acknowledge the existence of reality per se, he does not deny it, but ignores it. We have also examined the criticisms and shown that many of their answers are implicit in Goodman's statements. The most important critique is against the criterion for distinguishing the right versions from the wrong ones. In Goodman's view, the criterion for the rightfulness of a version is the "proportionality in practice", and contrary to critics' viewpoint, this criterion is, in fact, an objective and valid criterion.

Wāḥid) and kathīr are two important and basic concepts in theological thinking that elucidating the relationship between them has always been one of the main concerns of the thinkers in this field and any thinker, based on his own system of thought, has set its explanation and elucidation as his own concern. As a theological thinker influenced by Plato's system of thought, Plotinus proposes the concept of wāḥid as one of the supernatural, indescribable, incomprehensible, simple, and pure unity, which has necessarily created creation by its superior's perfection and transcendence through emanation (fayaḍān). He has attempted in such a way as to justify the relation of wāḥid to kathīrs, while maintaining the independence of the wāḥid. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, who not only by relying on the transcendent system of thought but also through the deep insight that he has achieved as a result of years of association with the Qur'an, considers the Unity of God as the true Unity by proposing the concept of wāḥid as the main concept in the monotheistic system. Of course, by bringing up the concept of manifestation and epiphany, he has also explained the relation of aḥad (unique) with kathīrs. The authors of the present article try to compare the solution of the problem of wāḥid and kathīr relation with respect to aḥad and the attributes of aḥad according to ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Plotinus, while examining the characteristics of aḥad and the reasons for proving it in the intellectual system of these two thinkers.

The discourse on determinism and free will is one of the important philosophical issues and dilemmas about which philosophers of the East and the West have pondered a lot throughout history. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, as an Islamic thinker, both in his philosophical works and in the interpretation of Al-Mīzān, has studied different dimensions of determinism and free will. Leibniz, as one of the great thinkers of the pre-Kant era, has done a great deal of research on determinism and free will. The main question of the present research is whether the belief in the principle of pre-established harmony is not a kind of negating free will and sovereignty of necessity? How is the eternal Divine will compatible with human free will? Leibniz sought to establish human free will by distinguishing between absolute necessity and conditional necessity and the theory of possible worlds. ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī also considers free will to be an innate entity and maintains that the principle of prior necessity, “a thing comes into being only after it is necessitated”, does not contradict human free will. In this research, after explaining the principles of Leibniz and ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī, we would examine, analyze and compare the viewpoints of these two thinkers.

Research on Mahdism as a field of research has its own topic, principles, goals and issues. The issues of research on Mahdism are the same categories that discuss the inherent accidents of the subject (Mahdism) such as awaiting, occultation, reappearance, and so on. Due to its enjoyment of widespread themes and multiplicity and variety of topics, research on Mahdism, as a field of studies, needs different methods for proving and justifying the related issues. Issues of Mahdism studies, based on the type of attitude used to explain and interpret them, are justified with the use of different methods. The issues based on ontological attitudes are justified by rational methods; textual-narrative method is used to prove issues based on theological attitude; the justification of issues based on historical attitude requires a narrative-historical method; and the issues based on intuitive attitude are also proved by using the natural method. In general, the field of research on Mahdism is organized by various methods due to the variety and multiplicity of issues and their multi-ethnicity, one of which, as we have said, is the natural method. The naturalness (fiṭrīyyat) of Mahdism is justified by two human and religious approaches; the human approach arises from the mankind’s inner and heartfelt tendencies and desires and the religious approach includes the very reports that are inferred from verses and hadiths.

Social cohesion in pre-Islamic Arabian society was focused on the tribe, the system, and the person of the tribal leader. With the rise of Islam in Mecca, the tribalism discourse faced a powerful rival called the religious theocracy discourse and was marginalized for some time. In this land, the factors of divergence at the community level had reached their maximum. The Prophet of Islam could not put the Revelatory system in full confrontation with the tribal system which had been rooted in the inner depths of the Arabs for years. The activities of the Prophet (SAW) were aimed at eliminating divergence and turning it into Islamic convergence. With a descriptive-analytical approach, this article raises the question of what were the interactions of belief, tribe, and enemy as a collective spirit in the social cohesion of the Prophet’s era. The results obtained from the research show that belief in the first stage, and tribe as the Islamic community (umma) in the second stage, and enemy in the third stage are among the factors of social cohesion in the Prophet’s time.

Self-knowledge is among the most important teachings whose essential role is emphasized by the revelatory and rational doctrines. Human feelings, speech, behavior, and attitudes are based on causes, one of the most important and neglected factors of which is the "supposition" whose realm of influence encompasses all aspects of human life. Since the management of a supposition is peripheral to its cognition, this paper examines the "nature and function" of the supposition in human thoughts and actions through the method of propositional and systematic analysis. The problem of research is directly rooted in the two disciplines of philosophy and psychology, and the researcher tries to explain the quiddity of supposition and its role in Islamic philosophy and religious texts with a philosophical and ontological approach. Supposition is a powerful mental form with an unconscious effect that can gradually become outstanding and replace the real subject, and due to changing attitudes, determine the general framework of thoughts and interactions on that subject and influence the person's decision-making through the logic of preference. The nature and function of supposition among Muslim scholars - and in a sublime way in Mullā Ṣadrā's view - is explained in more detail under the heading of "imagination". In the heavenly teachings of Islam, the role of supposition, interpreted as "suspicion" (ẓann), has been emphasized and attention has been paid to its correction. The present research is intended to correctly understand supposition in the light of revelatory and rational teachings in order to provide the necessary grounds for controlling and correcting supposition in different aspects of life and by reducing the consequences of not paying attention to this hidden dimension, an important step is taken toward self-knowledge and attainment of a goodly pure life.

According to the principle of alternative possibilities, the agent has a moral responsibility for what he did only if he could have acted or decided otherwise. Contrary to this view, Frankfurt emphasizes that sometimes we encounter situations in which, although the person is not compelled to take action, it is impossible for him to avoid doing so, and yet we hold the agent morally responsible. The dilemma defense has been the philosophers' most important response to the Frankfurt model and the rejection of the principle of alternative possibilities in it and according to it, whether causal determinism is ruling among the phenomena or not, the Frankfurt’s claim does not come true and we cannot face an agent that is morally responsible for an action, while having no alternative at hand, because in the case of the lack of causal determinism, there is no necessary and predictable relationship between the previous evidence and movements of the agent and his subsequent choice and behavior. In fact, he still has before him the alternative possibility of avoiding a certain action, and in the case of necessity and causal determinism, the person's moral responsibility is not ruled out and does not become meaningless. Interfering brain process and contained obstruction are among Frankfurt's responses to this approach, which, of course, do not have the necessary efficiency in defending Frankfurt.

Unconditional wilāya is one of the ranks and aspects of Prophethood and Imamate that enjoys wide dimensions. Making unconditional alterations in the human souls to turn them purified and to change their inner aspects is one of the dimensions of this type of wilāya. Accordingly, the saints, with the knowledge and power given to them by God Almighty, are able to change the souls of the talented human beings with the knowledge of their unconscious. The unconditional role of the saints in the inner transformation and purification of the souls is both a general and a specific efficient role. In the general efficient role, the saints are the cause and mediator of the Divine grace reaching all creatures, including human beings, which is specific to the fourteen Infallibles. The specific efficient role, which is manifested in the unconditional alterations of the saints, is divided into two types, maximum and minimum. The maximum role of guidance is interpreted as the delivery to the desired (īṣāl ilā al-maṭlūb). The meaning of the specific minimum is where one has not yet attained this ability; here, sometimes, the saint, by making alterations in the universe, paves the way for the purification of the soul for him so that he can fare the way with his inherent essence, that is, free will, and find the ability to have a special guidance. The present article, with a descriptive-analytical look, explains the different aspects of the concept of the unconditional wilāya and explains why the Imam's unconditional wilāya has an effect on the purification of the souls.

The principle of al-wāḥid is one of the principles that has long been of interest to philosophers so that some references to the contents of this principle can be found in the works of Plotinus, but Ibn Sina seems to be the first person to have tried to logically prove the principle of al-wāḥid. Although his theories seem to differ in his various works to justify the issuance of plurality from unity, he can generally be considered as one of the defenders of this principle with the contents intended by philosophers. The authors of the present article intend to refer to Avicenna’s works, and while extracting the differences in his statement about the issuance of plural from one, to critique the arguments he has presented in support of the principle of al-wāḥid. Although some criticisms have been written about Avicenna’s opinions (on this subject) and some people have sought to answer, we have, in this article, by analyzing Avicenna’s own words, reached some instances, most of which are not brought up by the critics and are therefore considered as a new analysis. For example, it can be said that, firstly, proving the principle of al-wāḥid logically causes a vicious circle, and secondly, other principles accepted by Avicenna show that the issuance of plural from the simple one is possible and will not lead to insertion (tarakkub) in essence.