نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 12 (پاییز و زمستان 1400)

One of the topics that has attracted the attention of philosophers and theologians is the “relation between the issue of hiddenness and the issue of evil.” The question is, “What is the relation between the issue of hiddenness and the issue of evil in terms of function and structure?” In other words, “Is the issue of hiddenness the same as the issue of evil?” In general, there are two main viewpoints on this issue: one reduces the issue of hiddenness to the issue of evil and considers it as a narrative or evidence of the issue of evil. The second viewpoint emphasizes the conceptual independence of the issue of hiddenness and evaluates it, at least conceptually, as distinct. John Schellenberg advocates the second view. In 1993 he formulated the argument of divine hiddenness as an atheistic argument, which is one of the most controversial issues in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In this paper, an attempt has been made to somehow show the strengths and weaknesses of each point of view by outlining and examining the possible relations between these two issues. Although Schellenberg’s arguments for proving the independence of the issue of hiddenness are somewhat significant, they are still insufficient and need further investigation.

The relationship between the soul and the body is one of the issues that received much attention with the beginning of philosophical thinking. The influence of Cartesian subjectivism on various fields, including ethics and culture, has made solving the problem of dualism a concern. In this article, by comparative and descriptive-analytical method, it is specified that Ṣadrā and Heidegger, in a similar approach, consider human a being, a subject that, in their opinion, has been neglected. Although the two philosophers use different terms, they are of the opinion that the distinction between the soul and the body is a rational and abstract matter, and that human beings have their own existential characteristics. Ṣadrā believes that the soul is ensued from the body and is aligned with it; and although it has its own characteristics as an abstract thing, this does not mean that there are two independent beings and that there is no more than one being ontologically. Therefore, the multiplicity of this being as the soul and body is by the credit of reason, and these aspects are not existential matters. Heidegger also believes that man is unique in his lived experience. In his view, any other conception of lived experience is a subset of it and the product of intellectual abstraction, rather than an existential matter. In his view, the Cartesian distinction causes the subjectivist aspect of man to prevail in philosophy, and under this rubric, the specific existence of man as Dasein is forgotten.

The doctrine of innovative creation is rooted in the Holy Qur’an and the noble Hadith and has received the attention of Muslim philosophers. Innovative creation is the supreme form of influence and action, and means the creation of something without matter and the former form, a creation that rests solely on the Creator and His care. Analysis of scriptural and rational arguments leads to the conclusion that such a verb is especially obligatory, and it is impossible to issue such a verb. Two groups of verses from the Qur’an and the hadiths of the Imams explicitly indicate this assignment and refusal. There are also five rational arguments for the transformation of innovation from possible, which are: the completeness of the creator (superiority of the creator), the necessity of the creative act (characteristic of creation), the poverty of possibilities (the need for phenomena), and the necessity of existence (status and quiddity), and the induction of the contingent beings’ actions. Analysis of Qur’anic and hadith arguments, and examination of rational arguments, especially using the sayings of Muslim philosophers, lead to the conclusion that it is impossible to issue an innovative act out of the possible existence. The effects of this result can be proposed and pursued in the philosophical teaching of the first intellect and the notion of delegation in creation.

The problem of evil in its various forms is one of the most important philosophical and theological challenges of contemporary man, in response to which the theory of exchange of Muslim theologians is one of the relatively effective solutions within the tradition of religious theism. This theory, by invoking reason and revelation and assuming a God with absolute attributes and the necessity of the existence of the Hereafter, introduces principles that are efficient in answering some aspects of the problem of evil. From among these principles the following can be mentioned: God’s innate provision pertaining to the creation of evil; the purpose of the evil being accidental for God; the expansion of human life range and the consequences of his actions to the Afterlife; emphasis on the limitation of the world to fully actualize the result of good and bad actions; the detailed account of dealing with the deeds of the servants in the Hereafter; the necessity of proceeding of fixed divine traditions in the world to test human beings; the importance of the difference between human and eternal perspectives; the reward of the innocent by God on the Day of Resurrection. The new formulation of such a theory could reveal more of its capabilities. The purpose of this study is to show the importance of the new formulation of theories documented in religious texts, such as the consideration theory in the face of some of the current challenges of evil versus the tradition of theism. In this article, by analyzing the content of religious texts such as the Qur’an, an attempt is made to show the efficacy of the consideration theory in answering some aspects of the problem of evil

English One of the most important issues in the field of psychiatry is the issue of the evolution of the essence of the soul and its belonging to the body is an element in terms of occurrence and completeness, according to which the soul and the body have two-way communication. The mediator of this belonging is the soul of the heater, through which the caliph and the obedient are the first of the soul, and through which the influence and influence of the soul and the body take place. One of the most important of these works is the question of the life and permanence of the existence of the body, which is exposed to the body from the existential table of the heater spirit. The body is an element of nature's intoxication and is fluid and fluid in essence, and every fluid body is inherently dead and perishable, so since the soul of the heater is a mediator in the soul's attachment to the body, the survival of the body will depend on its stability. However, can the survival of an element's body be ensured by maintaining stability in the heater's soul? The present article is an analytical-descriptive study that answers this question from the perspective of Islamic wisdom and proves that in case of moderation and stability of the heater soul, what is inherently dead and perishable, thanks to this intermediate existence, will live and survive

Muslim philosophers, while reasoning and thinking on rational principles and foundations, have added to the scope of philosophical issues with the help of revelation and religion. One of the topics that has been considered and rationally explained by Muslim scholars is the issues related to "prophecy", especially the prophethood of the Prophet of Islam, one of the branches of which is the creation of light and the priority of his creation over all creatures. Mir Damad is the first wise sage who tried to explain and interpret these narrations rationally. In this research, an attempt has been made to present the interpretation and narration of Mir Damad from the narrations of Noor Khalqat, especially the narration of "We are the first of God's creation" by the method of collecting information libraries and describing and analyzing them, and then to review and review it. The result of this study is that Sayyid's interpretation of the narrations that imply the meaning of the precedence of the Prophet's creation over creatures is the sufficiency, contradiction and equality of the status of the Prophet of Islam in the oud dynasty with the first issue in the beginning dynasty. It is a conflict, but it is not compatible with Mir Damad's philosophical principles.

Among the important issues in moral discourses and philosophy of ethics is the factor of moral motivation and the actualization of moral action. This paper seeks to examine the role of intellect in moral motivation from the perspective of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī. In this regard, first, the role of intellect in voluntary actions are examined and the factors for the actualization of a voluntary act are specified from the perspective of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and then, the components affecting the correct validation of practical intellect that lead to the realization of a moral act are examined. The findings of this study show that according to ‘Allāma, real perceptions that are perceived by theoretical intellect are the cause of incomplete motivation in moral action and the conceptual perceptions that are validated by practical intellect, are the cause of the actualization of action, as ‘Allāma in the definition of practical intellect considers it as the source of voluntary actions. Of course, the validation of practical intellect is influenced by the components that will be addressed in this study.

Marriage is a lasting and dynamic institution that has played a significant and undeniable role in the development and evolution of human societies. History reveals a wide variety of patterns of marriage in different eras. Historical debates and developments in marriage pave the way for differences in the approaches of moral philosophers to the issue of marriage. In modern times, some philosophers have presented various arguments against the morality of marriage. Dan Moller considers marriage as conditional on love and believes that couples who promise to love each other promise something beyond human will. After explaining the different ways in which a marriage contract is made, he argues that none of the marriage contracts are permanent and that most of them fail and end in divorce, and that marriage is therefore immoral and wrong. In this paper, Moller’ argument is critically reviewed by rational analysis. There are several drawbacks to Moller’s argument, including; voluntary nature of the expression of emotions, ignoring the value of happy days of married people, the non-necessity of love for marriage in different periods and the nativity of the argument. This article also provides a definition of love based on moral virtues. Accordingly, love is in fact love of excellences and virtues, and it disappears when the loved one loses his excellences and virtues. As a result, the continuation of love depends on the couples strengthening their virtues and perfections. So marriage is conditioned on the growth of moral virtues and mutual respect of couples.