نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال پنجاه و دوم شماره 1 (پیاپی 104، بهار و تابستان 1399)

Hermeneutics is the battleground of new theories in the field of understanding and interpretation. The study of the principles of hermeneutic theories is important because it provides a suitable ground for critique and analysis. Understanding and interpretation as the central point of hermeneutic discussions is founded on the four pillars of author, text, interpreter and context. The distinction of hermeneutic approaches depends on the role of each of the four pillars in the process of understanding and interpretation. In this article, the foundations of the hermeneutical views of the contemporary Islamic thinker, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and the contemporary Western hermeneuticist, Hans-Georg Gadamer, are scrutinized and analyzed. A comparative study of the four pillars of understanding and interpretation shows that the difference between Shabestari and Gadamer’s views in the first pillar, i.e., the role of the author, is definite and absolute; the principles of their views in the other three pillars, however, have both commonalities and differences. The most important commonalities are pluralism in text interpretation, the fact that understanding is affected by history, the necessity of interrogating the text, the hermeneutic cycle and the effect of presuppositions in the process of understanding and interpretation, and their main differences are over the effect of the role of the author’s intention or its elimination in the process of understanding and the methodicalness or unmethodicalness of the process of understanding.

Mulla Rajab Ali Tabriz is one of the thinkers of the Safavid era and contemporary of Mullā Ṣadrā. On several occasions, he has opposed the principles and foundations of Ṣadrā’s Transcendent philosophy. One of his oppositions is the issue of existence univocality. Tabrizi has strongly opposed the univocality of existence and has tried to prove its homonymity with various arguments. As for the Divine Attributes, he has also denied the attributes by referring to traditions (hadiths). In the present article, by examining these two issues, the weakness of Tabrizi arguments is made known. The drawbacks of Tabrizi’s view are as follows: interpreting narrations without considering the atmosphere and context of the time they were issued, ignoring the connected and separate indications in understanding their true meaning, disregarding narrations that have offered a completely affirmative interpretation of Divine Attributes, the fact that some traditions are irrelevant to this debate but are related to conditionality of the Divine Names and Attributes.

Nicholas Rescher is one of the pioneers among Western scholars who has studied and written about the logic in the Islamic period. He distinguishes four main pivots for describing the situation of logic in the Islamic period: 1. Choosing the title of Arabic logic for naming the logic of the Islamic period; 2. Creating an East-West dichotomy to separate the post-Avicenna logicians; 3. Loss of the logic studies after the tenth century; 4. Listing the names of logicians and their works. In this paper, the model of Rescher’s research in the study of the logic in the Islamic period is examined. The most important criticisms of his narrative of this period are as follows: 1. Rescher’s reasons for preferring the title of Arabic logic to the logic of the Islamic period are not justified; 2. Unlike Rescher, by Western logicians, Ibn Sīnā did not mean the thinkers of Baghdad school and their followers, rather, the Greek philosophers and those who were mere followers of them. The basis for Rescher’s East-West dichotomy of post- Avicenna logicians is also the consistency between the philosophical and logical ideas of these individuals, which has led to the misclassification of some Eastern logicians in the Western category and vice versa; 3. Due to his lack of access to original sources and manuscripts, as well as his ignorance of the studies of logic in non-logical works such as philosophy and principles of Islamic jurisprudence, Rescher mistakenly thought that the study of logic had been forgotten after the tenth century; 4. Rescher’s account of the names and number of works of logicians also suffer from some shortcomings.

The study of Islam, especially from the mystical point of view, reflects the fact that history, like the phenomena of the world, is purposefully evolving towards a monotheistic world community, coming back to Divinity. Its path is disposed to ups and downs in terms of its creaturely aspect (human free will) and is constantly perfecting in terms of its Divine aspect. With a descriptive-analytical method, this research studies the quality of this change from Ibn ʿArabī’s point of view. In his view, the manifestation of the Divine Essence is from behind the veil of Names, creation is formed by the system of Names, and society is subject to this system either. Due to the difference between Names in generality and particularity, their manifestations become different. Society, in its evolution, is moving towards the most general Names, and its main driving force in terms of its Divine aspect is the prophets. According to Ibn ʿArabī, it is the prophets and their trustees who can establish the Ideal City. The most important periods of history are formed by Arch-Prophets, and each prophet, due to his specific rank, promotes the society to the manifestation of his Name. The Seal of the Prophets is the manifestation of the all-comprehensive Name of Allah. By the sealing of the prophethood, the period of guardianship (manifestation of the inner secrets of religion) begins and gradually moves towards the sealing of the guardianship and the ideal society.

One of the criticisms of the intellectual traditions opposing Islamic philosophy is that all the different schools of Islamic philosophy are influenced by elements of Greek philosophy. Referring to common principles and foundations between Islamic and Greek philosophy, the followers of maktab-e tafkīk (school of separating religious and 'foreign' or secular sciences) claim that Islamic philosophy is against and in contrast to the pure teachings of Ahl al-Bayt (P.B.U.T.). According to them, Islamic philosophy is an expansion of Greek intellectual principles that have no divine origin and its purpose is to compete with the pure ideas of Ahl al-Bayt (P.B.U.T.). The most important basis of maktab-e tafkīk in opposition to Islamic philosophy is the existence of these common foundations between Islamic and Greek philosophy. The question now is whether maktab-e tafkīk itself has something in common with Greek philosophy, and if such similarities exist, can this be regarded as evidence of non-originality and secularity of this theological approach? By scrutinizing the works of Plotinus and the writings of the followers of maktab-e tafkīk, this paper examines the commonalities of these two intellectual approaches in the two realms of theology and psychology. According to the achievements of this research, many of the principles and foundations of maktab-e tafkīk have been clearly stated in the words of Plotinus, as if the word of Plotinus had appeared in another language in the written works of maktab-e tafkīk. According to the authors, the existence of these commonalities is not a proof of the non-originality and secularity of this school; rather, finding sources of one’s thought in the words of the ancients or in other cultures shows the wide scope of that thought and indicates that the course of human thought can be of a continuous, trans-temporal and trans-spatial course.

In this article, the ontology of knowledge is discussed in a Sadrian approach. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, knowledge is not of any essential kind and does not belong to the category of relation or psychic quality and does not fall under any category, rather, it is an existential and trans-categorial truth. The commentators of Transcendent philosophy have different views in explaining the trans-categorial truth of knowledge. According to some later commentators, the existentiality of knowledge means that it is of the type of external existence, not mental, and its abode is in the soul; from this point of view, cognitive forms and mental beings are not knowledge, but the shadowy existence of knowledge. Another group does not consider the difference between knowledge and the mental form to be actual, but deems it as a mental consideration and maintains that the mental form is knowledge in terms of existence, and is the true known object in terms of essence. Others consider knowledge as an illuminative relation and therefore think of it as an existential thing capable to create a side of relation, and consider cognitive and mental forms as the results of the soul illumination. Examining these explanations and their strengths and weaknesses, one can say that if we rely on the real distinction and existential multiplicity between knowledge and the cognitive form to explain the trans-categorial truth of knowledge, we will encounter problems and ambiguities. To solve these problems, this should be explained in a different way. Given that the illuminative relation is an existential thing, this explanation for the trans-categorial and existential truth of knowledge is more comprehensive so that we consider knowledge or cognitive form to be the result of the soul illumination

In this study, the differences and similarities between Rumi and Schopenhauer’s views on will have been investigated with a descriptive-interpretive method. Schopenhauer is a philosopher who explicitly accepted fundamentality of will and recognized it as the fundamental human force and the basis of his efforts and activities, including thinking. In his philosophical system, he has used terms such as “the world as representation of will” and “the will to power”, which are considered to be the indicators of his philosophical system. Rumi also defended the human will by stating religious, intellectual, sensory and intuitive evidence and introduced him as a free-willed being. He even deems the endeavor to thank God for His blessings as will. According to him, the lover voluntarily and freely annihilates his will in the will of the beloved. Examining these two accounts of the will can reveal their commonalities and differences, which removes the ambiguities related to this issue and provides the ground for the audience to become more familiar with it

Intercession is one of the firmly established beliefs in Islam and its existence is unquestionable. In the process of intercession, in order to dispose of the punishment or increase the reward, the interceded connects his power with the power of the intercessor and this leads to the evolution and promotion of his existence. Therefore, the capable souls are saved from darkness by seeking help from those who approach to God as much as possible and thus join the infinite mercy of Him. Since the human soul needs potency and readiness to receive a new status and reach perfection, whenever this readiness arises, the opportunity is provided for the inner enlightenment and progress by removing obstacles and veils, and there occurs intercession. As a result, intercession is one of the ways through which the soul can progress and develop after death. Now, the question arises whether there is potentiality and matter in the world of barzakh(isthmus), especially in the Hereafter? Transcendent philosophers have tried to answer this question. In the present article, after a descriptive-analytical review, each of these answers will be evaluated, and the more plausible one will be explained

With his phenomenological method taken from the teachings of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Hubert Dreyfus critiques the two paradigms of artificial intelligence, namely symbolism and connectionism. He then approves a trend from the third paradigm of AI, namely artificial life, with special conditions. This trend is known as "Heideggerian AI". After a brief review of Dreyfus’s critiques of the first two paradigms of artificial intelligence, this article examines his final opinion on the possibility of accepting Heideggerian AI. According to the author, the possibility of Heideggerian artificial intelligence based on Dreyfus' theories can be demonstrated in at least three ways. These three approaches are presented as follows: The first approach is presented using the Daniel Susser’s approach and is based on interactionism. The second solution is expressed by citing John Searle and distinguishing between strong and weak artificial intelligence; the third explanation demonstrates how this is possible based on the doctrine of co-instantiation, inter-consciousness, intelligence, and intelligent behavior.

Religious intellectualism in the last two centuries has criticized and refined the Islamic heritage. The wide range of its members and their critiques of the Islamic tradition is one of the most important issues in the study of contemporary Islamic thought. The Qur’anists, as a group of Muslims who claim to have emphasized the centrality of the Qur'an more than other Islamic groups, has attracted the attention of religious scholars. Since Qur'anists claim to fight against superstition, they have invalidated and rejected many Shia beliefs because they think that they are conflict with the Qur'an. The most important issue that has been criticized in this course is the Imamate of the Ahl al-Bayt. By relying on several verses of the Qur'an, the Qur'anists have tried to challenge the theory of the Shiite Imamate and introduce it as a belief contrary to the Qur'an. By evaluating the Qur'anists’ refutations of the notion of clear appointment of Imams, it becomes clear that none of these arguments can deny this notion and their evidence do not contradict the clear appointment of Imams.

The issue of istiṭā‘a, meaning  man’s ability to commit an act, has been raised to examine the relationship between man’s will and the Absolute Will of God. This issue has been raised among Muslims for a long time. The Imamites and their theologians have not been excluded from these issues either. In this regard, a range of theories of “free will”, “determinism” and “intermediate position” has been proposed both among all Muslims and in Imamite circles in a way that this issue can be considered a key to distinguishing the internal boundaries in Imamite theology. In this article, by reviewing the beliefs attributed to the companions of Imam Sādigh (P.B.U.H.) in the writings of theologians and historian of sects and comparing them with the narrations narrated by the Imamites themselves, we seek to identify the formulations that have been proposed by Imamite theologians in this regard. In this way, it can be understood that the “absolute freedom of will”, “the intermediate position” (amrun bayn al-‘amrayn), and a few approaches near to “determinism” have been supported among the Imamites.

Mullā Ṣadrā introduces philosophy as a knowledge for the perfection of all human souls and does not limit to a certain group; the complexity of philosophical issues and the difficulty of understanding them due to their abstract nature, however, is not hidden. Nevertheless, according to Mullā Ṣadrā, the power of imagination and speech are two divine gifts that make it possible for different audiences to understand and convey such complex issues. The power of imagination, by analyzing and combining forms and meanings, is constantly creating new forms and meanings, and language, with a wide range of mental creativity, through continuous changes in form and content, is a tool at the service of the speaker’s mind to convey meanings to the audience. Story is a format which is distinguished from other texts by the two elements of imagination and speech. In this article, the elements of story are explained from the perspective of Ṣadrā’s philosophy in a descriptive-analytical way, and its narrative capacities are examined. The existence of allegories in Ṣadrā’s philosophy and its presentation in the form of four journeys makes it possible to have a narrative reading of it using the old narrative archetype of “hero’s journey”.