نشریه پژوهش های عقلی نوین
پیاپی 13 (بهار و تابستان 1401)

Scientific methods are tools for solving the problems of any science. In the new and contemporary era, the independent discussion of some of these popular methods gradually fueled the formulation of science methodology. Although the issue of the method of philosophy was also discussed in the past, today this discussion is followed in an emerging field called meta-philosophy. This article seeks to take an initial step in order to identify the coordinates of Avicenna’s philosophical method. Avicenna does not have an independent and exhaustive discussion of the method of philosophy, and therefore, to identify his philosophical method, one should use his implicit meta-philosophy and by reviewing his works, identify the methods that he actually used. In this article, after an introductory discussion on the method of science and philosophical methodology, I review Avicenna’s discussions on the method of philosophy. In the next step, with a look at the more or less common methods in analytical philosophy, four methods of comparative reasoning, conceptual analysis, logical analysis, and mental test will be selected as models and frameworks for discussion and some examples will be presented for the application of these methods in Avicenna’s philosophy. Recognizing Avicenna’s philosophical method in this framework shows that his philosophy is very similar to contemporary analytical philosophy in terms of method.

What is the methodology of discovering the explanatory hypothesis? In the contemporary era, and in the West, above all, Peirce, Harman, and Lipton have been involved in this question. Their efforts have led to the concept of inference to the best explanation, which is a type of non-comparative reasoning consisting of two stages: (1) generation of explanatory hypotheses, (2) selection of the best explanation. Therefore, the initial question will be reduced to the question of what is the methodology of each of these two stages. In the traditional era, and in the Islamic world, among theologians and jurists, two inference methods have been popular by the names (a) thrust and inversion (ṭard va aks), or rotation (davarān); (b) division and fathoming (sabr), or hesitation, which can be interpreted as anticipations of the inference to the best explanation and, in particular, applied as a methodology of step (1). This perusal will not only make rotation and hesitation defensible against the critiques of Muslim philosophers and logicians, but also, on the one hand, it will give a contemporary aspect to the methodology of the two designers, and on the other hand, it will bestow an ancient background in a completely different culture to the inference to the best explanation. These findings can be important for the history of logic, the history of speech, and even the history of the philosophy of science.

Islamic studies, as one of the branches of religious studies, has always been exposed to the changes that have occurred in this field. The historicism method, as the most important development in the religious studies of the 18th and 19th centuries, was no exception to this rule and had a significant impact on Islamic studies. This method of study claimed that if its principles are followed, it can provide a more accurate and scientific understanding of religion and put an end to the prejudices and biases of the past periods of religious studies. In this article, an attempt has been made to first study historicism and its basic principles, and then to examine the results of its application in Islamic studies, in the works of Orientalists such as Abraham Geiger, Goldziher, and Patricia Krone, so that the claim made about this method can be verified in a case study of Islamic studies. The main subject of this article is scientific Islamic studies and its problem is to examine the relationship between modern religious studies and Islamic studies. The main question here is, “Has the new religious studies, which is formed on the basis of objectivity and historical perspective, helped to improve Islamic studies, especially in the last two centuries?” This article has examined the answer to this question from the three standpoints of some thinkers’ perspective, the religious tradition, and the general perspective of Islamic societies, and has altogether come to the conclusion that the historical method, although it was formed with the aim of solving the problems of religious studies in previous periods, but it failed to achieve its goals and despite the subtleties and precisions it used in studying the various components of religion, in practice, it did not contribute to a better understanding of Islam. Therefore, it could not contribute significantly to the better understanding of Muslims.

This article mentions a critical approach in methodological studies entitled “establishing a principle” (ta’sīs-i aṣl) and seeks to explain this practical method. The method of “establishing a principle” has been explained in an objective format with the participation of researchers in the field of humanities, and therefore, the researchers have reached specific results in four stages and by setting up a case study, the applicability of the structure and content of the method has been shown. Therefore, the current research has the qualification for a workshop and can be used in various other scales as well. Based on the consideration of the three relationships of ontology, epistemology, and methodology, the present research has placed its emphasis on the importance and creditable position of methodology in social and human sciences, therefore, the basis for explaining “establishing a principle” is the existence of necessity in response to the “quality” of criticism and toward realizing an atmosphere of “scientific critique” in the realm of humanities. Before describing and presenting this applied method in the field of critical studies, the epistemological roots and foundations, and the emergence of scientific criticism are stated so as to draw attention to the background of its rational support. Similarly, in the main part of the research and while paying attention to the “establishing a principle” method, the movement toward critical thinking has been dealt with as a fundamental introduction for entering critical research.

The use of the philosophical method and its effectiveness in theology has always been the subject of debate among Muslim and Christian theologians. Thomas Aquinas and Khājah Ṭūsī are contemporary theologians who, influenced by Avicenna’s philosophy, have found a similar doctrine and method by using proof in the explanation and theological defenses of religion, which can be called rational-narrative theology. This comparative research refers to their didactic methodology. Thomas Aquinas, believing in two knowledge systems based on revelation and reason, proposed two types of theology called revealed theology and natural theology. In his Summa Theologica, unlike the books of his predecessors, which only had a monastic and intra-textual aspect, in addition to referring to the Holy Texts and the works of the Church Fathers, he devoted himself to philosophical analysis in theological topics. Khājah Ṭūsī also discussed the integration of intellectual and narrative methods in his book Tajrīd al-I‘tiqād. This essay, while referring to the theological method of these two thinkers, with a descriptive-analytical view, shows the similarities and differences in the method of Thomas and Khājah. Adopting a moderate method is one of their common features. Aquinas is somewhere in between the Tertullian’s negligent opinion and that of the extremist Latin advocates of Averroes; and Khājah, by passing beyond such textualists as Shaykh Ṣadūq, is far away from the extreme harms of some Mu’tazila and exaggerated impressions of the like of Shaykhiyya sect. The result of the moderate method of both is the maximum use of rational arguments and passing through “sufficing texts” to “favoring texts”. The method of theology knowledge is basically not exclusive; but the author, through this comparison and paying attention to the criteria of method similarities, believes that the moderate method of the two of them is more efficient, useful and responsive than the textualist methods.

By referring to Mullā Ṣadrā’s works, it can be seen that in his view, wisdom emanates from the Divine source, world of immateriality, and the world of angels. Receiving wisdom is subject to the fulfillment of some conditions in the emotional, action and cognitive dimensions of man. Emotional conditions such as character description, health of nature and good character and epistemic conditions such as sharpness of mind, speed of understanding and soundness of thought and action conditions also include things such as complete compliance with Shari’a, asceticism and piety. Achieving wisdom has special impacts on the field of knowledge and behavior of humans. In the field of knowledge, it causes a person to reach certainty and get out of doubts and... In the field of behavior, achieving moderation and complete compliance with Shari’a is also one of the effects and goals that follow from it. Mullā Ṣadrā also mentions such wisdom with attributes such as legal wisdom, exquisite and pure wisdom, oriental wisdom, etc.

Encountering the variety of logic systems, three theories have been introduced; exclusivism, pluralism and instrumentalism. Exclusivists consider only one system of logic to be correct. Pluralists consider all systems of logic to be correct. Instrumentalists do not consider any system of logic to be correct (correctness of logic is irrelevant for them). The theory introduced in this essay is inclusivism. Inclusivism is neither exclusivism, because it does not consider more than one system of logic to be correct, nor it is pluralism because it does not consider all systems of logic to be correct, and nor is it instrumentalism, because the correctness and incorrectness of the logic system is irrelevant for it. Avicenna also faced diversity in the knowledge of logic; Aristotelian logic and Stoic-Megarian logic. He has not been exclusivist in this encounter, because if that was the case, he would choose one and give up the other. He was not a pluralist, because if that was the case, he would have taken both of them without any unwarranted change and all in one piece. Avicenna was not an instrumentalist either, because the correctness of the logic system was relevant for him.

This article is intended to answer a decisive question about Heidegger’s thought, that is, the relationship between his philosophical thought and theological views. Heidegger’s thought is the subject of many disputes among Christian theologians. On the one hand, the terminology and conceptual system of Heidegger’s philosophy is closely related to theology, and on the other hand, he is involved in a fundamental critique of Western metaphysics and its consequence, Christian theology. For this reason, it is not possible to simply expect a Christian theology or any other religion from his thought. He can eventually be accompanied by a kind of theology, provided that this theology has the destruction of metaphysics or ontotheology behind it. Such theology does not exist at present and it can be said that Heidegger’s God and religion are in the future, not the past. The point that this article tries to bring up is that perhaps focusing on Heidegger’s biography or some delving into his thought about theology will give clues to investigate the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and religious contents with theology, but thinking about future religion or theology through Heidegger’s thinking needs deeper reflection and research in Heidegger’s texts, and most probably focusing on Heidegger’s biography and insisting on familiar theological terms in some of his works is an obstruction to the correct understanding of his intellectual purpose.

This article seeks to examine the criterion of moderation from the perspective of Imāmī theology. To this end, we have explored into the criterion of moderation in terms of semantics and methodology, and we have addressed moderation in its general meaning based on the Qur’an and hadiths. Then, we have assayed the verses and narrations indicating moderation with the interpretations and traditions related to them, presented the basis of Islamic moderation, and discussed its verification based on the sīra of the Infallibles (A.S.). Along the discussion, we have also discussed the validity of reason in proving moderation. By comparing the sīra and moderate manner of these noble figures as the Source of Messengership (ma’dan al-risāla) and Imamate with the verses that order moderation in method and character, the criteria of moderation and extremism were determined in such a way that the authority and validity of the book, tradition, reason and usage of them should be considered regarding the level of moderation, and anything that contradicts the sīra of the Imams (A.S.) is considered to be a departure from the path of moderation and is not trustworthy.