نشریه دانش حقوق عمومی
سال دوازدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 39، بهار 1402)

One of the characteristics of law is clarity and justice. These characteristics require that the effects of laws be used to regulate and coordinate social relations based on the supremacy of justice. Likewise, the interpretation of ordinary laws which, in the opinion of the Guardian Council under Article Seventy-three of the Constitution; The expression is meant by the legislature, because it does not independently lead to the creation of a new rule, following the original law, it must have just effects. However, what is being implemented in the Iranian legal system, in the form of interpretative views of the Guardian Council and also in the field of judicial oversight of the Administrative Court of Justice, is to validate the perception of the executors, before the interpretation of the law is approved. The Guardian Council and, consequently, the Court of Administrative Justice, consider the perceptions of the executors before the interpretation of the law as the basis for not retroactive to the interpretation of the law, and consider the actions and omissions of the executors related to the law as final matters. This article analyzes the views of the Guardian Council as well as the procedure of the General Assembly of the Court of Administrative Justice in an analytical and positivist manner and analyzes the executive effects of these opinions.

Unilateral US sanctions imposed on Iran are an example of hostile policy in interstate relations and disregard for fundamental human rights, including the right to life, health, and development, which are recognized in international law and the fundamental rights of countries, and mechanisms are foreseen to guarantee and support them. In the Iranian legal system, these cases have been identified in the framework of public rights, and the judiciary and the attorney general's office play an inherent mission in restoring these rights. Therefore, the question that arises is how the Attorney General's Office, given the powers specified in the laws and regulations of Iran in restoring public rights, should act in order to restore the rights and interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran deprived of unilateral sanctions. In order to answer this question with a descriptive-analytical method, an attempt has been made to first follow up and monitor the issue of unilateral sanctions, and then the possible ways to pursue and file lawsuits in domestic and international courts have been examined. In this regard, in accordance with the rules and regulations in the system of international responsibility of states, the violation of general and specific obligations of the United States has made it possible to pursue this issue in international courts. Under domestic law, the jurisdiction to hear complaints against persons involved in sanctions in domestic courts has also made it possible for the Attorney General to pursue and supervise in domestic courts

One of the important tasks which has been provided in the Constitution for the government is to establish proper administrative system and eliminate unnecessary organizations. After decades of this ruling and the approval of various norms, the government has not yet been able to organize the administrative system in accordance with the aforementioned task. One of the reasons for this failure is the lack of a clear view of the elements of a proper administrative system, especially about the elimination of unnecessary organizations. This article tries to answer the following questions by taking a descriptive-analytical method and analyzing the comments of the Guardian Council: what does eliminating unnecessary organizations mean? What are the responsibilities of government powers in fulfilling this task? The findings of this paper are summarized as follows: The term "unnecessary" includes the organization disproportionate to the missions and the description of the legal duties of the government. Parallel, repetitive, non-functional organizations within the competence of the government are considered as examples of unnecessary organizations. This task is mostly addressed to the executive branch, but other branches of government also have responsibilities in this regard. Finally, there is no significant practice for invoking the "elimination of unnecessary organizations" in the Guardian Council's Opinions.

Regulating the relationship between religious and statutory law, explaining the nature and limits of legislation in an Islamic state, and the different public-law capacities of the Iranian constitution are very important. Regardless of the nature of the function of the Islamic Consultative Assembly with respect to the Sharia and whether it is legislation or codification, this article examines the competence of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in considering  Sharia from a jurisprudential and legal point of view. Our research seeks to answer  how the discretionary and mandatory authorities of  parliament to legislate these regulations logically and within the Iranian legal system can be evaluated. Based on a legal and jurisprudential analysis and with a descriptive-analytical method, this paper will argue that the establishment of fixed, clear, and definite rulings of the Sharia is not within the discretionary authority of parliament.

Although criminal laws have strong enforcement instruments, in order According to Article 113 of the Constitution, after the Supreme Leader, the president is the highest official in the country. He is responsible for the implementation of the Constitution and the head of the executive branch, except in matters which are directly related to the Supreme Leader. The rationale of the aforementioned principle is that the president is the highest executive authority. According to Article 114 of the Constitution, he is elected by direct vote of the people. Therefore, considering that the president is elected by the people and takes over the implementation of affairs that are the affairs of the absolute authority of the jurist, it seems necessary to examine the nature of his decisions, in such a way that the president is the lawyer of the people and the validity of his decisions as the decisions of the lawyer is limited to the limits set in the constitution or that he has authority through the implementation of the leader in the determinate compass and whether can act absolutely according to the interests of the wards or is his choice a sign of allegiance and the effects related to it are current? Among these effects, we can mention people's loyalty to all the decisions made.Therefore, an attempt has been made to explain the concepts of "province", "representation" and "allegiance" with a descriptive-analytical and library method and by adapting them to the limits of the president's powers in the Constitution, the juridical nature of these decisions has been clarified.Considering these concepts and examining the necessary conditions for the president and the limits of his possessions in the constitution, the president’s privilege of the title of authority will be given. Because legislation, judiciary and implementation of laws are the affairs of the absolute authority of the jurist and considering that these affairs are delegated to triple forces in the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, political representatives, who are called people's lawyers, as well as the president, have the title of authority, that this province is during the absolute jurisprudence of the jurist and it is obtained by means of tacit (representatives of parliament) and official (president) confirmation. It goes without saying that the nature of elections in the process of electing parliament members and the president is allegiance to the Islamic government because, as mentioned, the works of the triple forces are the affairs of the absolute authority of the jurist, whose implementation has been entrusted to the aforementioned forces.

Ossol amaliya as a method of removing confusion in the absence of a definite and valid reason is a solution that has been followed mainly in individual jurisprudence and in private and criminal law. In public law and governance, including economic, political and cultural, in some cases, these principles have been the basis of action of various institutions. However, this article, in line with the methodology of public law and international law, recognizes the difference between the method of interpretation of religious sources and the need to improve the criteria for inferring rulings in order to prevent the isolation or distortion of religion. Therefore, the main issue of this descriptive-analytical research is the possibility or refusal to invoke Ossol amaliya as well as the method of invoking these principles in governance. It seems that in line with the "necessity of establishing and completing the language of the Shari'a in order to understand history", the Ossol amaliya are not suitable language for the level of governance and can only be used in governance in the form of "approach". The taste of the Shari'a also greatly enhances the preservation of the system of citing Ossol amaliya

Different generational approaches (from intergenerational agreement to intergenerational rupture and collapse) are studied and analyzed in "generational sociology". In law and political science, crediting or discrediting the law and legal political system has been proposed in the form of a range of opinions and ideas. In explaining the relationship between these two areas, the question arises, how different generational approaches relate to the process of validating or invalidating the existing Iranian constitutional order? In fact, if generational sociological data confirms the occurrence of a generation gap in Iran, is it possible to revalidate the existing constitution by citing the legal right to self-determination? The following article has examined this relationship as an interdisciplinary study and with a descriptive analytical method. Using trans- generational objects in sociology and pre-constitutional arguments on the one hand and extra-constitutional reasoning on the other, the paper explains the existence of a conflicting relationship between these two categories.

The Islamic Consultative Assembly, on one hand, has the general legislative power in accordance with Article 71 of the [Iranian] Constitution, and on the other hand, under Article 110, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution the supreme command of the armed forces is entrusted to the Leader as commander-in-chief. In some cases, the Islamic Consultative Assembly enacts laws on matters related to the armed forces, which may not comply with the measures and orders issued by the commander-in-chief. This research, with a descriptive-analytical approach, examines the relationship between the general legislative competence of parliament and the requirements of the supreme command of the armed forces in the practice of the Guardian Council. The findings indicate that in the view of the Guardian Council, the competence of the commander-in-chief, as well as the sub-leadership of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, requires that all policy-making, monitoring and implementation in the armed forces be led by the Leader. In this regard, the Guardian Council believes that any change in the organization of the armed forces, appointment dismissal of commanders and officials, granting of authority or assignment to the armed forces, and policy-making for them without the authorization of the Leader, is unconstitutional. However, in some cases, the Guardian Council has acted contrary to its general practice. In this study such cases have also been examined.