فصلنامه پژوهش حقوق عمومی
سال بیست و پنجم شماره 79 (تابستان 1402)

The expansion of the Internet and its ever-increasing rate along with the rise of smart mobile phones have made Internet-based businesses one of the inseparable sectors of today's economy. The part that this type of business plays in today’s world economy is so much that now the top companies in the world, in terms of capital and market value, are companies in the field of digital economy. This is a reality that Iran will also face in the not-too-distant future; then, companies in the field of digital economy will take a significant share of the market. So, today, it is especially necessary to pay attention to the issue of competition in digital platforms and to set the appropriate rules to govern them.

Literature Review:

Until the writing of this article, most of the issues raised in Iran's competition law are devoted to the examination of rules governing competition in traditional markets. Only one article titled "Competition Council and Internet Businesses" by Zarei et al. (2019) has been written in relation to platform markets, and this work is also based on the traditional rules of competition law and regardless of the specific challenges of this field. Analysis of the vote number 306 of the Competition Council. Therefore, it can be claimed that the explanation of the characteristics and challenges of platform markets and its effect on the regulation of competition in this field, which is examined in this article, qualifies as innovation.

In order to correctly set the new rules applicable in the field of digital platforms’ competition, it is necessary to go through a three-stage system: first, we must get a correct understanding of the prominent features of the digital platform markets that affect the issue of competition. In the second stage, the competitive challenges arising from these characteristics, with which the traditional rules are not able to fully deal, should be examined and evaluated; and finally, new rules of competition in the field of platform markets based on the aforementioned characteristics and challenges should be put in place.As the title of the article suggests, the purpose of this article is to explain and analyze the first and second stages of the aforementioned process to show the deficiency of traditional rules in response to the competitive challenges of the field of digital platforms and the necessity of revising them. For this purpose, after explaining the meaning of "platform" and its conceptual evolution over time (the first part), the prominent features of digital platforms that affect the issue of competition are counted, identified, and evaluated (the second part) and finally, the challenges due to the aforementioned characteristics and the inadequacy of the traditional rules in response to them will be explained (part three) to prove the necessity of revising the traditional rules of competition law in the field of platform markets.

Based on the findings of this article, the main economic features of digital platforms are such as "the network effect", "reduction of transaction costs", "replacement of ownership with access", "fragmentation of supply and demand", "economy of scale and economy of significant scope", "simultaneous improvement of economies of scale and personalization" and "fundamental importance of data". Although they are not entirely new and traces of them can be seen in traditional markets, their simultaneous presence in digital platforms makes the market tend towards them. In addition, this problem may be aggravated by the actions of digital platforms to strengthen and expand their position in the market. It is noteworthy that none of the aforementioned features that have led to the occurrence of the mentioned challenges have been recognized in the traditional rules of competition as an obstacle to entering the market or as an anti-competitive practice. Therefore, the first competitive challenge of platform markets, which requires the regulation of appropriate rules, is the growing monopoly of these markets. Naturally, the most suitable solution to get out of this situation is to recognize the aforementioned features as specific types of entry barriers for digital markets.It should also be kept in mind that the preliminary stages to apply anti-competitive rules and guaranteeing them in digital platform markets face serious challenges. In these markets, it is not possible to identify the product as easily as it is in traditional markets, and the application of the conventional SSNIP test cannot be applied to many platforms that offer zero-price services or two- or multi-modal platforms. This makes it a serious challenge to recognize the exact share of the platform in the market and, accordingly, to recognize the market power. It seems that the transition from "quantitative criteria" to "qualitative criteria" is the way out of such challenges.Also, following the traditional rules in recognizing the anti-competitive behavior of platforms, causes many platforms to be accused of aggressive pricing at the very beginning due to having zero marginal cost. In addition, the existence of the aforementioned features has facilitated the conditions for committing anti-competitive acts, such as establishing exclusive conditions in the transaction, selling a package of products, collusion, etc. It seems that the requirement to overcoming such challenges is to promote ex-ante regulations along with the implementation of the current (mostly a-posteriori) regulation model.Finally, it seems that the simultaneous presence of these features in digital platforms has largely led to the reemergence of traditional issues of competition law as current issues, and this will consequently require a review of competition laws in this area, as countries such as the United States, China, and the European Union have followed the same path.

Human rights such as the right to life, the right to health, the right to work and social security, and the right to a healthy environment call for supporting workers of arduous or hazardous jobs in forms of their right to enjoy a proper, healthy and hygienic work environment and support during work and retirement. Clinical occupations have specifically been designated as arduous or hazardous occupations by the legislator's decree and its employees have been further supported. Unfortunately, because the mentioned employees work in different governmental and non-governmental sectors and that they are under different laws and regulations including different provisions depending on the relevant sector, different procedures have been adopted to support these employees which causes discrimination between people who have the same jobs with similar conditions and with the same duties. Those covered by the labor and social security law retire with at least 20 consecutive years or 25 alternating years of employment experience and without meeting the minimum age requirement, those subject to National Employment Laws and related regulations retire with at least 25 years of employment experience in non-specialized jobs and 30 years in specialized jobs, Azad University employees retire by having at least 20 years of employment experience, workers subjected to the Administrative Regulation for Employment and Organization of Non-faculty Employees of the University of Medical Sciences and Healthcare Services of the Country retire with 25 years of employment experience, and the employees of the armed forces retire with at least 20 years of employment experience. Therefore, extending the conditions of amendment 2 of Article 76 of the Social Security Law 1380 to all those working in arduous or hazardous clinical jobs can be considered a way forward.

Literature Review:

So far, no article has been written about supporting those working in arduous or hazardous clinical jobs.

Descriptive/analytical/exploratory research methods will be used in writing this research. Also, the method of collecting information in the upcoming research will be library research. Other methods of collecting information such as field research and questionnaires will not be used.

The table below demonstrates the different approaches to supporting those working in arduous or hazardous clinical jobs based on the governmental and non-governmental sectors and the different applicable rules to the mentioned sectors:Applicable law Minimum employment experience Minimum age Ex Gratia Payment for early retirement Organization's responsibility or authority Subject to the Labor and Social Security Law 1990.At least 20 consecutive years or 25 alternating years No need for meeting the minimum  age requirement severance pay equal to 1.5 years of experience for each year of employment Duty  to  agree with the request Subject to National Employment Laws and related regulations and employees of Social Security Organization and Martyrs and Veterans Foundation At least 25 years in non-specialized jobs and 30 years in specialized  jobs At least 55 years of age for men and no minimum age requirement for  women 5 years Duty to agree with the request Azad University staff At least 20 years No need for meeting the minimum  age requirement 5 years Duty  to  agree with the request Applicable law Minimum employment experience Minimum age Ex Gratia Payment for early retirement Organization's responsibility or authority Subjects the Administrative Regulation for Employment and Organization of Non-faculty Employees of the University of Medical Sciences and Healthcare Services of the Country At least 25 years At least 55 years of age for men and no minimum age requirement  5 years Duty to agree with the request Armed forces employees Subject to At least 20 years No need for meeting the minimum age requirement 5 years The duty or discretion of the armed forces in agreeing to the retirement of their employees is uncertain. Therefore, this system has caused discrimination between people who are employed in the same jobs with the same conditions and with the same description of duties which necessitates the initiative of the legislator to solve it.

A judge or a judicial system, that is not independent and is influenced by different factors is, unable of establishing justice; he/she is also unable to protect the rights and individual freedoms of people which calls into question the existential philosophy of that judicial system. People's lack of trust in the judicial system leads to a decrease in the legitimacy of the political system which causes political and social crises and at higher levels, the collapse of the political system. Based on the principle of separation of powers, which has been one of the most important intellectual achievements of mankind in social administration, the power of the government is separated and divided into the three branches of legislative, judiciary, and executive organs (although they maintain their interaction), in order to prevent the concentration of power in one person or institution. Judicial independence is, therefore, one of the logical results of accepting the principle of separation of powers, the origin of which can be found in the era of Aristotle. Today, this principle is considered one of the most important principles and, in fact, the cornerstone of democratic governments–a form of government that seems better able to provide justice than other forms of government. The Principle of Judicial Independence in International Documents and the Legal System of Afghanistan One of the results of accepting the principle of separation of powers, as mentioned earlier, is the acceptance of the principle of judicial independence. This principle has been discussed and supported in international and regional documents. In Afghanistan, for the first time during the reign of Amanullah Khan, it was recognized in Article 53 of the Constitution of Afghanistan (1923) by stating that "all courts are free from any interference". In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (2004), there is no clarity about accepting the principle of separation of powers. But from its general structure and its division of chapters –the fourth chapter (government) the fifth chapter (the National Council) and the seventh chapter (Judiciary) it is inferred that this principle is accepted. Judicial independence is also explicitly accepted in Article 116: "The judiciary is the independent pillar of the government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan".

Research Problem:

In Afghanistan, in recent years, several criminal cases have resulted in decisions that raised questions about the status and position of judicial independence in the judicial system of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Do judges and the judicial system of Afghanistan act independently?

Although much research has been done about judicial independence in the world, it has received less attention in Afghanistan which is perhaps the reason why Afghan legal writers have made fewer claims about the strength or weakness of judicial independence in Afghanistan based on evidence. Therefore, evidence-based research about judicial independence, in which the personal judgment of the authors is minimized, is one of the needs of Afghan society. The main question of this essay is regarding the status of judicial independence, as one of the most important pillars of good governance, in the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.Judicial independence can be studied at both organizational and individual levels. At the organizational level, it is indicated by a look at factors such as the recognition of the independence of the judiciary in the constitution and other laws, the exclusivity of judicial authority in the judiciary, the binding nature of the rulings of the judiciary on other organs, administrative independence, and finally, its financial independence. Also, to evaluate individual judicial independence, one should consider indicators such as the process of selecting and appointing judges, job security of judges, prohibition of engaging in political and other duties for the judges, prescribing objective conditions for their promotion and demotion, documentation of judicial decisions, establishing a judicial panel in court, judicial immunity, the salaries of judges and finally their safety and security.

 The results of this study show that in Afghanistan during the republic period, at the organizational level, while the independence of the judiciary was recognized in the constitution and other laws of the country, the exclusion of jurisdiction in the judiciary was not desirable. The rulings of the judiciary were not so binding on other organs which had damaged its independence. Administrative independence was also weak, but financial independence was in a good condition. At the individual level, the selection and appointment of judges was not suitable, but the job security of judges had been relatively good as the mechanism of hiring judges was in a good situation that ensured their job security to a large extent. The guarantee of the prohibition of their employment in political duties was weak, but in other duties, the ban had been appropriately executed. Also, while the prescription of objective criteria for the promotion and demotion of judges was very bad, the judicial decisions were documented and the judicial boards were established in proceedings. Judicial immunity had been realized incompletely, judges' salaries were assessed as appropriate but their safety and security had been inadequate. In general, judicial independence in Afghanistan was weak which, according to the authors, had caused people's distrust in the judicial system and as a result, a decrease in the legitimacy of the republican system. This can be considered one of the factors for the fall of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

The president’s interpellation before the Islamic Consultative Assembly (ICA), set in the Constitutional law of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has been a challenge. The cause of the challenge is the contrast between the 2nd clause of Article 89 of the Constitution and Article 114 of the Constitution. Article 89 says: “In the event that at least one-third of the members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly interpellate the President concerning his responsibilities for leadership of the executive power and managing the executive affairs of the country, the President must present himself to the Assembly within one month after the submission of the interpellation and to give adequate explanations regarding the matters raised. After hearing the statements of the opposing and favoring members and the reply of the President, if two-thirds of the members of the Assembly vote for his incompetency, the vote will be communicated to the Supreme Leader for implementation of Article 110(10)”. Article 114 holds: “The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people. His re-election for a successive term is permissible only once”In other words, The main cause of the challenge is the appointment of the president through elections and the lack of any power by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in this regard. The current presumption among the legal society is that interpellation would be applied to an authority that is elected by the ICA. Although the current presumption is relatively true, what has been neglected during these years is that in fact, the interpellation of the president in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is impeachment in a different, unique concept.

In some political systems, the president would be removed by legislative assemblies by means of impeachment.  Comparing the elements of the term impeachment with the elements of interpellation proves the above claim. Hence, comparing the two elements of  their grounds and their procedures are notable.in the draft of the Constitution, a two-stage procedure for the removal of the president was set, but after the enactment of the Constitution, two different one-stage procedures were created. One procedure would be run by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the other would be run by the Supreme Court. In fact, two procedures that work together in an impeachment, have been transformed into two independent procedures, both of which leave the final decision-making  to the Supreme Leader.

Conclusion:

The grounds for the president’s removal have been changed from “treason or conspiracy against national security” in the text of the Constitution to “treason and violation of legal duties” and eventually, to “violation of legal duties” and “lack of qualification”. Lack of qualification and being unfit to continue in office are common concepts among the grounds of impeachment in different political systems. lack of qualifications, incapability in doing his executive duties, or ineptitude in executive management in the text of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran are the instances of the general notion of “being unqualified unfit”. Both concepts of “lack of qualification” and “violation of legal duties” are incorporated in the general notion of unfitness in the legal and political literature of the Islamic Republic of Iran and are equal to impeachment in other systems; However, interpellation is often based on political reasons. Since the causes and the grounds of the president’s removal are enumerated in the Constitution, we can conclude that the nature of presidential removal in the Constitution is impeachment, but its title is interpellation.Thus, some clarification and some reforms are required by amending the Constitution. Before any constitutional amendment, the nature of the interpellation of the president and its elements should be explained by the legal society. It may prevent this oversight tool to become a reason to remove the president based on political disagreements and may regulate and restrict the oversight tool to only clear legal grounds. This may, in the future, be the inspiration to possibly omit or add to the grounds for presidential removal in the constitutional amendment. According to the current laws and regulations, the procedure of presidential removal via Islamic Consultative Assembly is almost clear but the procedure of presidential removal through the Supreme Court is unclear. Again, reforming the procedure of presidential removal and merging the two procedures requires an amendment to the Constitution. Another subject that must be considered is the effect of this presidential removal mechanism and whether, irrespective of the removal from office, there are any other effects and sanctions for the president or not. Another sanction for the president’s incompetency would be exclusion and prohibition from holding any public office which is worthy to be debated and considered for the future.

In recent years, there has been a growing trend in the “North and South” dialectics in all fields. International law is no exception to this rule. Recently, in international law studies, in particular, in philosophical discourses and historical development research regarding the origin and the basis of international law obligations, efforts have been made by new scholars to spread the Eastern approach to international law. As these thoughts normally emerge from the less developed and colonial countries, it is called the “Third-World Approach to International Law (TWAIL)”. This approach is rooted in the critical legal studies movement in international law. By taking the Asian perspective into account and also, the evolution of the history of Asian civilizations, this approach attempts to address the inauspicious phenomenon of colonialism in undeveloped or less developed countries, and thereby, decenter Europe as the origin of international law.From 1996 to 2020, we have been facing a significant increase in studies related to this third-world approach to international law, which depicts the possible emergence of a renaissance period in this field of study.  Although its initial consistent rise happened between 1998 and 2012, the volume of scientific content production in this approach gradually increased. In fact, this approach points us to a re-examination of the historical evolution of international law. As mentioned, the researchers and experts of this approach are actively present in the world of international law and this approach will undoubtedly impact their opinions and activities.

Furthermore, the third-world approaches to international law have rooted in different areas, but naturally, they have become more prominent in some categories of international law, in terms of studying the methodology and the historical background of international law that were mentioned earlier.The third-world approach functions in two ways: first, it challenges the radicalized power and the hierarchy of international institutions and norms, and second, it examines the past and the present foundations of colonies and imperial structures of international law. Many of the insights created by the critical approach have been important and useful for the supporters of the third-world approach to international law. So, this approach will analyze the current issues of international law and human rights in a critical discourse. Although there is a fear of division and conflict in such approaches, they create more awareness and increase the debate between different nations on the subject which leads to the universality of international law. It is worth mentioning that Marty Koskenniemi and David Kennedy are among the most famous experts in this field of study and have written many articles about this approach.

In conclusion, it seems that the critical and bold approach to international law through the lens of the so-called third-world countries analyzes the deep-rooted inequalities in the international community. The synergy between the critical approach and the third-world approach has expanded the content of international law norms and has created new discourses in international law. Based on the writings of the experts with the third-world approach to international law, it seems that in the past and especially in recent centuries, through the flawed phenomenon of exploitation and colonialism (both in its traditional and modern forms), the powerful countries of the world have seriously damaged the trust of other countries regarding international decisions and regulations concerning third-world countries and especially Asian countries. Thus, actions should be taken to rebuild that trust. It is possible to change the view of third-world countries to powerful countries in international relations. But the emergence of other powerful governments and Asian actors, especially those countries that have a significant impact on the international economy and, as a result, are noticeably influential on politics and international relations, can lead to a redefinition of many concepts in the modern world.Finally, it seems that, regarding the true goals and ideals of international law, the presence of “North and South” views in all areas related to international law have led to different political sides and the current international order. challenges exist at all levels, but the examination and analysis of such multi-dimensional approaches will lead to the expansion of the discourse and exchange of opinions between different nations and will raise awareness and respect for
different cultural systems among them, which finally, contributes to the universality of international law.

Governmental development plans have always been a point of concern for countries in terms of how to use national wealth in these projects. Governments have tried to devise possible ways to make better use of public resources in development projects. One of the solutions provided in Iranian law is the establishment of a legal body called the Supreme Technical Council. This council was established according to Article 80 (amended) of the Budget Law of 1977, approved in 1979, and was responsible for duties and powers, such as the authorization of price floors and the revision of general contract rates. In 1999, according to paragraph (c) of Article 53 of the General Conditions of Construction Works Procurements (a uniform regulatory document issued by the government that prescribes some general conditions that apply to all construction projects engaged in by a public authority), it was considered to be the arbitrator in disputes arising from development projects and so, this role was added to its aforementioned capacities. In this study, by analyzing the nature of these duties, powers, and authorities of the Supreme Technical Council, we will examine whether, first of all, the assigned missions are in line with the existential philosophy of this council. Is there a need to plan such tasks or not? further, is there a consistency between the duties, authorities, and powers of the council? Finally, some solutions and suggestions will be provided accordingly.

In this article, by collecting data through library resources, we answered questions with the analytical-descriptive method.

1- According to parts "a" and "b" of amended Article 80, the Supreme Technical Council is responsible for reviewing and approving the basic prices and related market regulations and instructions, as well as reviewing and approving the prices of special items (which are marked with an asterisk). This has so far been the best way in preventing the unusual increase in the cost of public construction projects and the abuse and waste of public resources. In this role, the Supreme Technical Council has an executive duty.2- According to part "c" of the amended Article 80, the duty to revise the general contract rates has also been assigned to the Supreme Technical Council. The appeal request by the general contractor is subject to the approval of the highest administrative authority of the public party (the employer) and after that, the Supreme Technical Council makes a decision regarding the request. This type of adjustment is a contractual price adjustment and the role of the Supreme Technical Council in agreeing to the appeal is to be a part of the decision-making elements of the public party's executive body which makes it a party to the contract (on the side of the employer). Therefore, in this perspective, the legal nature of the role given to the Supreme Technical Council is as a party to the contract.3- The last duty assigned to the Supreme Technical Council in part "D" of amended Article 80 is to review and make a decision on issues that have been raised by the public parties (employers) for which the contract has not provided a specific solution beforehand. it has been discussed that, in this role, it seems that the Supreme Technical Council is, again, a part of the decision-making side of the public party, and therefore, as a matter of its legal nature, it plays the role of party to the contract.4- The last power that has been considered for the Supreme Technical Council is the authority of arbitration in construction projects, which is derived from paragraph "C" of Article 53 of the general conditions of Construction Works Procurement, which is a judicial role and the Supreme Technical Council acts as a judge between the parties in this role. In addition to the problems that exist in terms of the possibility of exceeding its legal powers in setting guidelines about the general and specific conditions of Construction Works Procurements, and in providing templates for drafting arbitration clauses and the terms used in them, it seems that this authority causes the litigant to be the judge of its own case. Because as mentioned, in some cases, the Supreme Technical Council is on the decision-making side of the executive board of the public contracting party and is somehow involved in this litigation.

According to the aforementioned results, the suggestions are as follows:1- Considering the practical benefits of the duties mentioned in clauses "a" and "b" of the amended Article 80, we suggest keeping them as they are until a better solution is found in this regard.2- Regarding clauses "c" and "d", considering their negative effects in terms of time and money, it is suggested that these powers be assigned to the highest authority of the executive body of the public contracting party just like they were before the amendment of Article 80.3- Finally, regarding the duty of the arbitration, it is suggested that the position of alternative dispute resolution methods in the General Conditions of Construction Works Procurements should be strengthened and it should be mandatory to refer to them and not be at the discretion of the parties (as it is). Also, by amending the laws, the parties of construction projects should be given the right to choose an independent and validated arbitration authority active in the country.

The most important or one of the most important concepts in the legal sciences and legal systems is the controversial concept of “right” which has a long history behind it. In the meantime, “The right to be wrong” has also entered legal texts and documents in addition to theory. This right is the result of the growth of rights and the product of many centuries of struggle between the government and citizens in Western liberal thought and the result of various social, economic, and political happenings. The "right to be wrong" in a simple and concise sense, means respecting the conscience of others, even when we are sure they are wrong. In other words, this concept means non-interference of others in the wrongdoing of the right holder. Based on this, a person can build his moral system in such a way that, even according to others, is considered wrong, unjust, or immoral. "Right to die" or "Right to refuse medical treatment" and "Abortion", "Right to choose a racist party", and "Homosexuality" and... are some clear examples of the right to be wrong. Right to be wrong, which emphasizes the trans-ethical nature of rights by differentiating the right in the objective and subjective sense i.e., between "being right" and "having a right", reveals the content of the right in a new sense. Acknowledging the concept of having a right to be wrong in legal systems implies the acceptance of the principle of tolerance in regulating and harmonizing the legal relations of citizens and accepting the concept of "pluralism" instead of "plurality".

Literature Review:

Comparing the concept of the right to be wrong with the basic foundations of the legal system of the Islamic Republic of Iran voiced in the constitution shows that it cannot be assumed that this concept is accepted by the constitutional legislature through neither the textualist, structuralist nor intentionalist interpretation methods. Reflecting on the fourth and fifth articles, the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh in particular, the sixth paragraph of article 2, and finally the thirteenth article of the constitution, confirms the claim of the authors in this regard with a loyal and faithful interpretation of the text and the structure of the constitution. Also, referring to the constitutional negotiations documents -as an important source in understanding the fundamental rights of societies- in an attempt at an intentional interpretation, does not open a way to apply the concept of right to be wrong in this system. However, using the philosophical hermeneutic method instead of the previous interpretive methods, which seeks a dynamic interpretation of the text by understanding the "meaning of the meaning", while paying attention to the "requirements of the time", "the historicity of the text" and finally "the compromising between of the views of the author and the interpreter", makes the idea of accepting the right to be wrong in this legal order and system possible.

In this research, in addition to clarifying the concept, the theoretical foundations and justifications of the "right to be wrong", and emphasizing its prominence and prevalence in legal systems, its possibility in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran was measured and examined through the hermeneutic method.

The Guardian Council, which according to Article 98, is the only official interpreter of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has prevented the possibility of using a dynamic interpretation method, especially the new hermeneutics method, and refuses to accept the right to be wrong since its establishment. This institution has only authorized and used the two methods of textual interpretation (with an emphasis on the literary meaning of the word) and intentional interpretation, in the framework of the principles of Shia jurisprudence and based on Shia’s thought system in the interpretation of the holy texts and avoiding self-serving interpretation. This has become an issue that, of course, can be revised to make the domestic legal system more efficient. Reflecting on the capacities of Imamiyyah jurisprudence in identifying the concept of the right to be wrong and its application in domestic law and constitution, of course, requires another time.

The findings of this article show that the Islamic vision accepted in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has distinct principles regarding rights with a liberal point of view, which has manifested itself in the form of the Sharia law governing the Constitution. "God-centeredness in all matters", distinguishing between "God's right" and "people's right" and finally the supremacy of "natural rights" over "conventional rights" are unchangeable and unbreakable elements in Islamic thought. According to this view, human rights are conventional and contractual, and nature, law, and above all, human beings, do not have inherent rights. it is through God-given rights that human rights are valid.

In recent years, one of the old, yet controversial doctrines of the law of neutrality -called "unwilling" and "unable"[1] doctrine- has been reformulated in the jus ad bellum discourse, according to which some states may use force in self-defense against non-state terrorist actors operating within the territory of host states based on the unwillingness or inability of the territorial state to control them. The unwilling or unable doctrine has one of the lowest standards with which it determines when non-state terrorist organizations can legally be attacked in third states based on the right of self-defense,[2] even though the legality of such use of force against non-state actors in weak host states, without the consent of the host state, is unclear. In the context of legal positivism, this article seeks to prove whether the current sources of international law allow states to recourse to the unwilling or unable doctrine in the host state. Since these concepts have not been mentioned in any legal document (besides Article 17 of the Rome Statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention) or even international case law, it is not clear whether it is possible to accept such use of force in international law despite its prohibition in the UN Charter, denying its legitimacy by most publicists, very little occurrence of it in the practice of states and subjectivity of the concept of unwillingness or inability. The International Court of Justice and some scholars also deny the legality of the use of force in an ineffective host.This article seeks to critically examine and demonstrate the evolution of the use of force in the name of self-defense against non-state actors in the territory of host states, which is justified by the unwilling and unable doctrine. The purpose of this research is not only to identify the unwilling and unable doctrine but also to offer a practical solution to the challenges regarding extra-territorial self-defense against non-state terrorist organizations.

Research Question(s):

This article, by examining de lege lata, seeks to verify whether treaties, customary laws, and international judicial practice allow states to legally resort to the unwilling and unable doctrine in another state (the host state). In other words, has the unwilling and unable doctrine become a part of international law (as it exists)? Moreover, does the doctrine provide a legitimate way to use transnational self-defense against non-state actors, particularly in a situation where the host state is willing to repress the non-state actors but is unable to do so? Based on which criteria is it determined that the host state is unwilling or unable to fight the threat posed by the non-state actors? Finally, is it possible for the acting state to make this decision unilaterally or does the host state also play a role in this regard?

The article has used descriptive and analytical research methods. The necessary data has been collected through the library research method by reference to relevant books, essays, and international judicial decisions.

This article shows that although the right to self-defense in ineffective host states may be desirable in light of the contemporary security and safety threats, the existing data about the doctrine is incomplete and has many gaps. The "unwilling" and "unable" doctrine presents a significant challenge to the “rule of law” in international law. This doctrine based on self-judgment theories in international law and providing exceptions to the jus ad bellum regime, not only leads to the instability of this regime, but also its legal justifications are a serious attack on the fundamental legal concepts that are generally accepted in international law. This article, with a legal positivist look, believes that any resort to the "unwilling and unable” doctrine is subject to the following criteria: an armed attack according to Article 51 of the Charter, lack of control of the host state over its territory, proof of inability and unwillingness of the host state by the victim state, act of the victim state with the consent and cooperation of the host state, giving the host state a reasonable time to effectively deal with the non-state actor, and the inability of the host state based on duty of due diligence, lack of cooperation by the host state and refusal to accept international assistance.

According to the above, the inevitable conclusion is that it’s very difficult to balance the unwilling or unable doctrine with the jus ad bellum regime. This doctrine lacks both a legal underpinning and a clear, distinct content. The criteria for the unwillingness and inability, the legality of self-defense, and the permissibility of resorting to force in an ineffective host state do not have a valid basis in either treaty law or customary international law; It is not mentioned in Article 51 of the UN Charter, nor have the states accepted it sufficiently. The International Court of Justice and the most highly-qualified publicists have also refused to recognize such use of force. Due to the change in the nature and power of terrorist organizations, the rules in this field remain unclear and this field is replete with legal uncertainty. It is not surprising that the UN charter is not able to provide clear answers for these situations.Despite the relative success of the jus ad bellum regime in preventing armed conflicts between states, the mentioned doctrine undermines the legal framework regulating prohibition on the use of force and poses a threat to the UN Collective Security System. The doctrine distorts the concept of imminence and damages the definition of armed attack[3] 3 enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter by lowering the threshold for the justifiable use of force in self-defense. It also destabilizes the fundamental principle of necessity in self-defense. Finally, by providing weak governing standards for the victim state may make unilateral decisions as to the necessity of the use of force, in spite of the  disapproval or unwillingness of the host state, the doctrine extremely over-privileges the interests of the powerful states at the expense of the rights and interests of typically weaker host states. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that the doctrine created to address the limited and specific threat of transnational terrorism cannot be a justification for weakening the regime designed to maintain international peace and security.If we apply this doctrine, any state will be allowed to start military operations simply on the pretext of the host state’s inability to suppress a terrorist group. Accepting to such a view by the international community and allowing to create this new legal order will lead to a fundamental change in the UN system if it is not completely damaged. By granting discretion to any state to adopt unilateral actions in the war on terror, through the unwilling and unable test, it simply ignores some fundamental provisions of the Charter (Article 39) and challenges the entire Collective Security System of the Charter. Creating unwritten exceptions to the principle that prohibits the use of force not only causes problems for the integrity of international law but also leads to disorganization in international law.Finally, within the framework of the lex lata, the only point that can be said regarding self-defense against attacks by non-state actors in situations, lower than the threshold that the ICJ has stated in the Nicaragua case, is that such actions are undoubtedly illegal. In the framework of the Lex ferenda, we believe that the customary law is evolving regarding the applications of Article 51 of the UN Charter, defensive action in the territory of target states, and the use of force against non-state actors in host states. Even in the light of Lex ferenda, it cannot be said that the unwilling and unable doctrine is currently an established rule of international law.