فصلنامه سیاست
سال پنجاه و سوم شماره 1 (پیاپی 65، بهار 1402)

The relation between tribal/ethnic identity and national identity has become a subject of recent studies in Iran. While many consider these identities as mutually conflictual ones, this paper focuses on the mutual operational relations among them and emphasizes that this pattern has been dominant in the post-Islamic period in Iran. The Iranian tribal groups have had remarkable role in many socio-political movements in Iran. Before collapsing in its entirety, Iran’s nomadic tribes were political agents with considerable impact on the country's social and political events. Just as the Iranian Constitutional Revolution divided the tribal forces into the pro- and anti-revolutionary factions, so too the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry witnessed the same political situation among the nomadic tribes. The movement for the nationalization of the oil industry and the 1953 Iranian coup d’état in addition to the political stance taken by the leaders of Iran’s nomadic tribes in reaction to these events are of considerable importance. In the present article, we focus on a case study of Qashqa’i tribal confederacy and investigate the reasons their leaders chose to support the nationalization movement of Mohammad Mosaddegh and fight against the 1953 coup d’état.The main research questions raised in the paper are as follows: 1. What were the political views and positions of Qashqa’i leaders on the nationalization of the oil industry in Iran? 2. What factors influenced the formation of the Qashqa’i leaders’ opinions on this issue and their attitudes towards the nationalization movement in Iran? The research hypothesis is that the Qashqa’i people’s support for Mosaddegh and the nationalization movement rests on three axes: i) a concern about the Pahlavi’s coming back into power and resuming their authoritarianism and the pattern of Reza Shah’s rule; ii) the friendly relations between the Qashqa’i leaders and Dr. Mosaddegh; iii) Qashqa’i leaders believe in the linkage between tribal identity and national identity which led the leaders to prioritize national interest over tribal interest. To answer the research questions and help understand the views of the Qashqa'i leaders towards the historical events culminating in the nationalization of Iran’s oil industry, this paper analyses archival evidence taken from the relevant documents in the National Library and Archives of Iran, specifically the records of communication between Prime Minister Mossadegh and the key Qashqa’i leaders. Furthermore, personal accounts and observations of these leaders as presented in their published autobiographies, memoirs and the interview transcripts in the Iranian Oral History Project are examined.Theoretically, the authors rely on the identity level of analysis and cooperation, rather than on conflict between social and national identities in Iran which had been promoted in the works of the first author. According to Ahmadi’s previous research on the types and degree of influence of the Tribes in Iran’s political activism and struggles, the tribal communities in Iran have been different from the tightly knit cultural or political groups which have habitually been in permanent conflict with the governments. On the contrary, the Iranian tribal groups have had much cultural and religious communality with other Iranians on the national level and have cooperated with different Iranian governments in the past. Iran’s tribal leaders and people have not considered their tribal identity (denoted as social identity in this study) to be in constant conflict with the Iranian national identity. The case of the Qashqa’i tribe and its involvement in the 1951 oil nationalization movement reflect such constructive relations.

The Era of Ardashir (Ahd-e Ardashīr), is attributed to Ardashir, the founder of the ancient Sasanian Empire (224-651 A.D.) and is a historical text on how to govern considering the principle of expediency in this dynasty. The importance of Ardashir's Testament is that it presents Ardashir's ideas on statecraft and policy based on his experience in governance. This work gave political advice to the Sasanian Shāhanshāh (King of Kings) as the supreme royal authority on acquiring, maintaining, and consolidating power. In his writing, Ardashir proposed the appropriate use of various instruments—including realistic wisdom, coercive power, job creation, religion, and Farrah-e īzadi (mystical divine force)—which had the attribute of infrastructure (the base) and superstructure (e.g., politics, laws, civil society) in governmentality. He intended to teach his successors of the Sasanian empire and the future generation of Persian rulers when and how to use force as an instrument or use religion as the ideological superstructure of the government. Ardashir presented his views about specific infrastructure and superstructure instruments of governance and drew attention to the proportional use of these instruments in different situations with which a ruler is confronted. This writing depicted a collection of ancient Persian maxims, and Iranian political wisdom which subsequently influenced Islamic political though. More significant was the edict that ideology and religion could be useful in running the kingdom, because of the unity of religion and state as illustrated by the claim that “king's authority is guarding religion, and religion is the foundation of king's authority”.The main research question to be answered is, “what is the nature of the relationship between the ideological superstructure (such as religion, justice, Farrah-e īzadi) and the infrastructure (foundation) of governance (e.g., the use of force and bureaucracy) in Ahd-e Ardashir?” In the hypothesis, the authors argue that there is a continuous and organic relationship between the infrastructure and the superstructure of Ardashir’s political system, as described in Ahd-e Ardashir. Using the framework of Althusser's theory of ideology and ideological state apparatuses, the organic relationship between the superstructure and the infrastructure of governance is analyzed. The argument will be articulated by drawing from the literature that exists on Ardashir's edicts of governance and his views on issues such as establishing a central power with an organized bureaucratic system, consolidating power in his domain, relations with the outside world during the reign of Ardashir. In Althusser’s view, religion as an ideological superstructure of a political system can be reflected in private and public spheres. What emerges from the content of Ahd-e Ardashīr is that religion can flow into the society mainly through the public channel—i.e., the public institutions related to the government. The relationship between Althusser's infrastructure and the state repression apparatus can also be seen in Ahd-e Ardashīr. In this paper, the infrastructure and superstructure of governance are first discussed and then connection between the two are examined. In conformity with Althusser's arguments, it is shown that ideological superstructure helped maintain the power of the state during the reign of Ardashir.

War weariness and destruction caused by the intensity of the two World Wars persuaded the Europeans to search for an immediate and lasting solution to bring together the allies and adversaries among the countries of Europe in a regional security arrangement. The European Union (EU) as a symbol of regional unity, cooperation and integration has faced uncertainties and instability over the years. Indeed, Brexit can be seen as the culmination of a wave of secessionist and nationalist tendencies that have challenged European integration now more than ever. The result of the referendum of 23 June of the United Kingdom (UK) sent a great shockwave across the territory covered by the EU. It was predicted that the proposal of Britain''''s withdrawal from the EU would be dismissed by an agreement based on David Cameron''''s four-point plan to renegotiate the terms of Great Britain''''s EU membership, but 52 percent of British voters agreed to the Brexit, and thus ended their country''''s 42-year membership of the European Union.The assumption is that political culture as a part of a shared national identity of a state shape its views on national interest which in turn guide its policy preferences, policymaking, and policy implementation in the various foreign policy issue areas. In this context, our research questions are: How has British political culture influenced its orientations and policies towards the European Union? 2. To what extent will the Brexit affect the UK foreign policy towards the EU in the future? In the research hypothesis, the authors claim that British political culture with its peculiar conservative attribute has adversely affected its European foreign policy, culminating in its withdrawal from the EU. Using the theoretical framework of constructivism, they rely on the method of conceptual content analysis to examine official statements ade by the British leadership and discuss the findings of referendum and public opinion surveys related to Brexit to find answers to the research questions.Britain is one of the victorious countries in the Second World War, has an imperial background and is an island-state located on the periphery of the European continent— all these factors have influenced British politics to this day. The perception of being a powerful country with a rich history has had a significant impact on the foreign policy behaviors of the UK, and consequently has contributed to the unwillingness of British policymakers to commit their country to the ideas and actions which might diminish its role and standing in the international system. Today, as an island nation cut off from the continental Europe, England together with its much smaller overseas territories around the world, represents only a small fragment of a former empire that disintegrated a long time ago, but most British people evidently are unwilling to forget the glory of its past. Accordingly, the UK has not yet completed its process of full decline and has aspiration of somehow regaining its hold on its vast former colonies and dependent territories. It is a contradiction that needs to be examined closely. Its national identity is muddled because of how the British political elites and ordinary citizens view their country’s standing in the world today. They perceive the UK as a greater power than it really is.The results of Brexit referendum indicated that most British public and political elites believed that their country would be in a more favorable position if it were to be less involved in the mainland Europe. As a result, they accepted the Brexit which reflected some kind of self-interested isolationism and a desire to leave Europe''''s problems to the rest of the EU members. Here, selective isolationism refers to a preference to disassociate the UK from the EU crises which might require coordinated policies to deal with unusual situations. Interestingly, this type of isolationism does not include issues related to the Britain’s interests in the Middle East and similar non-European issues which do not impose disproportionate financial burden on the country. Therefore, the UK continues to increase its political power by walking alongside the powerful European players if the collective security arrangement does not limit its freedom of action to pursue its own foreign policy objectives and priorities. British political culture has had a significant impact on the formulation of this country''''s foreign policy towards the EU. However, Brexit does not mean that this former imperial power has abandoned its efforts to reach the position of a great power with the ability to influence world politics.

Politics and economics are closely related, politics decisively affects the fate of the world economy, and economics has far-reaching consequences for international and global politics. The complexity of the interactions of economics and politics has formed the academic discipline of international political economy (IPE) with its flexible boundaries. Liberalism, realism, and Marxism have been the three dominant and traditional approaches to the study of international political economy. In an analogous way to the studies of international relations, the field of IPE has undergone theoretical diversity since the 1990s. At present, markets have become globalized, and cooperation or conflict of interests is one of the obvious realities of political economy. Therefore, theory building and hypothesis testing in international political economy—examining the relationship between governments and the markets—has also gone beyond the conventional theories. Thus, theories such as constructivism, postmodernism, criticism, feminism, and environmentalism have been taken into consideration. Of these, constructivism as a new intellectual endeavor has attracted a great deal of attention in the research on the global political economy. In this paper, the two research questions are as follows: 1. What are the foundations of the constructivist theory of international political economy? 2. To what extent is constructivism relevant to the study of international political economy? Using an analytical-explanatory approach, various research findings of the prior works have been examined to identify propositions and important themes. To get insight into the constructivists’ perspectives, we compare and explain different constructivist arguments about the need to apply their theoretical approaches to the field of IPE. Then, an attempt has been made to answer the research questions by analyzing and inferring from the qualitative data taken from these texts. In the research hypothesis, it is postulated that relying solely on economic or political analyses without considering the interaction of politics and economics leads to the inability to fully understand the dynamics of the international political and economic order. Given the diversity of the objectives of the stakeholders in the political economy, the multiplicity and ambiguity of their preferences and strategies, as well as the uncertainties of the outcome of the actions of the competing state and non-state actors have increasingly made the researchers’ goals of explaining and predicting international political and economic processes and outcomes more difficult. Constructivism is an approach which attempts to understand "the dynamic roles played by ideas, norms, values and identities in political processes and outcomes", and provides a viable theoretical framework for analyzing issues in international political economy (i.e., the nature of conflict and cooperation in the areas of trade, finance, defense, development), and explaining the interaction between political and economic forces at international level.

The Nasserists and Ba’athists, who influenced political strategies of Egypt and Syria during the second half of the twentieth century, engaged in Arab nationalist discourse. Because of the inconsistencies and paradoxes which appeared between the recurring political struggles and a score of the old dogmas of Pan-Arabism, Arab nationalism lost its validity and favorable place in Arab political discourse in the 1970s. Under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian Nasserists who determinedly participated in Arab nationalist discourse were willing to accept the failure of Arab nationalism after the traumatic shock of the defeat in the Arab-Israeli Six-Day War in June 1967. They announced the irrelevancy of Arab nationalism and focused attention on the “Egypt First” slogan to show their preference for Egyptian nationalism at the expense of Arab nationalism. On the contrary, Syria under the leadership of Hafez al-Assad as a neo-Ba’athist military man stood by the ideas of Arab nationalism but frequently ignored its dogmas whenever the changes in the political situations in Syria or the Arab world required a change of attitude towards Arab nationalism. It means that Syrian national interest was given a higher priority than the collective interest of the Arab community ('ummat). Syria symbolically used Arab unification propositions to explain political behavior, views, and policies. Thus, Syrian leaders ironically held on to the rhetoric of Arab nationalism to safeguard Syria’s national interest and garner support for their political agenda among the Arab people. Assad’s intention was to reach the top leadership position in the Arab world by gaining public support and more power and influence among the Arab political elites.A key purpose of this study was to address the following research questions: 1. Why did the Nasserist and Ba'athist governments in Egypt and Syria thought and acted differently about Arab nationalism? 2. What factors (e.g., the internal contradiction of the discourse, the negligence of those involved in the discourse, the dishonesty of Arab political leaders in believing in the Arab unification, and external pressures) worked against the discourse of Arab nationalism? In the research hypothesis, it is claimed that the lack of effort of the agents of Arab nationalist discourse, as well as the dishonesty of the Arab leaders in genuinely believing in Arab unity led to the decline of this discourse in the Arab world. There is the gap between the explanatory system of the discourse of Arab nationalism to represent political events and the essence of these events. Building on the theoretical framework of psychoanalytic and Hegelian approach of Jaques Lacan and Slavoj Žižek, the authors use the method of qualitative event data analysis to assess the relationship between the most significant historical events and the discourse of Arab nationalism by the advocates of Nasserism and Ba'athist with the aim of explaining how their different opinions and preferences led to different political behaviors of Egypt and Syria.Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser stubbornly adhered to Arab nationalism and the slogan of unification of all Arab people. Anwar Sadat as his successor publicly presented a different view on Arab nationalism and pursued a different foreign policy after the 1973 October War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. Despite the prior agreements with Syria to recapture all Arab territories seized by Israel in the 1967 war, Egyptian military forces were withdrawn from the battle zones after regaining parts of Sinai Peninsula. Sadat’s breach of promise to Assad was followed by his secret negotiations with the U.S. and Israel, and the Camp David peace Accords which culminated in the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state. Syrian military was left alone in the war and forced to accept a cease fire. The government of Egypt’s adherence to the principles of Arab nationalism was abandoned when confronted with the outcome of the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973, but the Ba'athist government of Syria with its weaker attitude towards this issue continued its pursuit of the Arab unity, albeit selectively and irresolutely.

The geographical, cultural, and economic position of contemporary Iran has invariably induced the ruling elites to adopt the logic of balance in the international politics to preserve national independence and interests against external powers. This is a logic that enables the containment of one aggressive and expansionist state through the expansion of cooperation with its rival or adversarial states— relying on the protagonists (the relatively good guys) to deter the antagonists (the bad guys). The conduct and direction of foreign relations of Iran have changed substantially since the overthrow of the pro-western monarchy. With the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the perception of Iran's foreign policy makers of the nature of the international system changed, and attentively opposing foreign domination became the main component of foreign policy formulation. A clear transition in Iran’s foreign policy orientations is evident in its relations with the great powers. The Pahlavi regime’s policy of looking to the West, the post-revolution policies of rejecting both the West and the East, and the consideration of looking to the East policy by the current foreign policy makers in Iran could be explained by this logic. The policy of “neither East, nor West, but the Islamic Republic” was introduced during the anti-Pahlavi protests and was founded on the revolutionary ideal of “Independence, Liberty, the Islamic Republic” in 1979. The slogan of “neither East, nor West- but the Islamic Republic” (nah sharqi, nah gharbi– amā Jomhouri-e eslāmī-ʼi) was recognized as a key principle to guide foreign policy goals and behaviors in Article 152 of the Constitution of the Islamic republic of Iran (IRI). Historically, the mantra of “neither East, nor West” has been activated whenever bipolarity gains momentum in the international system, and small and medium powers had no choice for the preservation of their national interest than joining either one of the two superpowers of the East or West. The “neither East, nor West” policy rejected the alliance with the superpowers and called for neutrality since it was argued that both superpowers had been in favor of maximizing their own powers at the expense of the rest of global community. The history has shown that their first priorities had been their national interest. As a result, the two power blocs have been conceived to be similar and on the same side of one global arrogance which repeatedly ignored the rights of the oppressed. With such a pessimistic view, the Islamic Republic of Iran rejected dependence on either of the world powers and opted for self-reliance in foreign relations. With the end of the Cold War, the fall of the Soviet Union, and the hope for multipolarity in international system, this foreign policy outlook of the Islamic Republic was somehow moderated. The IRI actively entered the global political equations as a regional power. Using the theoretical framework of neorealism, the author attempts to find answers to the following two research questions: 1. To what extent have the main principles that guided Iran's foreign policy changed? 2. What domestic and external factors led to the change in Iran’s foreign policy from the “Neither East nor West” to the “Look to the East” policy? In the research hypothesis, it is argued that the new international security environment that emerged with the transformation of the nature of the international system after the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War as well as the anti-Iran US-imposed sanctions forced Iranian leaders to  gradually revise the foreign policy of “Neither West, Nor East” calling for rejecting dependence on the great powers to the “Look to the East” policy. To find answers to the research questions, the author draws on policy statements made by Iranian government officials, formal document analysis, and the evidence provided in the works of analysts and theorists who have tried to explain Iran’s post-revolution foreign policy. To elaborate on the core factors which influence the making of foreign policy of Iran, he emphasizes the escalation of US-Iran tensions, Iranian leaders’ determination to challenge the US hegemony and unilateralism, and the deterioration of East-West relations that increased the chances of forming a united front against the Western domination with help of the great Eastern powers.  Iran’s foreign policies at different post-revolution time-periods—particularly the three policies of moderate revolutionism, 'uma’garai of supporting Muslims and liberation movements, and finally pragmatism— are analyzed. In conclusion, it is argued that the success of Iran’s foreign policy requires a proper degree of accommodation and normalization of relations with the West based on mutual respect, shared interests, and multilateralism to avoid disproportionate, one-sided dependence on the East, which would lead to perilous limitation on Iran’s choices in foreign policy.

Germany is recognized as one of the world's most powerful economies, with unique experiences in economic modeling and institutional building. Ordoliberalism is a German socioeconomic school which believes that the country can maintain its ideals of social justice, and at the same time, establish a unique governance model to substitute Anglo-Saxon classical liberalism in the context of market economy and neoliberalism, by avoiding the pitfalls of "market fundamentalism." In fact, the German nation-state has been confronted with internal and external crises and conflicts since the unification of German-speaking political units during Bismarck's time in 1871. Nevertheless, Germany is a distinctive case regarding political economy and state building. Germany introduced the unique model of state building in the form of ordoliberlism as a modified version of liberalism in favor of social ideals. Based on Hegel's definition, one can explain that ordoliberalism creates a separating wall between "the political state" and the social individual based on the market processes, thus safeguarding the "civil society”, for which the institutions of the state are built in Germany. Ordoliberalism emerged during a severe crisis of liberal political economy in the Weimar Republic of Germany in the late 1920s. In fact, there was a sort of concerted political effort to restore the rationality of the free economy in the behavior of the state as well as the behavior of the market participants. Ordoliberalism— based on the teachings of ancient Greece, Christianity, and the Age of Enlightenment— became the theoretical backbone of the German social market economy. At the time, the liberal governance was presented as the necessary foundation of the free economy and as a force that could provide the framework of expected conditions for the intervention of the "invisible hand" in the economy to preserve its characteristic of ‘being free”.If economic liberty under liberalism means economy is completely free from any government intervention, there is the risk of the creation of monopolies and oligopolies, and the expansion of poverty in society by “Commodification of Rights”. In its historical process, ordoliberalism in Germany prevented such an outcome by establishing the civil society (i.e., the external state in Hegel's terminology) and reforming liberalism in favor of the common good while still contributing to the formation of governmental institutions in Germany. Earlier ordoliberals had argued in favor of ‘strong government’, which could not be manipulated by corporate pressure, and underscored the concept of ‘social market economy’. They cautioned that economic growth enhancing policies should not be at the expense of social programs. Domestically, Germany utilized democratic and fair mechanisms such as the presence of unions, state intervention in the equitable distribution of income and wealth, and preventing wealth accumulation by the cartels, based on respect for free-market principles. Principally, the paper aims to examine the evolutionary process of the German state during the 20th century by focusing on political economy and ordoliberalism. The primary goal is to explain how the ordoliberal system in Germany has been able to strike an optimal balance between the state and markets despite scores of ebbs and flows in the political history of Germany. At the same time, the article explores how the ordoliberal system has been integrated in the global neoliberal order while coordinating internal political forces in an effective way to build a democratic order. In short, the authors try to investigate the role of German ordo-liberalism in the historical process of the evolution of the state in Germany. The two research questions to be answered are as follows: 1. What are the foundations and characteristics of the German state? 2. From the point of view of state building based on Hegel's theory of state, to what extent has ordoliberalism influenced German politics? Ordoliberalism, as a variant of neoliberalism (or a state-centric neo-liberalism) has coordinated Anglo-Saxon liberalism for the benefit of the "collective good", and ordoliberal ideas have influenced postwar institution-building in Germany. In the research hypothesis, it is postulated that the strong state could regulate free markets to guarantee competition and social justice.This study introduces the main elements of "neoliberalism" as a German interpretation of neoliberalism using a historical approach. The findings of this article demonstrate that ordoliberalism, as the convergence of three intellectual and practical traditions (i.e., ancient Greek, Christianity, and Enlightenment) has successfully created the intermediate space between individuals in society and governmental institutions that Hegel had envisioned while adapting neoliberalism in favor of the social good. After World War II, Germany was integrated into neoliberal international order and reasserted its economic power as part of the capitalist world but aspired to be a model of ‘organized capitalism.’ To achieve the research objective, Hegel's theory of the state is used. First, the authors explain the main components and definition of the state, as well as the primary features of each of these components. Then, Germany's main efforts toward state-building are examined through a historical lens. Finally, the conclusion highlights the role and contribution of ordoliberalism in creating and developing the German state institutions.

Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and the outbreak of the ensuing crisis, have had important security consequences for the international system and particularly for the security environment of the European Union. Since the end of World War II, it is the first time that the European countries feel the shadow of war in this continent. In fact, this crisis has intensified Europeans' efforts to strengthen their defense capabilities. For instance, Germany has promised for the first time to fulfill its NATO commitment to allocate 2% of its GDP to the defense of the military alliance members. Moreover, the drafting of two key documents, (i.e., Strategic Compass of the European Union, and New Strategic Concept of NATO) shows significant determination to strengthen the capabilities of European countries. The publication of NATO's new strategic concept document of June 2022—which is considered the eighth strategic document of this organization since its establishment in 1949— indicates fundamental changes in the European security environment and a change in the threat perception in NATO, which is showing a tendency to return to the long-standing tradition of deterrence and defense.Notable changes resulting in a range of policies include the following: First, in the previous strategic concept of NATO at the Lisbon Summit of 2010, it was announced that the Euro-Atlantic region is peaceful and the threat of a conventional attack on NATO territories is low, but in the new strategic concept, it is said that the Euro-Atlantic is no longer in peace and the possibility of endangering the territorial integrity and sovereignty of NATO  members  should  not be ignored.  Second, the  Lisbon  summit sought to establish a strategic partnership with Russia, while in the latest document Russia is considered the most serious threat to the security, stability, and peace of the Euro-Atlantic. Third, China was not mentioned in the Lisbon strategic concept in 2010, however in the new document, Beijing is described as a systematic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security. In addition, the deepening of the Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership can be a threat to this organization. Finally, it is stated in the new document that the hybrid operations against this organization can reach the level of an armed attack, thus activating the NATO’s Article 5, which specifies that “[t]he Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all”. In sum, regardless of the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, Russia will continue to be a long-term threat to European security.While Russia's invasion of Ukraine has strengthened NATO in the short term, its long-term political cohesion is still an important concern for the political leadership in the mamber-states. Russia's action also reduced tensions between France, the United States, and the United Kingdom which had erupted after the formation of the AUKUS trilateral security pact for the Indo-Pacific region. After the initial phase of the unity of the European countries to confront the threat of Russia, the member states have shown little signs of agreeing on the future strategies. Apparently, they have moved back toward the old way of putting their national security above the collective security. As this conflict continues, the unity of the European Union will be tested. For instance, the Eastern member states of the Union tend to demand more military support for Ukraine and the tightening of sanctions against Russia. Conversely, the Western members of the Union are less willing to strengthen sanctions,  are against sending more weapons to Ukraine, are worried about the increase in tension between NATO and Russia and are unwilling to bear the economic costs of reducing access to the Russian energy sector. Most of the leaders of Western EU countries are thinking beyond deterrence and sanctions and are preoccupied with how to manage relations with Russia in the post-crisis era. The main challenge for European security in the coming years is to strengthen deterrence against Russia and at the same time deal with other security threats.The focus of this research is to answer the following question: What will be the impact of the formulation of NATO's new strategic concept on the future of NATO-EU cooperation and European security? In the research hypothesis, it is argued that the changes in the EU perception of the Russian threat led to the formulation of the new EU strategic compass, and the emphasis on the role of NATO in European security which would strengthen NATO-EU relations at least in the short term and medium term. To test the hypothesis, the authors rely on the expert analysis offered by the analysts and researchers who have explained the consequences of the transformation of the EU and NATO's strategy for European security. Furthermore, the qualitative conceptual content analysis method is used to analyze the most important official documents of NATO and the European Union as well as the relevant policy statements made by the key government officials of the EU and NATO member-states. As expected, the findings of the research show that changes in the threat perception of the EU leadership which led to the formulation of the new NATO strategic concept have had a positive impact on the strengthening of NATO's role in European security