فصلنامه شیعه پژوهی
پیاپی 24 (بهار و تابستان 1402)

Reason is one of the four sources of Shiite knowledge, inference, and thoughts. The Shiite intellectual history bears witness to the fact that this source has gone through various developments in different aspects, including its employment in kalām (theology) and religious doctrines. A survey of the history of Shiite thought demonstrates that there is a wide range of theories about the use of reason, from minimal rationalism to maximal rationalism. The latter seems to be prominently represented by al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā. He was a prominent figure in Shiite rationalism, and even Islam, in the fifth century AH, and was largely influential on Shiite intellectual history. Shiite kalām was impacted by the School of Baghdad, as formulated by al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā, at least until the ninth century AH. Undoubtedly, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is another turning point in this regard. His impact on Shiite kalām can be seen in turning kalām into a branch of philosophy and in his scholastic approach to Shiite kalām. This article seeks show the developments of Shiite kalām in terms of its methodology and interactions with reason through a comparative study of the works of al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā and Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī. This research takes into consideration the characteristics of rationalism and then evaluate the work of these two prominent Shiite scholars. A major application of reason in solving some of the contemporary epistemic crises is as a valid source in epistemology, the relationship between reason and religious obligation, and the relationship between reason and religion. Among the available sources, we focus on al-Sayyid al-Murtaḍā’s Rasāʾil and Tanzīh al-anbiyāʾ, and Khwāja Naṣīr’s Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid and Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād.

The Quranic exegesis attributed to Imam al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (a) is a very controversial book among Shiite scholars. On the one hand, there are prominent scholars on both sides of opponents and proponents of the book’s validity, and on the other hand, each camp has presented compelling evidence in favor of their respective position. Since some of the hadiths within this exegetical book has garnered attention in issues of jurisprudence and its principles, it is necessary to study the extent of validity of this Quranic exegesis by scrutinizing the views and arguments of both sides. The question of this article concerns the extent of validity of the Quranic exegesis attributed to Imam al-Ḥasan al-ʿAskarī (a). The findings of this research indicates that the arguments presented by advocates of the book’s validity are more cogent. Despites its deficiencies, this Quranic exegesis is valid with respect to its chain of transmission. The contribution of this article is its comprehensive study of the views of scholars and their arguments pertaining to the validity of the book.

The emphasis placed on Imamate in Shiism, coupled with the significant role of reason in Shiite sources of ijtihad and the acquisition of religious knowledge, has captivated scholars in the field of Shiite studies, leading them to ponder the intricate connection between the authority of the Imam and the authority of reason. Specifically, they seek to understand the nature of the relationship between these two sources of knowledge. In response, at least three general views have been put forth: closure of reason and its submission towards the Imam, minimal role of the Imam, or maximal rationalism and the authority of reason despite its need to the Imam. The present research employs a descriptive and analytical method, relying on library sources to collect data. The closure of reason in relation to the Imam is espoused by scholars of hadith such as ʿAllāma Majlisī, which is the focus of this article. While ʿAllāma Majlisī has utilized reasoning and reason in his understanding of hadiths, embracing reason as an instrument for inferences (which he calls “reasoning about religious amtters), he rejects reason when it comes to the principles of religion, dismissing its validity as a source of religious knowledge. By citing certain hadiths, he tries to establish that rational arguments cannot be relied on with respect to the principles of religion.
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In Quranic verses, reason is characterized as the main distinctive feature of humans versus animals. However, the Quran does not clarify the definition and implications of reason. In their interpretation of verse 70 of Surah al-Israʾ pertaining to the dignity and superiority of humans, exegetes of the Quran state that reason is the criterion for the human superiority, and then provide implications and characteristics for reason, including speech, perception of universal concepts, resurrection, and belonging to a nation. Nevertheless, all these characteristics are apparently imputed to animals in verse 38 of Surah al-Anʿam, 15-26 of Surah al-Nam, and verse 5 of Surah al-Takwir. This has raised debates over the apparent inconsistency of these verses, presenting the exegetes with the question of how humans may be superior to animals, and yet animals have all the distinctive features of humans, such as reason, speech, community, and resurrection. Exegetes of various philosophical, theological, and mystical folds have addressed the inconsistency by constructing theories to interpret the apparent meanings of verses concerning the human superiority over animals, but they failed to provide a consistent account of the distinction. In fact, the definition and implications of reason, as offered by exegetes, have resulted in this confusion.

The historical connection between Ismailism and Sufism can be traced back to a period preceding the fall of Alamut. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there exist accounts documenting theoretical and practical associations between these two groups even prior to this era. Therefore, it is crucial to explore the earliest instances when Ismaili communities began establishing connections with Sufism. This article considers historical sources and accounts preceding the fall of Alamut, showing that with the beginning of the translation movement when Aristotle’s idea of the unity of being entered Muslim communities, Ismailists were the first to be influenced by the idea. They formed their own beliefs and rites first in association with Bāṭin movements and then with certain Sufi ideas of Ḥallāj in the fourth century AH. This association is manifested in the first works by Ismaili intellectuals were Sufi immitations of certain Fatimid Imams, the period of the declaration of uprising in Alamut, and performance of Sufi rites and practices in their royal courts.

Dunaduni, or the belief in reincarnation, is the second principle of belief within Yarsanism and remains a highly contentious doctrine. Adherents of this creed maintain that dunaduni entails a series of successive lives in one thousand and one bodies, serving to explain the hardships encountered in life. According to their perspective, embracing dunaduni is integral to affirming divine justice, representing the sole pathway to its affirmation. Without embracing dunaduni, they belive, God cannot be deemed just. During the developments of this creed, there have been disagreements among Yarsanists over the construal of dunaduni. Moreover, the doctrine was criticized by non-Yarsanists as well, as many researchers believe this is a belief in the transmigration of the soul. The question in this research is what implications and consequences this belief has for the belief in divine justice within Yarsanism. By collecting library data and deploying the descriptive and analytical method, this research seeks to explain the nature of dunaduni in line with the prevalent interpretation of the doctrine among Yarsanists as well as its implications for divine justice.