نشریه پژوهش های فلسفی
پیاپی 44 (پاییز 1402)

Aristotle assumed Praxis as a comportment with beings which differs from both production and Theoria. Praxis as true action means doing for the sake of doing and not for an end out of the action itself. In the case of the theoretical attitude toward beings Aristotle differs it from Praxis due to the autonomy Theoria carry with itself. Although near Heidegger the Aristotelian conception of action could be appreciated as a pathway to his own project in Being and Time but it is still in need of making clear the relation between self and world. to accomplish the task, we examine the non-representational attitude of Dasein to world, as its own constituting moment, which forms it in projecting own possibilities. We attribute reflection, the term coined by Heidegger, to how Dasein, without representing the self as a logical-formal possibility of his activity, comes to itself in his world-forming transcendence which is called here Praxis.

Anthropology in psychology under the title of "personality theories" has been able to be effective in the field of behavioral studies and interpersonal relationships. The need to explain and analyze the true nature of man in the field of "being" - contrary to psychological personality theories that generally identify human nature in the field of "appearance" - caused this article based on Sadra's anthropological opinions and view According to Allport's trait theory, which is one of the pioneers of the trait approach, it should be organized by descriptive-analytical method. The individualistic approach based on traits is the main feature of Allport's and Mulla Sadra's personality theory. The foundation of personality in both theories is based on the most profound characteristics of person; However, in the analysis of Mulla Sadra's philosophical texts, the quality of the appearance of these traits and why they influence the structure of personality and, accordingly, human behavior, have been explained. "Self" or ego, contrary to its abstract concept in Alport's view, is a real and existential thing in Sadrai's system. The dynamism and unity of Alporti's personality can be rationally explained by the rule of "unity of the known and the known" and "intrinsic volitional movement".

In Mullah Sadra's thought and transcendental wisdom, ways have been introduced to reach the supreme truth, which is the ultimate goal of man in the process of self-perfection. These ways are the way of action and struggle, the way of knowledge and knowledge, and the way of grace and grace, each of which can help a person in the path of his spiritual life and perfection towards the supreme truth. This article, while examining the issue of receiving and the ways of receiving the supreme right from Mullah Sadra's point of view; The superiority of the path of knowledge and knowledge is explained from the point of view of Mulla Sadra. Mulla Sadra is not satisfied with only intellectual behavior in the discussion of the collection, but by proposing the wisdom of grace and divine favor in reasoning to prove the correctness of philosophical issues, he reaches the position of understanding and discovering facts. Mulla Sadra is skeptical about the issue of reaching the Almighty. This article, which is written with analytical-descriptive method and based on Mulla Sadra's works and first-hand sources, shows that Mulla Sadra has presented a new theory and initiative in transcendental wisdom in the matter of attaining and the problem of ways of attaining the supreme right. For this reason, it can be said that Mulla Sadra is the first mystical thinker who introduced Seleucid thinking and important proof reflections about the truth and the ways to reach the supreme truth with these elements into philosophy.

According to Ockham’s razor, assumptions must not be unnecessarily multiplied. While this principle is widely accepted, its justification is controversial. More precisely, we don’t know whether Ockham’s razor is truth-conducive. The present paper aims to address this problem within Betz’s theory of dialectical structures (2012). First of all, I give a brief explanation of this theory. Here, the essential elements of Betz’s theory, which pertains to my discussion, are highlighted. Secondly, I explain why Betz’s theory is favored over the Bayesian framework. In the next step, it will be argued that, at least in the minimal complex positions, potential rivals for Ockham’s razor don’t discharge their functions unless Ockham’s razor is considered as a criterion. The fourth step amounts to the evaluation of Ockham’s razor and its rivals in the minimal complex positions. It is shown that each rival only represents an increase in the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis whereas Ockham’s razor increases the degree of justification of the likelihood of evidence given the hypothesis as well as the posterior degree of justification of the respective hypothesis. This justifies to some extent Ockham’s. Moreover, while the ratio between prima facie plausibility of two competitive hypotheses in the case of Ockham’s razor is greater than those of the potential rivals, the hypothesis with lower prima facie plausibility receives higher posterior degree of justification.

The focus of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is the issue of understanding, and more precisely, the way understanding occurs in our encounter with the world as a "text". Gadamer tries to phenomenologizing the understanding, to express the conditions of the possibility of understanding and how it occurs. His provocative claim is that "any" encounter with the world, is mediated by language. The process of interpretation is the same our linguistic understanding of the world. The universality of this linguistic understanding of the world is to the extent that, even when language seems to be "suspended", we still have to take refuge in language itself to discuss this inadequacy. This is one of the "mysterious" aspects of human linguisticality. Another aspect comes back to the fact that language, like the world, never fully acquiesce to "objectification" and is not given to our consciousness as a unified whole, because language is preceding any understanding. The main questions of this article are as follows: By emphasizing the interconnectedness of language and understanding, Gadamer simply is trying to remind us the same long-standing claim about the relationship between language and thinking, or does he have a more fundamental claim? Does he, by focusing on the linguistic nature of human understanding, want to show us the limitlessness of the boundaries of language, or emphasize on its limitations? In this article, while clarifying the meaning of language and understanding and their relationship in Gadamer's thought, we have tried to answer the mentioned questions implicitly by emphasizing that the significance of language in Gadamer's hermeneutics is not simply limited to putting experiences into words, but this is the mere external and concrete manifestation of the linguisticality of our understanding.

Mulla Sadra has experienced three philosophical journeys: the originality of nature, the originality of existence of gradational oneness and the originality of existence of personal oneness. These three journeys are the main principles of Transcendent Theosophy, and any kind of evolution in them leads to evolutions in minor issues. Due to the systematic connection of the issues, in the issue of the reality of science and various issues related to it, there should be evolutions that are proportional to the three mentioned journeys. According to the first journey of science, the science is from the category of accident and as a result, it is an essential affair, while according to the requirements of the second and third journey, the science has coexistence with existence. This transformation leads to transformation in many minor issues and creates fundamental differences. The issues of the first journey are more influenced by the non-existential view of the realities related to the subject of science, which is referred to as the foundation of qảvm in pre-Sadrai philosophy. In this article, due to the position and opportunity, we will address and analyze some important preliminary issues, which include: the position of discussion, the essential or existential nature of science, being nature or concept of science, the definition of science, the equivocality of names or commonality of meaning of science, being contiguous or analogous of science and the type of attribution proposed in science based on three philosophical journeys.

The ratio of ethics of care and ethics of virtue is one of the questions facing experts of ethics of care, the answer to which has important consequences for ethics of care. Michael Slote and Virginia Held are two leading scholars of care ethics who have different views on its relation to virtue ethics. Slote considers care ethics to be a branch of virtue ethics, but held, while acknowledging some similarities between the two, considers care ethics to be a distinct ethical system. In order to judge between these two views, first, it has been tried to provide a criterion for virtue ethics; Then, the approach that these two experts have towards the ethics of care should be analyzed to determine its compliance or non-compliance with the stated criteria. But due to the fact that Slote considered the element of "empathy" and held the element of "caring relationships" as the basic value in the ethics of care, we are faced with a fundamental difference that makes the answer to the question of "the relationship between the ethics of care and the virtue ethics" subject to the examination of their views on the central element in ethics of care. Despite examining the arguments of the parties about this matter, examining the degree of conformity of these two views with the prevailing view of the ethics of care seems to be the final solution to answer the said question and arbitrate between Slote and Held. Examining the dominant view shows that the basic value in the ethics of care is generally considered to be "the act of care" or "care relationships" and not virtues such as "caring" and "empathy", and accordingly, care ethics, as Held says, should be defined as a system distinct from as virtue Ethics.

Focusing on five symbolic painting works from Golchin Asha’r of the Shiraz-Behbahan school dating back to 1398, the current study attempts to approach the world of meaning of these works in light of Henry Corbin’s Phenomenological-Hermeneutical thought. It will answer the following three questions: What is the relationship between geosophy (visionary topography) and these symbolic paintings? What are the advantages of Corbin’s philosophy to interpret traditional Iranian painting, particularly the Shiraz-Behbahan school? What meanings does the world of these works present? The findings show that it is possible to apply the symbolic painting’s method of representation instead of the familiar drawing methods to present geosophy / visionary topography (geography). The visionary history and geography do not occur on the natural earth but the celestial one through the faculty of imagination. If such a world, celestial earth, is supposed to be represented, the Iranian symbolic painting will be a perfect choice. Corbin’s ideas make the interpretation of such paintings possible by decoding their visual aspect and content. Accordingly, Golchin Ash’ar’s paintings can represent geosophy, in which the question of “what” the earth turns into the question of “who” as the visionary earth replaces images of the natural earth, through some references to the Mazdic texts.

The review of the works and the writings of philosophers regarding the origin of philosophical concepts and the origin of the concepts and imaginations before it are indicative of the gradual and influenced formation and importance of this issue from a series of ideas in both the west and Islam. In the western world, the idea of innate ideas raised by rationalists and the rejection of the same idea by empiricists finally leads the Scottish philosopher Hume, who is evasive from the mysterious philosophy,to tract the origin of concepts and adaptations and by presenting a plan to refer concepts and adaptations has beaten all philosophies and introduced them as illusory and invalid concepts,and appeals to justifying the existence of these concepts in the mind to psychological and imaginary bases. later and in the passing of time due to the entry of western ideas into Iran,especially in the contemporary era,the issue of the origin of concepts and ideas (in general) and the origin of philosophical(in particular) by Allamh Tabatabayi has doubled its value and importance. Allameh, like Hume while rejecting the idea of innate and preconceived notions of the mind and bringing science to the field of presence and emphasizing the inherent existence and discovery of science and by reference all concepts and ideas to present science the validity and epistemological value of the philosophical concepts which are in Hume's philosophical dictionary restores what was disappeared and gives new life to philosophy and its concepts.

In this paper, I will argue against certain criticisms of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, made especially by Baker and Hacker, McGinn, and McDowell. I will show that their interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s view is misplaced. According to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument, there is no fact as to what someone means by her words. For Kripke, this conclusion, combined with Classical Realist view of meaning, leads to the Wittgensteinian paradox, according to which there is no such thing as meaning anything by any word. Wittgenstein presents this paradox in paragraph 201 of the Philosophical Investigations. As Kripke reads Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein is in agreement with his sceptic on the sceptical conclusion of the sceptical argument, that is, that there is no fact about meaning, and builds his sceptical solution on an endorsement of that. McDowell, McGinn, and others have objected that Kripke has failed to properly understand Wittgenstein’s main remarks in 201, that is, that the paradox is the result of a misunderstanding of the ordinary notion of meaning. Wittgenstein does not accept such a sceptical conclusion. I will use the distinction George Wilson draws between two different conclusions of the sceptical argument and show that Kripke has respected all of the remarks that Wittgenstein has put in section 201.

Rhetoric, being among five arts of logic (i.e., Sana’at Khams), is a persuasive yet uncertain art. However, philosophers consider it as a non-philosophical and invalid art. In such a view, this art has no philosophical value and its users seek to deceive and influence the audience in order to attract their attention, so logical speech must be de-rhetorical. The study of early philosophers, especially Aristotle, shows that rhetoric is not one of the branches of uncertain logic, but it is a political tool and is a complementary art in practical philosophy, and because practical philosophy is one of the branches of philosophy, it is also related to philosophy. Plato considered rhetoric to be against the politics of society. Aristotle, also under the influence of Plato, first criticized the common discourse of his time, which relied on the Forensic type and sophistic method. Then, he tries to teach a desirable version of rhetoric for the prosperity of society, considering the necessity of rhetoric in political societies. Aristotle uses enthymeme to relate rhetoric to premises and to highlight its political nature by emphasizing the deliberative rhetoric. This study aims to investigate this proposition in Aristotle’s thoughts, and clarify the political implications of rhetoric.

This article explores the concept of substance, attributes, and modes in Spinoza's "Ethics" by examining them through the perspectives of ancient Greek and medieval philosophers, as well as Descartes' views on substance and extension, along with their notions of God and His attributes. Wolfson's interpretation of Spinoza based on these perspectives serves as the basis for this investigation. The primary objective of this article is to critically evaluate Wolfson's interpretation of the concepts of substance, attribute, and mode as proposed by Spinoza, with a focus on their philosophical implications and coherence within Spinoza's overall framework. Spinoza's predecessors, Aristotle and Descartes, believed in the multiplicity of substances. In contrast, for Spinoza, there is only one substance—a self-sufficient being that exists independently and does not rely on others for its existence. One considers a similarity between modes in Spinoza's philosophy and accidents in Aristotle's system: It is impossible to imagine modes and accidents without substance. Despite this similarity, in the Aristotelian system, accidents characterise the substance, but in Spinoza's philosophy, the substance precedes modes; in fact, modes result necessarily from the substance. Spinoza then claims that the substance has infinite attributes, but the human mind only knows two attributes—Thought and Extension. According to him, the substance is identical to its attributes. So, the substance as thinking thinks about itself, i.e., the body. For Spinoza, individual things and Ideas are finite modes of the attributes of body and mind that follow necessarily from the substance.

In Islamic ethics, it is very important to pay attention to the spiritual dimension of man and the role of moral vices in jeopardizing mental health. In this regard, Islamic sages have divided the existential powers of man to treat moral vices and stated the rule of reason over other powers of the soul as a criterion for mental health. They refer to moral virtues as values that are essential for mental health. Islamic sages have proposed solutions for the treatment of moral diseases, among them: modification of attitude, spiritual explanations, and treatment based on the tendency to virtue versus moral vice. Considering that in Islamic ethics moral vices are mentioned as psychological diseases and methods for their treatment are stated, these methods can be used in the treatment of psychological disorders as well. Our goal in this research is to provide guidance for developing a native Islamic model based on the role of Islamic virtue ethics in CBT and Logotherapy, which are two important theories in contemporary psychotherapy, considering the multidimensional nature of human beings and the influence of these dimensions on each other.

Mullā Ṣadrā offers two different views regarding the references of the philosophical secondary intelligibles. According to the first view, philosophical secondary intelligibles only have external foundations for abstraction (mansha al-intizāʿ) and no external counterparts (mā bi iza ͗). And according to the second view, also known as Mullā Ṣadrā’s final view, these concepts have external counterparts which exist with the very existence of their subjects. This view faces some problems: First, Mullā Ṣadrā’s reason for the existence of these concepts’ external counterparts begs the question and is therefore invalid. The argument Ṭabāṭabāʾī offers in his commentary on Mullā Ṣadrā’s argument is also flawed since it presupposes a point that is more difficult to accept than the conclusion and so would naturally be rejected by the other side. Second, the purported counterpart’s mode of existence is not clear. Third, it is not clear by virtue of what difference between quidditative and philosophical concepts the former but not the latter have independent counterparts. The method employed in this paper is library research and rational analysis.

Only difference exist in the language. It should not be unheeded that it is the difference which usually determines affirmative phrases where difference is counterbalanced in their intermediacy: but in the language only differences devoid of affirmative phrases exist. In the language, considering sign or signified, no concept or vocal could be found which had existed prior to the language, in lieu, only vocal or conceptual differences, engendered by the grammatological scheme, could be descried. The concept or the essence which the sign enfolds carries less significance than other signs which are encompassing it. The mere proof of this claim is that by changing its adjacent words, the value of a term could be altered and this is achieved without implementing a change in its own meaning or voice. What is of import in the post-structural critic of philosophers effected by de Saussure is his debased organization of though and not a sign-based one regarding the narrative of construction.

Schelling's goal is to find a total consciousness for human; therefore, in the philosophy of nature, he tries to reach from the real to the ideal. On the other hand, the conscious spirit is a product of human subjectivity, so, an unconscious spirit manages things. Therefore, Schelling's transition from natural philosophy to the system of transcendental idealism occurs. Reaching this level of consciousness is possible when [I] goes through different stages. The first stage is sensation, then reflection and after that comes praxis. But since the will of the subject of and the will of nature are the same, and ethics is in the realm of practical reason, then the subject of action does not have free will. Therefore, there is a gap between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy that Schelling must somehow fill. He solves this problem with the free and creative will of an artist, a will that acts not out of necessity but freely. Schelling reaches the absolute from the identity of natural philosophy and transcendental idealism. The absolute is the result of identity of the real and the ideal. It is crystal clear that expounding how to objectify the absolute leads to a better comprehension of Schelling's philosophical system. In this article, it is investigated that among theoretical wisdom, practical wisdom and art, which one Schelling deems the most functional mechanism to objectify the absolute, and what are the roles of genius and the beauty through this path.

Rorty claims that metaphysicians and religious scholars agree with the separation of the public sphere (politics) from the private sphere (religion). While metaphysicians try to find this goal by discovering the nature of public and private, theorists try to do this by prioritizing public instead of private or vice versa. But Rorty, by creating a dividing line between the private sphere and the public sphere, claims that the political sphere does not need to obtain its foundations from the individual criteria of the private sphere, to which religion also belongs. He removes the centrality of truth from the stage of thought with an epistemological and religious approach and replaces it with dialogue (correlation with different "us") in which no member is more fundamental than another and no member is allowed to Judgment is not about other competence. According to Rorty, religious arguments are viewed as limited knowledge, which is non-negotiable and acts as a dialogue stopper. This is where religion not only becomes a way to reject the authority of the rest of the world, but also acts as a way to block the will of agreement between people. Our assumption is that Rorty's view of religion, which is based on the theory of the primacy of politics over religion, is contradictory to her ideal of a society for which both religious pluralism elites are important and maintaining political solidarity.

This article deals with the imaginary and symbolic function of the psyche, and the Real as the main categories of Lacan's thought, which was achieved by the logical extension of Freud's psychoanalysis, and then, by using the Freudian-Lacanian conceptual network, the roots of formation of Plato's metaphysics will be considered. A requirement of Parmenides' philosophy is silence and the inevitable outcome of Heraclitus's becoming, is idle talk, and perhaps the death of Socrates is due to the disregard of the defenders of Parmenides to social issues and the baseless discourse of the defenders of Heraclitus. According to the Freudian-Lacanian interpretation, Parmenides’ thought, which deals with the idea, corresponds to the symbolic function, and Heraclitus’ orientation, which pays attention to sensory perceptions, is compatible with the imaginary function of the psyche. However according to the Platonic interpretation, absorption in unity is a static activity, and mere attention to multiplicity leads to baseless dynamics. Plato uses the generality and necessity of the idea to limit the representation of the object and transcends the violence hidden in the imaginary function by the truth-seeking spirit in the play of ideas.

This article aims to reassess the concepts of power, resistance, and subjectivity by examining the ideas of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. At first glance, it seems that these two thinkers, rooted in different philosophical and theoretical foundations, are in opposition to each other, making a dialogue between their perspectives seemingly impossible. However, this article proposes an alternative approach by highlighting the common grounds and commonalities in their deconstruction of power. Moreover, it argues that their political views can be seen as aligned and complementary, leading to a deepening and development of each other's ideas and the creation of new political approaches. Thus, the central questions addressed in this article are: what forms of agency emerge for the contemporary subject as result of the deconstruction of power in thought of Arendt and Foucault? How does power act as a source of resistance while opening up new possibilities for the subject? The main finding of this study is that, in contrast to traditional and modern interpretations, power in the works of these thinkers is seen as a positive, creative, and productive concept. Based on this understanding, resistance and alternative forms of empowerment for the subject emerge. It should be noted, however, that Arendt’s and Foucault’s interpretation of resistance agency and power may differ due to the primacy of political and social issues in their respective theories.

Various definitions of humanity have been expressed in Islamic culture; Such as a physical substance with a duty, a talking animal, a single soul, an animal in love, and a living being; However, Mulla Sadra has defined man as a "fixed and fluid being" based on the essential movement, and based on this definition, he considers the supreme value for a person to be "permanent movement towards absolute perfection". Sadra's other interpretation of the perfection of a person is to reach the "super celibate position" that by reaching this position, a person can enter the holy world and God's pleasure and even surpass the position of angels. According to him, the origin of this dignity in man is the weakness of man and the abundance of pests and diseases that are mentioned in the verses of the Quran. A creature that is not like this at the beginning of creation imagines perfection in itself; therefore, there will be no waiting for him to reach perfection.

Michel Foucault (1926-1984), a French postmodern philosopher, has reflected on the nature of philosophy and its relationship with modernity in his various books. This article is based on the contemporary controversies about the nature and destiny of philosophy that have been raised under the literature of "metaphilosophy" since the 1970s and by referring to Foucault's key Ideas such as the order of things, the Archeologydg of knowlee, the history of sexuality, power-knowledge. And …. to Analyise the relationships of Foucault's understanding of philosophy (Foucault's metaphilosophy) in connection with his reading of humanism as the foundation of modernity. What in Foucault's opinion is the link between metaphilosophy and modernity is Foucault's theoretical effort in expanding and deepening the intellectual literature of "anti-humanism" in the tradition of continental philosophy.

Scientific realism has always faced continuous criticisms from scientific anti-realists. Kyle Stanford's "unconceived alternatives" argument can be seen as a late and troublesome version of these challenges. In this paper, we will first briefly mention scientific realism and its supporting arguments, including the "no-miracle" argument and the "slippery slope" argument. Then we will list the main challenges that scientific realism has faced. Arguments such as "pessimistic meta-induction" and "underdetermination of scientific theories" are raised against scientific realism. In the following, we will take a look at Stanford's argument and examine how it creates a challenge for realism by combining historical and philosophical arguments, and we will also describe the realist answers raised to the said challenge. We will also try to explain from Roy Bhaskar's critical realism point of view how the Stratified view of the world and scientific theories, makes it possible to achieve knowledge of reality through scientific activity and also can weaken the basis of Stanford's anti-realist argument.

In Philosophical investigations, Wittgenstein criticizes many classical and contemporary philosophical theories about language. Here, with a brief presentation of what is called as the theory of "language of thought" (or mentalese), I will try to show why this theory is also rejected by Wittgenstein's conception of language. For this purpose, my efforts will be focused on answering these questions, according to Wittgenstein: What is called "thought" and what is its relation with language? Is thought a purely mental process? Is language just an instrument to convey thought? Does thought precede language or is it not independent of language? If thought is not independent of language, do humans have something as mentalese, or the language of thought, before learning a language? Finally, I will try to show Wittgenstein's objection to the theory of the language of thought falls under which set of objections to this theory and what is the response of proponents of the language of thought to this objection and how is this response evaluated.

The issue of the nature of the state is one of the most important issues in political philosophy, and any interpretation of it will follow an interpretation of government ends, ideal government, and the necessity to obey the government, political legitimacy and freedom in its own way. The present study, which is theoretical in terms of its fundamental content, applies the theoretical framework of Mouffe's radical democracy, and focuses on one of the prominent figures of the political philosophy of public law in the 20th century, and finally attempted to answer the main question of what is the ideal government the type and the nature of it in the political theology of Karl Schmitt? The results illustrate that the understanding and interpretation of the nature of the state as well as the desired government in Schmitt's political philosophy and political theology in the light of understanding the fundamental concepts in his thought such as political theology is political matter, rule friend/enemy/independent dictatorship, sovereignty, the concept of exception in criticism of European liberal parliamentary system, negative anthropology, adaptation of citizenship to political nationality, criticism of the concept of majority in liberal democracy. The results also state that Schmidt's ideal government is compatible with the identity-oriented type of radical democracy. The significance of the study dates back to the growing criticism of liberal democracy and the emergence of radical democratic governments, especially in Latin America.

The law is the reason and guide for human behavior; therefore, it is a normative social practice. But what conditions should a norm have to be called a law and what is its relationship with morality? Is the criterion of being a law, its origin or its content? In response, the school of natural law and legal positivism are two long-standing competing theories. The school of natural law, which is a recommendatory and prescriptive, emphasizes the content, but the positivism, which is descriptive and explanatory, emphasizes the source of the law. Of course, at first, the school of natural law looked for content in religion, but today, individual human rights as the subject and social contract as the process has noticed. The conceptual space of legal positivism is formed by the combination of two theses of social reality and separability, and the separation theory denies any conceptual and content relationship between law and morality. but, Dworkin, by criticizing the separation theory, divided positivism into two opposing camps, soft and hard, and the soft positivism abandoned the separation theory to some extent. But is soft legal positivism compatible with the claim of the authority of the law and its guiding function? Is discovered or invented morality an essential and existential part of the law or is it a criterion for its evaluation? In this article, the mentioned questions are analyzed in order to discover the position of hard and soft legal positivism.

Thaddeus Metz has tried to show that the meaning in life, like morality and happiness, is one of the normative categories of life and emphasizes the distinction between the meaning in life and happiness. According to Metz's definition, happiness consists of "positive experiences" and pleasure is basically connected with happiness. Why is happiness different from meaningfulness and what are their differences? These are the main questions that this article addresses. By searching in Metz's works, we can provide some witnesses and reasons why Metz makes a distinction between happiness and meaningfulness. According to Metz's view, happiness is related to the animal realm of the individual, while meaningfulness is related to the human realm, so that although pleasure can increase happiness, but it will not necessarily lead to meaningfulness increase. He makes six distinctions between happiness and meaningfulness: 1. The source of meaning is "relational", but the source of happiness is "intrinsic"; 2. The bearer of meaning is "action", but the bearer of happiness is "sensation"; 3. The greater impact of happiness from “luck” than meaningfulness; 4. The desire to "continue" the state of happiness, wanting "esteem" to be meaningful; 5. The possibility of happiness, only "during the lifetime" in contrast to the possibility of meaningfulness "posthumously"; 6. bias towards the future v lack of bias. Although Metz has mentioned six important distinctions between happiness and meaning, his statement is not comprehensive and other distinctions can be added to Metz's list.

Clarifying the nature of accidental lights is one of the main parts of Suhrawardi’s emanative structure. Having elaborated the way these lights illuminate and the role they play in creating Lords of Species (archetypes), he innovatively explained parallel (horizontal) multiplicities of intellects whose presences make all entities possible in all worlds lie below the world of Power (Alam al-Jabarut), i.e., alam al-malakut and alam al-mulk.Mulla-Sadra, who has often mentioned Platonic Ideas in his works and considered himself as a defender of this theory, was intensely influenced by Suhrawardi’s emanative structure and especially his theory of Lords of Species (archetypes), which are equivalent to Platonic Ideas. Although Mulla-Sadra mostly owes his ontological structure to Suhrawardi’s emanative one, he, when dealt with the problem of accidental lights, which provides a basis for Lords of the Species to be possible, presumes that believing in accidental lights is in conflict with the principle of complete actuality of intellects and their pure incorporeity. In this article, firstly, we make it clear why even if someone adheres to Mulla-Sadra's position regarding complete actuality of intellects, he can still accept Lords of the Species. He can explain the creation of parallel (horizontal) order of intellects by referring to different aspects of intellects lie in ascending (vertical) order. Secondly, we show that Mulla-Sadra was not justified in believing in complete actuality of intellects. Because it is not one of the principles of Transcendent Wisdom (Al-Hikma al-muta ‘aliya), nor does it cohere with other main principles of this philosophical system.

The question of time has always been one of the greatest questions of philosophers and physicists throughout history. Undoubtedly, every philosophical thought is manifested in different forms in literary and artistic works, and among them there are writers and artists who use philosophy as the basis of their works. Samuel Beckett is one of the most influential writers in shaping the school of thought of Absurd Theater, which has its roots in philosophy. This article purports to examine and express the issue of time in the play Waiting for Godot using the ideas of Martin Heidegger. Martin Heidegger looks at the question of "time" from an ontological point of view and in his divisions, he considers "time" in both original and non-original forms for Dasein (existence). As in the play Waiting for Godot, the most important action of the play "the issue of time" is the characters' conflict in the form of two Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger's definition of the original and non-original "time" with which Dasein is involved in life, "time" was examined as the most important element in the play Waiting for Godot. To achieve this analysis, it was first necessary to provide an exhaustive definition of "time" in the philosophical thought of Heidegger and the philosophers before him, and then by examining the issue of wait and its meaning in Heidegger's "time", the play Waiting for Godot and the characters' continuous wait were interpreted. Analytical research has been used in this study and by examining Heidegger's thoughts and Samuel Beckett's the play Waiting for Godot, and using descriptive-analytical method, it has been tried to find the common ground between Beckett's thought on writing and performing the scenes of this play and Heidegger's philosophical thoughts to shed new light on its analysis and conducting.

As Hegel claims in the phenomenology of the soul, subjectivity as the fate of the history of consciousness aims to show how the soul tries to establish a dialectical relationship between the objective and the subjective by becoming aware of itself and reconciling consciousness with self-awareness and to reconcile the two in the subjectivity found in absolute idealism. The main problem of this article is to show how and with what conceptual possibilities Hegel can overcome the one-sidedness of objective realism and subjective idealism by means of the subjectivity in the phenomenology of the soul. To answer this question, the author tries to explain the subjectivity in the book Phenomenology of the Spirit through the conceptual possibilities of consciousness, self-awareness, human society and political situation, and how to actualize the abstract absolute existing at the beginning of the history of consciousness through the mentioned concepts. show for this reason, it is explained that by bringing the absolute closer to the human community and creating an ontological dialectic between God and human "us", Hegel integrates the absolute into the political situation, and by integrating God into the political state, to reveal the absolute both to himself and to human "us" in philosophical knowledge and in this way establish a dialectical union between the realm of the subject and the realm of the object. In this article, the author has used the descriptive-analytical method to explain his position.

Regarding the analysis of voluntary action, there are two general attitudes in Western philosophy: causal explanation and non-causal rational explanation. The first view has been the classic and common theory in the history of Western philosophy and thought, but the second has been formed in the contemporary century. According to the first view, the inner elements of the agent, i.e., desire, intention and belief, have a causal relationship with his action, and the explanation of the action based on them is an example of causal explanation. John Searle, a famous contemporary philosopher who defends the second view, lists six assumptions for the first theory and criticizes them. Based on the words of Searle and other proponents of the first view, this article explains, rationally analyzes and evaluates Searle's six assumptions and his criticisms.The mentioned assumptions are: the causality of beliefs and desires for rational actions, rationality as following certain principles and rules, rationality as a separate cognitive faculty, weakness of will caused by disturbance in the psychological antecedents of the action, denial of desire-independent reasons for action and realization of rationality in the assumption of consistent collection of previous desires. Searle believes that these assumptions are incomplete. Some of Searle's criticisms and his positive views are debatable, including that the agent himself is the cause of action, not his beliefs and desires, and that Searle's idea of the desire-independent reason is incomplete and there is a desire in this kind of reason. The rationality includes primary goals and beliefs.

Love is one of the few effective common topics in philosophy, art, mysticism. It can be believed that the greatest Greek philosopher who spoke extensively about love is Plato. His view had a direct impact not only on the philosophy of the Western world, but also on Islamic philosophy. In Islamic philosophy, love also plays a central role in Suhrawardi's works. They have also given an epistemological role to love. Another importance of this topic is that love has been introduced and played a role in the religion and thought of the West and the East by both philosophers., Both philosophers have presented an ideal city that cannot be imagined and understood correctly without understanding concepts such as love. On the other hand, a significant part of the current love affairs has taken a deviant path and caused a great distance between the current cities and the desired city in terms of human dignity, which requires the presentation of a correct model. Present research with a descriptive-analytical method aims to clarify what Plato and Suhrawardi thought about love, how they thought, what conclusions they made, and what lovemaking is like in their ideal city, and what are the commonalities and differences?