فصلنامه پژوهش های راهبردی سیاست
پیاپی 46 (پاییز 1402)

The present research deals with the discrepancy between the hypothesized theory of the Asiatic mode of production and the empirical evidence from the Qajar era. Specifically, it explored whether the state–class relationship in the Qajar era can accurately be characterized as oriental despotism (or an Asian state), or it reflects a state where the power of the king was limited by influential classes, such as the clergy, affluent merchants, local nobility, provincial rulers, princes, large landowners, and tribal chiefs. The central focus of this research was to determine whether the Qajar state enjoyed power concentration or operated within a kind of power plurality. In this respect, the central question is: Was the power of the Qajar state limited by social classes, or did it wield absolute and supra-class authority?

Theoretical Framework:

The study examined the state–class relationship through the lens of Karl Marx’s theory of the state. Marx’s perspective on the state can be categorized into three distinct models: the powerless state, the state with relative power, and the state with absolute power. Applying these three models, the present study analyzed the dynamics of the state–class relationship during the Qajar era.According to Marx’s instrumentalist theory, the concept of a class state suggests that both the form and essence of the state are contingent upon prevailing classes. While the state may exhibit diverse variations and characteristics in different historical contexts, it fundamentally relies on classes. In all instances, the state functions as a dependent entity and a tool of the ruling class. Marx presented his theory of the Bonapartist state in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852) and The Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 (1850). Marx acknowledges that the state possesses a certain degree of independent power or relative autonomy from the ruling class. According to Marx and Engels, the absence of private land ownership and the existence of large-scale state-controlled water facilities, despite their apparent contradiction, are the defining characteristics of the Asian state, in which the autocratic state machinery exercises control over the production surplus and serves not only as the central apparatus for oppression but also as a tool for economic exploitation at the disposal of the ruling class. In such a setting, “the state reigns supreme.”As evident, Marx’s triadic model of the state analyzes the state–class relationship at three levels. The model of class state portrays a state that lacks power and relative autonomy from the ruling class. The Bonapartist state enjoys relative autonomy from the ruling class, while the Asian state wields absolute power and autocratic authority over all societal classes. The present research used Marx’s triadic model as the analytical framework to examine the state–class relationship during the Qajar era.

This research employed a historical case study approach, which involves gathering extensive information through various data collection methods over an extended temporal span. The collected information is systematically analyzed with the explicit objective of deriving theoretical insights. The documentary research method within the framework of recorded or written history was used to collect the relevant information. There are three strategies for data analysis: pattern matching, explanation building, and time series analysis. Given the descriptive nature of the current case study, the pattern matching method, specifically the type of rival explanations, was utilized. This method involves comparing the historical pattern derived from experience with the predicted theoretical pattern.

The central question addressed in the present article pertains to the extent of the Qajar state’s power; whether it was constrained by social classes or characterized by absolute and supra-class authority. According to the research findings, the influential clerics, relying on their social support base, exerted their influence over the state. This influence manifested openly through the issuance of fatwas in significant events such as the Russo-Persian Wars, the Persian Tobacco Protest, or the Constitutional Movement. Furthermore, the clerics often succeeded in establishing common interests through their relationships with statesmen, thereby exerting influence over high-ranking state officials. Notably, clerics comprised 20% of the social composition of the first parliament, which signifies their official entry into the power structure of the time.Prominent and affluent merchants, particularly in the first half of the 19th century, wielded influence by fulfilling the financial requirements of the state and cooperating closely with it. However, their role evolved in the second half of the 19th century marked by events like the Tobacco Protests and Monsieur Naus, when they joined the protesters and disrupted the country’s economic cycles due to conflicting interests. This class emerged as one of the most influential groups in Iran during the Qajar era. With the establishment of the Constituent Assembly, they secured a significant one-third of the parliament composition.The influential patriarchs of tribes and the heads of important clans held significant sway due to their independent geographic position and economic resources, military strength, and provision of manpower to the Qajar army. This enabled them to exert influence and even engage in direct conflicts with the state, such as during the Constitutional Movement.Given Iran’s population structure, which predominantly comprised farmers, the large landowners assumed the role of quasi-sovereigns within the territories under their ownership. Their possession of extensive estates, personal military forces, and substantial incomes derived from landownership, combined with a weak bureaucracy and an inefficient tax system, granted them considerable autonomy in areas under their influence.

According to the findings, it becomes highly challenging to conceive of the Qajar state as the entity possessing absolute power, as Marx suggests as the primary characteristic of the Asian state. In the Qajar Iran, influential social classes, including the clergy, affluent merchants, local nobility, provincial rulers, princes, large landowners, and tribal chiefs, served as intermediary layers that limited the state’s power and prevented the establishment of a supreme master or an absolute ruler. Moreover, the Qajar state, originating from the Qajar tribe, was not practically reliant on the tribe itself or other social classes, so the Qajar state actually employed various methods, such as granting state positions or making discord between tribes, to control and even suppress them. Accordingly, the Qajar state cannot be categorized as a mere instrument of the ruling class or an entity with absolute power. It does not align with the concept of a class state or even a supra-class state. Instead, enjoying power and relative autonomy from the dominant class, the Qajar state could create a relative balance between social forces, leading to its characterization as a Bonapartist state.

Social dissatisfaction in Iran, particularly over the past decade, has been widespread and profound, as confirmed by national surveys. A review of the last four decades reveals the emergence of social discontent and political unrest in various manifestations and at different times. In certain instances, such as in 2009, the protests have posed a threat to the survival and stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Indeed, an analysis of the frequency and duration of social protests demonstrates the growth and prevalence of social dissatisfaction within Iranian society.Social dissatisfaction can manifest itself through apathy and non-participation, as seen in the decline in political participation during the Islamic Council and presidential elections in in the recent decade, particularly in 2019 and 2021. A review of relevant research shows a lack of deep insight and comprehensive understanding of social dissatisfaction as a multi-faceted issue in Iran, which can be a major obstacle to insightful policymaking for successful and cost-effective management of social dissatisfaction.The present research aimed to analyze and elucidate the underlying factors that contribute to social dissatisfaction, and subsequently develop strategies for effectively managing and mitigating the issue within Iranian society. The objective can ultimately enhance the efficiency of the decision-making process and policymaking in order to effectively address social dissatisfaction and protests. Accordingly, the main research questions are: What are the causal factors underlying social dissatisfaction in the Islamic Republic of Iran? and what are the potential solutions to solve the issue?

The present research employed a mixed methods research design. The documentary analysis method was utilized to examine and analyze various perspectives and approaches, as well as to investigate the evolution of the phenomenon of social dissatisfaction in Iranian society. Moreover, the method of causal layered analysis (CLA) was used to analyze and explain the underlying causes that contribute to social dissatisfaction in Iran.This method incorporates the examination of four distinct layers: the litany, social/systemic causes, discourse/worldview, and myth/metaphor. The litany layer represents the surface level, encompassing the most evident and objective aspects of the future. The social/systemic layer involves exploring the technological, social, economic, historical, political, and environmental causes associated with the subject matter. The discourse layer encompasses efforts to comprehend linguistic, cultural, and social structures that shape and pertain to the future. Lastly, the myth/metaphor layer delves into the investigation and exploration of schemas, mental images, and underlying narratives.The researchers collected the data by administering an open semi-structured questionnaire to a total of 10 experts. The collected data was subjected to review by 5 additional experts, who were asked to confirm the identified causes and related factors with the ultimate aim of ensuring the validity and reliability of the data. Based on the degree of consensus and frequency, the identified causes were categorized into three levels: systemic, discursive, and metaphorical. Furthermore, the researchers developed scenarios of social dissatisfaction by sharing the collected data with 5 experts, who were requested to envision future dissatisfaction scenarios in the 2031 horizon across three categories: desirable, possible, and probable.

After conducting a review of relevant literature and collecting insights from 10 experts, the present study examined and analyzed the causes and factors contributing to social dissatisfaction the Islamic Republic in three layers: systemic, discursive, and metaphorical. At the systemic level, various factors were identified and discussed, including the prevalence of poverty, increasing discrimination, widening class gap and increasing Gini coefficient, evolving societal lifestyles, widespread feelings of deprivation, unjust distribution of national resources, and unsustainable development, etc.In the discursive layer, various causes and factors were identified and analyzed, including the historical mistrust towards the political sphere, the duality of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Shia culture and thought, the modern thought and worldview, the discourse of transformation, the discourse of Western development, and the alienation of political governance, etc. Moving to the metaphorical/mythical layer, factors such as the portrayal of the government as a bandit in Iranian culture, the usurpation of power by the state, the metaphor of the Alavi government, and historical transformation-seeking were recognized and discussed as influential elements in the development of social dissatisfaction.Moreover, in accordance with expert opinions, three scenarios (desirable, possible, and probable) were formulated and constructed regarding the future of social dissatisfaction in Iran. In the desirable scenario, effective reformist measures and the realization of the right to protest would lead to a reduction in social dissatisfaction, putting protests within a legally recognized framework. In the possible scenario, considering the continuation and exacerbation of underlying causes of dissatisfaction, we would witness the accumulation of social dissatisfaction and the emergence of intermittent episodes of violent social protests. Finally, according to the probable scenario, civil disobedience would arise as a result of the prevailing security-focused approach and the rising costs of engaging in protests.

Social dissatisfaction remains a significant issue in Iran, posing considerable challenges to political stability and national security. Effective policymaking and management concerning social dissatisfaction initially requires a comprehensive and accurate understanding of this complex issue. In this line, the present study used the CLA method as an effective approach to examine different causal layers and drivers and their impact on social dissatisfaction. The results indicated that the Islamic Republic of Iran aims to move towards its desired scenario, which involves reducing dissatisfaction and implementing a persuasive and systematic approach to managing social protests. However, given the current circumstances, attaining this scenario proves to be challenging. Instead, the possible scenario entails the continued accumulation of dissatisfaction and ongoing social protests, which will pose a significant challenge to the political stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Protests will be characterized by increased violence, potentially leading the political system to adopt a hard approach in suppressing and managing social unrest. This, in turn, may exacerbate radicalism and further fuel social dissatisfaction. The probable scenario, characterized by intermittent and costly protests as well as civil disobedience, presents an alternative outlook for the future of social dissatisfaction. In this scenario, social dissatisfaction manifests itself through intermittent protests that occur at various intervals and in response to specific events. As social dissatisfaction continues to evolve and persist, some citizens may resort to civil disobedience and divergence from official values and norms.

Iran is a vast country situated in a strategically significant region of the Middle East. Within its borders, a diverse array of ethnic, cultural, and religious groups coexist. A crucial aspect of Iran’s internal dynamics pertains to the formulation of ethnic policies aimed at fostering an inclusive unity and cohesion among its populace, all the while preserving and celebrating the richness of its cultural and ethnic diversity in line with the country’s objectives and ideals. Today, the formulation of ethnic policies has become an exceedingly vital and indispensable matter due to a number of factors, including the rise of micro and sub-national discourses and the need to regulate their interactions with the political system, government, and national identity; the proliferation of ethnic and religious groups in various countries and particularly in neighboring states; and the prominence of ethnic and tribal identities. Limiting the sphere of influence, authority, and acceptance of a shared collective identity, these developments are accompanied not only by the presence of influential international and regional factors and actors but also by gaps in ethnic identities. It is thus necessary to formulate ethnic policies in the country.A significant segment of Iran’s population comprises ethnic, local, and regional tribes and subcultures, whose inclinations, attitudes, and actions hold great importance across various social, cultural, and political domains in the country. The election is considered a key domain with the high frequency of occurrence in Iran. In this respect, the relationship and activities of ethnic groups during election periods represent a significant topic for study and investigation. The areas of interest include the degree and nature of participation of ethnic groups and their behavior towards a particular candidate or political party in the election. The participation in elections actually serves as a stable indicator of political participation.In Iran, ethnic groups perceive their participation in elections as playing a social–identity role in political dynamics. As candidates vie for as many votes as possible during their election campaigns, they engage in election campaigns characterized by slogans and the presentation of plans and promises. Meanwhile, in the institutionalized and conventional opportunity offered by elections, voters and citizens form their opinions concerning the desired choice by listening to and comparing candidates’ plans, programs, and policies.In a study conducted by Agumore and Adams (2014) in Ghana, the examination of 17 influential factors on voting behavior revealed that candidates’ electoral messages had the most significant impact on voters, while the candidate’s ethnicity proved to be one of the least influential factors. This suggests that the stance and programs advocated by candidates play a crucial role in motivating voters to support them. Alwan (2020) studied the tribal power in Iraq and its implications for the political and social system. The findings demonstrated that a weak and corrupt government contributes to the encouragement of tribal dominance. The Iraqi people, regardless of their personal beliefs, are strongly attached to their tribes. Despite recognizing that tribes are pre-state organizations and a distorted form of civil society, they perceive no viable alternative due to the inability of the weak state to establish law and order.Akbari and Fakhari (2016) explored the influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity on the electoral behavior of citizens in Bojnurd. The research involved 367 participants from diverse ethnic groups. The results revealed an ethnic voting pattern score of 34.7 on a scale of 0 to 100. Additionally, the average ethnic identity score among the respondents was 58.6. The findings of the study indicate a significant relationship between ethnic voting patterns and variables such as ethnic demands, the sense of political legitimacy, and ethnic identity, as demonstrated by the multivariable regression model. According to Tabiee et al. (2022), there are numerous paradoxes, contradictions, and conflicts between political tribalism and the development in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad. The research suggests that an increase in the tendency towards political tribalism leads to a decrease in development in the province. However, the development and progress of society can mitigate the effects of political tribalism, potentially leading to its dissipation.

The present research used the method of content analysis for data collection. The method involves gathering empirical evidence by enquiring text units rather than directly surveying individuals. In content analysis, the primary unit of observation is the text itself. Concerning the present study, the researchers selected texts on the candidates’ speeches presented in various sources, including newspapers such as Ettela'at, Shargh, Resalat, and Vatan-e Emrouz, as well as the candidates’ speeches during visits to East Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, and Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad. The researchers also considered the coverage of these speeches in the aforementioned newspapers or locally relevant websites. Additionally, televised elections debates, particularly those focusing on cultural themes, were included in the analysis.

Relying on empirical evidence, the study analyzed and compared ethnic slogans and ethnic belonging in the 9th and 11th presidential elections. According to the results, the representation of ethnic slogans stands at 31.11%t in the texts produced by candidates during the 9th election, whereas during the 11th election, the figure increased significantly to 68.89%. Moreover, the representation of ethnic belonging was found to be 26.93% and 73.07% in the texts produced by the candidates during the 9th and 11th elections, respectively. These findings indicate that candidates during the 11th period placed considerable emphasis on ethnic issues, delving more deeply into these matters. They made concerted efforts to attract the votes of ethnic groups by highlighting ethnic concerns and giving significant attention to these issues in their campaign texts and speeches. As a result, the candidates who had prioritized ethnic issues could receive a larger share of votes in the aforementioned provinces.

According to the research findings, it can be concluded that there was a significant increase in the representation of slogans and ethnic belonging by candidates during the 11th election compared to the 9th term. The candidates put a special focus on ethnic issues in their speeches and campaign texts. Among the candidates in both elections, Hassan Rouhani stands out for emphasizing ethnic issues more than others. His receiving notable and substantial votes in these provinces, particularly in Kurdistan, indicates his special attention to this category.The research findings, particularly in the 11th election, indicate that addressing ethnic slogans and belonging and highlighting them in presidential campaigns can effectively increase candidates’ votes in provinces with a significant ethnic population. However, regarding the reasons behind the heightened attention to ethnicity and repetition of past issues by the candidates in the 11th election, it is suggested that the demands and needs of ethnic groups had not been adequately addressed in previous elections. Alternatively, it is possible that the repetition of past issues is merely a strategy to secure votes, with candidates failing to address these demands even after winning the election, thus treating them merely as a means to an end.

The Palestine issue has held a central position in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran has pursued a policy of non-alignment and protection of Muslims, marked by the non-recognition of the Israeli regime and the protection of Palestinian rights. This article aimed to elucidate the foreign policy perspective of the Islamic Republic of Iran regarding the Palestine issue, with a primary focus on formulating possible, likely, and desirable scenarios for Iran’s future foreign policy on this matter.

As an exploratory endeavor, the present research employed a qualitative research method, which consisted of two stages: an initial exploratory study involving extensive reading and subsequent interviews. The research did not involve a statistical population; instead, a community of experts comprising 21 individuals was selected through the snowball sampling method.

The interviews were conducted until reaching the saturation stage. Then, nine themes were identified through thematic analysis. The identified themes encompassed the main statements derived from the interviews. They are as follows:Prioritizing the Palestine issue and emphasizing its significance in Iran’s constitution, as well as the necessity of supporting anti-Israeli resistance according to Imam Khomeini’s perspective, as national religious duties and fundamental pillars of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran;Supporting the resistance front, fostering unity, aligning goals among resistance groups against Israeli dominance, and establishing strong ties with countries that maintain anti-Israel policies;The lack of public incentive to support Palestine attributed to distrust in domestic policymakers, divisions among Muslims, and lack of consensus and a single voice on the part of the regional superpower concerning the Palestinian cause;Potential compromises involving recognition of the Palestinian government, alongside the importance of Islamic unity and awakening;Supporting Palestine as a national project, requiring a unified stance and support from all branches of government, including political, economic, social, military, and cultural sectors, as well as academic and research institutions;Supporting the resistance front and pursuing common goals against Israeli monopolization, while fostering strong relationships with the countries opposing Israel;Advocating for international laws pertaining to Palestine, planning and overseeing referendums, and championing the right to self-determination;Highlighting Israeli vulnerabilities, dismantling the perception of Israeli invincibility, exposing the true nature of Israel, and refusing to recognize it;Restoring the lost rights of Palestinians and reclaiming control over their territories;Achieving absolute dominance in the Middle East and gaining control over its financial and economic resources as Israel’s main objective, in addition to its strategic positioning.

In conclusion, the following strategies are recommended for Iran’s foreign policy on Palestine. First, the regional crisis indicates that the Middle East experiences the highest political and security unrest compared to other regions. This is primarily due to the conflicting security policies pursued by actors with different identities. The United States has focused its national security strategies on the Middle East. Iran should aim to create a regional and Islamic identity among the actors in order to foster constructive interaction. Each country in the Middle East has its own identity incentive to play its political role. Therefore, any regional innovations by Iran in addressing the Palestinian conflict and promoting Middle East peace should take into account making an identity model. The emergence of Islamic groups has transformed the nature of conflicts in the region, highlighting the influence of identity and ideological trends. These factors have also imposed limitations on the United States and Israel.Second, the redress of Palestinian rights is the main issue in the Middle East. Iran should play a role in establishing a strong, integrated government in Palestine as a first step towards finding an Islamic identity and reducing ongoing bloodshed in theregion. Other countries must recognize the Palestinian government. Third, the increasing conflicts in Palestine keep the peace proposal to come into effect and help stablish two governments in this region. Iran’s foreign policy goal on Palestine should be to support the idea of establishing a unified Palestinian government based on the majority demands. Organized support for Palestinian fighters is necessary under these circumstances. However, if Palestinian groups reject Iran’s policy, a new wave of anti-violence policies will emerge in the region. Therefore, revolutionary movements in Palestine should be recognized internationally, especially by the Islamic world. This recognition will help protect the revolutionary identity and resistance in Palestine by preventing Israel from repressing them.  Finally, Iran’s foreign policy towards Palestine relies on the support of its own people. It is crucial for Iran to maintain and protect this public support at any cost. While the current support is largely based on religious beliefs, the government should also clarify other aspects of its policy to the people. Addressing any questions or concerns that arise will help reinforce Iran’s policy on supporting the Palestinian cause. Therefore, Iran’s foreign policy on Palestine should be backed by comprehensive national support, and any compromise in this regard is tantamount to compromising Iran’s Islamic and revolutionary identity.

In today’s geopolitical competitions, the intricate and innovative concept of gray zone represents a military approach based on geopolitical advantages. Within this strategy, the primary objective is to secure control over desired territories and advance security interests in the conflict. Scholars in this field believe that countries such as Russia, China, and Iran have successfully employed tools and tactics within this concept, enabling them to pursue their security and political interests without triggering major power sensitivities. In this regard, the escalating intensification of geopolitical rivalries in Southwestern Asia, especially between Iran and regional and extra-regional countries, has become a significant challenge when it comes to ensuring security in this area. Adopting the security-for-all-or-no-one approach, Iran aims to establish superiority in its geopolitical rivalry with the United States, the most prominent external actor in this field. Since 2003 and the aftermath of the Iraq war, Iran has introduced a novel strategy in its geopolitical approach. In this respect, the present study aimed to elaborate on the concept of gray zone and highlight its key components as influential variables in Iran’s geopolitical strategy.

As an applied study, the present research employed a comparative descriptive–analytical approach. The data collection method involved a combination of library research and computer-assisted techniques.

As containment measures against Iran intensify due to the US unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), there have been increasing efforts to neutralize Iran’s strategies and weaken its regional activities, particularly in the realm of geopolitics of resistance. These developments pose a potential threat to Iran’s national security. It is thus necessary to identify and examine the components of Iran’s geopolitical strategy while considering alternative interpretations. Iran’s geopolitical expansion in the region have prompted the West and its allies to impede Iran’s geopolitical influence by scrutinizing its geopolitical territorialization approach marked by the formation and organization of as well as support for proxy forces, manifested in shaping the political dynamics of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, and even in direct confrontations with the West on the Syrian battlefield. In this context, leveraging its historical, geographical, and cultural unity, Iran has successfully mobilized communities throughout Southwest Asia by relying on small non-state groups, and emphasizing commonalities while overlooking divergences. This mobilization effort is gradually expanding its reach from the southern Arabian Peninsula to the shores of the Mediterranean.By examining the interpretations of gray zone and geopolitics of resistance as two key strategies, this research aimed to address the question of how Iran seeks to achieve its desired security and implement its geopolitical strategy in Southwest Asia. The term axis of resistance refers to geographical regions that pursue both ideological and geopolitical objectives. On the other hand, gray zone is not necessarily a geographical representation of a strategy, but rather a number of tactics that employ specific tools to advance geopolitical interests in strategically significant geographical areas.The findings of this study reveal that Iran’s geopolitical rivalry in Southwest Asia, particularly with the United States, has led Iran to develop a distinct geopolitical strategy known as axis of resistance, or according to American scholarship, gray zone. In this strategy, Iran aims to achieve its security objectives by focusing on five key areas (i.e., military, political, economic, informational–narrative, and cultural or religious) and relying on cooperation and support of non-state armed groups in specific countries in the region. In this way, Iran has successfully achieved its objectives by establishing geopolitical corridors and attaining the desired geographical integration in Southwest Asia. This has enabled Iran to gain access to the Mediterranean Sea and establish proximity to Israel. However, unless subnational and national requirements are seriously taken into account, the mentioned security achievements will prove ineffective and temporary. In other words, despite Iran’s expansion of geopolitical territorialization, the erosion of internal capabilities, particularly in the political sphere, coupled with the disruption of Iran’s economic lifelines, will gradually lead to increased challenges in sustaining support for its geopolitical arms.

When examining the objectives, methods, and tools employed by the United States to counter Iran’s gray zone geopolitical strategy, it becomes evident that the US, rather than solely relying on its own capabilities and geopolitical confrontation, has prioritized targeting Iran’s vulnerable points. While countering Iran’s gray zone strategy, the United States has adopted a hybrid approach that encompasses all four primary domains: political, economic, military, and informational. However, America has specifically recognized the political and economic domains as the Achilles heel of Iran’s security, and by extension, of the gray zone strategy. At the same time, the United States is diligently uncovering Iran’s vulnerabilities by restructuring its decision-making processes within the government and military, as well as streamlining bureaucracy to facilitate prompt responsive measures in the gray zone. Through exerting influence and applying pressure on Iran in the aforementioned domains, the United States aims to achieve a goal that surpasses mere neutralization of the gray zone strategy, that is, undermining Iran’s national and territorial security. As a result, America has successfully identified Iran’s vulnerabilities in key military, political, economic, and informational domains. It has thus devised and carried out tactics appropriate for each domain, both within the framework of the US gray zone strategy and through conventional means.

Some governments and organizations are preparing to exploit artificial intelligence (AI) in order to destabilize the world and benefit from numerous cyber-attacks. The rapid advancement of AI enables cybercriminals to amplify their destructive impact worldwide, as AI has the potential to reshape and disrupt global conditions in the coming years. The primary objective of this research was to establish a comprehensive framework for critically evaluating the role of AI in facilitating unethical practices within the realm of security, both in theory and in practice. To lay the groundwork for the practical implementation of national security measures based on grounded theory requires adopting a problem-oriented perspective on terrorism, warfare, and conflict. A strategic instance of this approach is the concept of algorithmic national security which has the potential for creating and developing a new security order. This article aimed to contribute to the existing body of scientific literature, as there is currently a dearth of research in this field, thereby paving the way for future investigations. The primary objective of this research was to establish a comprehensive framework for critically evaluating the role of AI in facilitating unethical practices within the realm of security, both in theory and in practice. The present research aimed to develop a comprehensive framework for the critical evaluation of the role of AI in the unethical utilization of its functions in security matters, both in theory and in practice. In this line, the main question is: How can national security topics be problematized in light of AI hegemony and within the framework of terrorism, war, conflict, and defense?

Adopting a descriptive–analytical approach, the present research relied on library research and documentary method to collect the data from various printed and electronic sources, including websites and magazines. Note-taking was used as a tool in data collection stage. In this study, AI and national security were considered as the independent and dependent variables, respectively.

The debate surrounding the use of AI and its autonomy on future battlefields has predominantly centered on the ethical implications of granting complete authority to independent and autonomous weapons, often referred to as killer robots, capable of making life or death decisions. Is it truly feasible for these systems to operate without any human intervention, or does their deployment potentially violate the principles of warfare and international humanitarian laws? Avoiding such a predicament necessitates that those involved in warfare differentiate between combatants and civilians on the battlefield, prioritizing the preservation of civilian lives and minimizing harm to them to the greatest extent possible.Proponents of this emerging technology argue that machines will eventually possess enough intelligence to distinguish themselves from humans. Conversely, opponents maintain that machines will never possess the capability to make such a fundamental distinction. They argue that machines lack the capacity to make split-second decisions in the heat of war or exhibit timely empathy. In response to these concerns, several human rights and humanitarian organizations have launched the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, aiming to establish an international ban on the development and deployment of fully automated and autonomous weapon systems. In the meantime, a highly contentious debate is unfolding within the military sphere regarding the use of AI in the command and control systems governing how senior officers convey essential orders to their subordinate soldiers. Throughout history, generals and admirals have consistently sought to enhance the reliability of command and control systems to ensure the fullest realization of their strategic objectives.Nowadays, these systems are heavily relied upon to ensure the security of radio and satellite communication systems that connect headquarters to the front lines. However, strategists are concerned that in a future hyper-warfare environment, these systems could be vulnerable to disruptions caused by jamming, which would make the speed of military operations exceed commanders’ limited ability to receive battlefield reports, process data, and issue timely orders. It is important to go beyond these concerns and consider the practical definition of the uncertain fog of war, which is further complicated by the multiplication effect of AI and the potential for failure. Many military officers see a solution to this dilemma in relinquishing the control of machines to these systems. As stated in a report by the Congressional Research Service, AI algorithms can offer more reliable tools for real-time analysis of the battlefield and enable faster decision-making, thus being able to stay updated.

We are currently witnessing a turning point in technology. The pace of advancements in AI is surpassing even the expert predictions. These breakthroughs offer significant advantages to humanity, enabling AI systems to tackle complex issues in medicine, the environment, and other fields. However, along with progress, there are also accompanying risks. The implications of AI for national security are becoming increasingly profound with each passing year. In this article, the aim was to assess the extent of these consequences in the years ahead. The findings indicate that AI is likely to highlight several, if not all, of the most challenging aspects of transformative military technologies. It thus becomes increasingly crucial to address its implications in examining how policymakers in the realm of national security respond to this technology.Unfortunately, AI carries the potential for risks comparable to those posed by previous technologies, and in some cases, its impact could be even more devastating, owing to the rapid pace of technological advancement and the intricate relationship between government and industry in the present era. While we appreciate the increasing number of high-quality AI reports published in recent years, we acknowledge that a certain degree of conservatism has somewhat impeded comprehensive analysis. In this article, the objective was to provide an honest description of the AI revolution as truly revolutionary rather than merely different. To address this challenge effectively, governments must approach the issue with ambition, emphasizing both research and development while considering its ramifications.The advancement of AI technology in the military, information technology, cybersecurity, and economic sectors over the next decade will lead to profound transformations worldwide. These changes are occurring at a faster pace than anticipated, and undoubtedly, they will present their own set of challenges, with implications extending to various aspects, including national security. AI introduces a level of complexity in the interactions between states, industries, and individuals, necessitating the deployment of skilled experts to respond quickly and effectively to the evolving landscape shaped by this phenomenon.

Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties have been a source of insecurity in western Iran, undergoing significant changes in their movement over time. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they exploited the vacuum in central power and the nascent revolution, creating instability and insecurity in Iran’s territories against the central government and people residing in Kurdish regions. Later, as the central government established itself and brought peace and order to the country, these parties sought refuge in Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime, which was then at war with Iran. After Saddam’s fall, they fled to northern Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan, citing a shared Kurdish identity as the reason. Understanding the roots of their presence in northern Iraq and their impact on Iraqi Kurdistan requires examination of the current power structure in Iraq and sociological analysis of its ethnic and religious dynamics, especially during the democratization process in the post-Saddam era.The overthrow of Saddam Hussein had a profound impact on Iraq’s political structure, resulting in consociational  democracy as the replacement. Consociational   democracy, as an alternative for majoritarian democracy, relies on the cooperation and agreement of the power elite and parties involved in heterogeneous societies. Given Iraq’s unique cultural, social, and historical factors, it was not feasible for majoritarian democracy to ensure public participation and protect minority rights. Even consociational democracy has its own consequences and effects. In Iraq, consociational democracy led to changes in the power dynamics and positions of the Iraqi Kurds. These changes had implications beyond Iraq, affecting the Kurds of other countrieincluding Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties—given their shared identity and common historical and cultural background. The main question of the research is, what is the impact of consociational  democracy and the institutionalization of power in Iraqi Kurdistan on Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties?

 Literature Review:

Using analytical and descriptive methods, Pourahmadi et al. (2016) examined the obstacles facing the democratization process in Iraq. The results revealed multiple factors including ongoing insecurity and political instability, low levels of economic and social development indicators, weak civil political culture, and other factors that exacerbate these crises. Nasri and Rezaei (2018) adopted an analytical–descriptive approach to examine the limitations and possibilities of the Iraqi Kurdistan region in achieving independence. The results concluded that currently, due to structural constraints, geopolitical nature, and resistance from neighboring countries, complete independence for the Iraqi Kurdistan region is not feasible. Relying on the content analysis method, Mohammadi (2008) studied ethnic divisions and their role in ethnic divergence within the country. The results indicated that in regions with higher social divides, there is greater ethnic divergence, while areas with intersecting divides experience lesser divergence.

The present research used a qualitative method and a descriptive–analytical model to investigate the impact of consociational democracy and institutionalization of power in Iraqi Kurdistan on Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties.The research employed Lijphart’s perspective on consociational democracy as a theoretical framework and applied it to the Iraqi context. The main objective of the study was to offer a thorough analysis of how consociationalism and power institutionalization in Iraq have impacted Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties.Lijphart identified four key criteria for consociational democracy: grand coalitions, proportionality, mutual veto rights, and segmental autonomy or federalism. These criteria were incorporated into the government structure of Iraq after 2005. This study analyzed the impact of this democratic process on Iraqi society, including the Kurdish population, and assessed the effects of changes in Iraqi Kurdish society on Iranian Kurdish movements, particularly anti-Revolution movements. To ensure the study’s reliability, the researchers relied on 20 experts, including university professors and specialists in the issues related to Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurdish anti-Revolution front. Additionally, the results of in-depth questionnaires were used to formulate and compare the findings.

In conclusion, the consociational democracy and institutionalization of power in Iraqi Kurdistan have led to a shift in the autonomy strategy and the adoption of federalism among Iranian Kurdish anti-Revolution parties. As a result, their independence and centrifugal tendencies have increased. The discourse of autonomy among these parties has evolved into a discourse of federalism, influenced by Iraqi Kurdish politics. This shift does not diminish the significance or meaning of the process, but rather opens up a more nuanced discussion of separatism, including the right to self-determination and a Kurdish independence referendum within a federal framework. Federalism is a more appealing and populist concept for the anti-Revolution parties. These armed groups have continued to provide military and urban warfare training to the Peshmerga forces in the Kurdistan region and occasionally engage in guerrilla attacks on Iran’s borders. Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, Iraqi Kurdistan has become a base of support for Kurdish anti-Revolution forces, enabling them to create pursue instability in western Iran and pursue their separatist agenda through both soft and hard tactics.Due to the strong sense of Kurdish identity, the Kurdish society and the Kurdish anti-Revolution are inevitably influenced by Iraqi Kurdistan. This issue should be addressed in order to control the peace and security of the borders. In this line, it is suggested that the costs of hosting the Kurdish anti-Revolution in the Iraqi Kurdistan region be increased for both the regional government and the central government of Iraq. This can be achieved by relying on soft power, diplomatic efforts, and negations with the Kurdish and Iraqi authorities, or if necessary, by resorting to military power.

The China–Saudi Arabia relations have witnessed significant growth and development from 2011 to 2022. Primarily driven by oil relations, the relations between the two countries have flourished in areas such as trade, investment, technology, and military cooperation. In December 2022, the two countries established the highest level of bilateral ties by signing 34 investment agreements valued at around 30 billion dollars, spanning various sectors such as clean energy, hydrogen production, solar energy, information technology, transportation, medical and housing industries, and building materials factories. Furthermore, China’s oil imports from Saudi Arabia increased from 5 million and 66 thousand barrels per day in 2011 to 10 million and 852 thousandbarrels per day in 2020. The figure remained above 10 million barrels during 2022, despite the challenges posed by the COVID–19 pandemic and unfavorable economic conditions. This trend Indicates growing relations between China and Saudi Arabia.China and Saudi Arabia have exchanged a large share of capital in the energy sector. The Saudi active presence in the Chinese oil market has positioned it as China’s largest trade partner in the West Asia and African region. The bilateral investment volume between the two countries stands at approximately 73 billion dollars. Saudi Arabia’s extensive investments aimed at controlling China’s oil import network, refineries, and petrochemical industry, along with its involvement in the plan to double China’s strategic oil reserve, underscore the importance of maintaining China’s energy market for Saudi Arabia. Consequently, given China’s status as the largest energy consumer and Saudi Arabia’s position as the largest oil exporter, both countries possess the requisite capacity to foster cooperation in this field.In addition, Vision 2030 and the One Belt One Road Initiative are strategic factors facilitating the expansion of China–Saudi Arabia relations. In this regard, the two countries have signed comprehensive strategic cooperation agreements, leading to the establishment of the High-Level Joint Committee. During the committee’s second meeting in Riyadh in August 2017, contracts valued at 70 billion dollars were signed. Moreover, an important milestone was reached by signing a memorandum of understanding between the two countries for the establishment of a joint investment fund worth 20 billion dollars. Furthermore, Industrial Development Fund, China’s Silk Road Fund, and Everbright Bank were established. These agreements, memoranda, and funds intend to expedite the development of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Although China is trying to maximize its energy security by distributing its oil imports among different countries (e.g., the US), Saudi Arabia’s consistent share of approximately 20% in recent years remains of utmost significance.

Literature Review:

Several studies have examined the topics of US energy policy and the development of China–Saudi Arabia relations. However, few works have linked these two phenomena in an analytical manner. The novelty of this article lies in its attempt to bridge this gap and provide an analysis by exploring the interplay between these two issues.

This research adopted a mixed methods design, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data. Documents and library resources were used to collect the data. Relying on an examination of research, analytical and statistical texts, the study focused on indexing and defining variables and their influential factors in a bid to conduct an analytical and inferential exploration to elucidate the trends and interrelationships between the independent and dependent variables.

The US–Saudi oil relations have witnessed unparalleled growth and encompassed various economic, political, and security sectors in recent decades. Furthermore, to ensure its own growth and development, it is imperative for China to maintain stability and security in the energy sector. This objective can be achieved through effective management of competition and, in certain instances, cooperation with the United States. The ongoing trend of expanding relations between China and Saudi Arabia in the energy sector is unprecedented, solidifying China’s position as a significant competitor to the United States. The growing China–Saudi Arabia relations are driven by the mutual needs in the energy sector and strategic development plans. Yet the present research aimed to analyze China–Saudi Arabia relations with an eye to the US energy policy, relying a neo-mercantilist approach. Consequently, the primary question addressed in this article is: how has the US energy policy during 2011–2022 influenced the dynamics of China–Saudi Arabia relationship. The study was based on the hypothesis that the US energy policy during 2011–2022, characterized by increased oil and shale gas production and a reinforced neo-mercantilist approach in the energy sector, played a crucial role in fostering closer ties between China and Saudi Arabia, primarily in the oil sector, and supported their efforts to broaden mutual cooperation across other fields. The hypothesis was tested through empirical and explanatory methods. The research findings suggest that China–Saudi Arabia cooperation is expected to expand further in the future, while taking into account the sensitivities associated with these relations from the perspective of the United States.