فصلنامه ذهن
سال بیست و چهارم شماره 4 (پیاپی 96، زمستان 1402)

The rule of experimental science in stablishing the modern civilization and changes in human life is an object of multidimensional studies. It has brought about different approaches, one of them is scientism which has had noticeable effects on human culture and thought, especially on the western one. The mentioned approach has especial indications also in ontology, epistemology and methodology of knowledge, which invites the philosophers of science and religion to deep thinking on it. It is because of having important implications concerning religious studies and relations between religion and science, which is at least absolute governance of science on religion and religious understanding methods.

The present issue is to study and identify the above approach and its reasons by descriptive method and evaluate it by rational-analytical one.

The result is however, necessity of understanding the diference between science and scientism. Factually scientism is not based on a logical standpoint, nor will it have a useful function in the field of science and human knowledge.

From the religiouse epistemologic point of view, thre is no important difference between the week scientism and the strong one. The latter, however, indicates that religious understanding and interpretation should be everchanged on the basis of what the modern scienc imposes.
Contemplation on scientism and its reasons indicates that:Not the main idea is coherentive, nor is it based on the sound epistemic foundations.
The reasons of scientism are even affected by lack of logial consistency or failure to justify it.
Not only scientism has no beneficial rule in science, but also has a detrimental one.

Most of Hilary Putnam's influential ideas are referred to his two fundamental commitments: pragmatism and realism. These two commitments caused the proximity and, at the same time, his intellectual distance from the other contemporary pragmatist, Richard Rorty. While committing to pragmatism, they have very different positions on realism. Their difference is so problematic that the meaning of pragmatism will not be apparent if we count Rorty and Putnam together in the group of pragmatists. Reviewing these two philosophers' thoughts will help us determine how broad the horizons of pragmatism can be. Intellectual opposition between Rorty and Putnam is discussed in this research. This research does not consider the intellectual opposition of these two philosophers based on non-pragmatist ideas. It is aimed to examine their intellectual coherence regarding their philosophical positions.
This research evaluates the intellectual opposition between Rorty and Putnam. The information cited in this article has been collected using the library method. Furthermore, the method of information processing is comparative-analytical.
(1) Despite the common pragmatist positions of Rorty and Putnam, what they really disagree with each other is what can be preserved from the realist tradition. In the recent period of his thinking, Putnam, by defending "common sense realism" among his pragmatist positions, tries to find a place to preserve a notion and meaning similar to the nonlocal and nontransient "rightness" that realist philosophy provides. According to Rorty, pragmatist positions are acceptable only to the extent that we want to practice without such meanings and notions.
 (2) The philosophical opposition between Rorty and Putnam is based on their metaphilosophical disagreement on pragmatism. Putnam is convinced that the mere pragmatic "convenience" is not a suitable criterion for "practice." According to Putnam, "common sense realism" provides a minimally realistic insight into the "truth" that can guide pragmatic convenience in the "right" direction. In contrast, Rorty believes that "more" and "better" convenience is the only condition that can provide us with a criterion for modifying current procedures while remaining within the limits of the anti-platonic commitments of pragmatism.
Pragmatism is the mainstream of Rorty and Putnam's thoughts. According to the results of this research, Rorty takes a more original process in the path of pragmatism. Putnam's realistic concerns contradict his pragmatist positions. Even though these concerns are followed in the framework of the minimal truth of "common sense realism." By resorting to the determined "truth" lies at the heart of "common sense realism," Putnam loses the coherence of his thought. Such a "truth" does not indicate particular pragmatic "convenience" except if used in a metaphysical, ahistorical sense. While the characteristic of pragmatism's anti-absolutism means that the common sense, realistic intuitions will also be subject to historical changes. Based on pragmatism, the Hegelian historicization of philosophy is essential precisely because it grasped the emptiness of Kantian attempts to regard "truth" as an ahistorical matter. Putnam's view is a return to pre-Hegelian attempts to find something ahistorical to which philosophers can be committed to follow.

The importance of designation (anecdote, description, implication) in Epistemology and acquired knowledge is clear. In the field of designation, there are various viewpoints and some of them can be combined with each other and some of them are contradictory and cannot be combined. One of the famous opinions of philosophers is that the relationship between the concept and the described object is intrinsic to the concept.Some believe that the intrinsic description view has indefensible flaws. For example, in the article "Intrinsic Designation under Scrutiny",  the view of famous philosophers about "Intrinsic Designation" (Hekait-e dhātī) has been criticized, and more or less the view of the Allameh Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi has been confirmed and strengthened under the title "Potentially Designation" (Hekait-e Shaani; Contingent Designation). In the mentioned article, the authors have made seven objections to the "Intrinsic Designation". In our opinion, all the mentioned objections towards the view of "Intrinsic Designation" have several problems; And on the contrary, "Potentially Designation", as presented in this article, is both wrong in itself and inconsistent with principles of Allameh Mesbah. A detailed treatment of all the objections raised around the "Intrinsic Designation" and all the problems of the, "Potentially Designation", as presented in the mentioned article, requires the writing of a book in the field of the designation. Therefore, inevitably, in this article, we have evaluated the first two objections briefly and left the criticism of other objections to a wider field.
It is necessary to mention:First of all, rejecting the objections raised about "Intrinsic Designation" does not logically require the truth of "Intrinsic Designation" and in order to establish this point of view, we should have a positive discussion about its ontological, anthropological and epistemological foundations, and about its consequences.
Secondly, in this article, our defenses of the "Intrinsic Designation" and our objections to the "Potentially Designation" are based on this common basis between the famous philosophers and Allameh Mesbah that on the one hand, the knowledge of ordinary people about the material world is exclusive to the acquired knowledge, and on the other hand, the mental image has two aspects: from one aspect, it exists in the human soul and itself is known, and it is a presentational knowledge, and from the second aspect, it presents something else and it is acquired knowledge.
Thirdly, our main discussion in this article is, first of all, the defense of the "Intrinsic Designation", not the criticism of the "Potentially Designation".
Our method in this article is analytical and descriptive.
In our opinion, objections made to the theory of "Intrinsic Designation" and affirmations raised in the field of establishing the "Potentially Designation" are debatable. Some of the disputes are as follows:(1) Involving the characteristics of Arabic words in semantic and philosophical analyses; (2) Not paying attention to the difference between conventional understanding and conventional analysis; (3) Confusion between the role of the knower and the specific role of knowledge in the designation process; (4) Inserting the concepts of existence and non-existence into whatness; (5) Confiscation and self-explanatory nature of some claims and arguments; (6) Ignoring the differences between mental images and external forms, or ignoring the differences between what is reasonable in itself and what is reasonable through an intermediary; (7) non-distinction between of designation (hekait, description, implication) and transmission.
At least some of the problems that have entered the theory of "Intrinsic Designation" are due to the lack of correct understanding of this theory, and this theory is more accurate than the theory of "Potentially Designation".

In this paper, my aim is to clarify McDowell’s chief objections to Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein presented in his well-known book, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) and then to introduce and explain McDowell’s own interpretation of Wittgenstein’s main remarks on meaning and rule-following. Finally, I argue that McDowell’s construal of Wittgenstein, contrary to what he claims, does not significantly depart from Kripke’s. For McDowell, Kripke has only focused on the first part of section 201 of the Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein states that “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here” (Wittgenstein 1953, §201). McDowell’s main objection to Kripke, among other objections, is that Kripke has failed to successfully capture the main point of Wittgenstein’s remark presented in the second part of section 201, according to which “It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases” (Wittgenstein 1953, §201). Wittgenstein’s suggestion seems to be that there is a way in which a grasp of meaning is not an interpretation at all.McDowell then proposes his own take on these remarks and argues that once we see the practice of rule-following as an activity which is already rule-governed in a community, we can with no harm take it to form a (normative) fact about what the speaker means by her words. This means that Kripke has gone wrong in arguing, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that there is no such fact. More particularly, “shared command of a language equips us to know one another’s meaning without needing to arrive at that knowledge by interpretation, because it equips us to hear someone else’s meaning in his words” (McDowell 1984, 350-351). Within such a linguistic community, there is a capacity for “a meeting of minds” (1984, 351) so that each member can hear what the other means by a word directly. For, the members of such a community have been trained similarly in a community of speakers, whose responses are already meaningful, whose world is already conceptualized, and whose rules are already determined. However, once we carefully read McDowell’s own interpretation of Wittgenstein, we can see that Kripke’s reading is not in any serious conflict with it. Not only this, but Kripke seems to have been aware of the issues McDowell raises and attempted to deal with them. McDowell takes the meaning facts to be constituted by certain communal facts but does not want to subscribe to a reductionist view of meaning. For that reason, he then treats such facts as primitive, irreducible to any other fact about the speaker. But, in Kripke’s remarks, we can find no conflict with this. For Kripke too, Wittgenstein does not deny the legitimacy of ordinary uses of terms like “truth”, “fact”, and the like. On the contrary, Kripke emphasizes, like McDowell, that once we are free of the regress of interpretations, we are fully entitled to use these terms in relevant language games. Moreover, Kripke’s Wittgenstein too sees membership in a community as an essential aspect of the rule-following practice. In the present paper, I discuss these claims in some detail and show that McDowell does not dramatically depart from Kripke in his interpretation of Wittgenstein.

Metaphor theory is proposed in cognitive science. From the viewpoint of contemporary cognitive linguistics, conceptual metaphor is basically "understanding and experiencing" something in terms and phrases of something else. In conceptual metaphor, by establishing mappings between the two areas of origin and destination, an abstract or lesser-known thing is always understood based on a concrete or better-known thing. One of God’s methods of conveying meaning in the Holy Qur’an is using similes, similes, and metaphors. With the help of conceptual metaphor theory, we obtain a new analysis of the metaphorical language of the Quran and its connection with the Islamic worldview, according to which the conceptual metaphors of the Quran are an inevitable part of Islamic thought. These metaphors, like the traditional view, should not be considered mere literary crafts, but intellectual crafts that transform a person’s thought to give him a frame of mind in which he should look at the whole being, nature, man, and revelation. Charity is one of the Qur'anic topics expressed in the form of sensible to tangible metaphors. According to the place of charity in the Qur'an, the current research, using an analytical descriptive method, seeks to answer the following question: What are the conceptual metaphors of giving in the Holy Quran?
a. In the conceptual metaphor of verse 261 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the destination field; The truth of the act of spending in the way of God and hypocrisy in the cause of God over the origin field; A seed that is planted and gives 7 clusters, and each cluster contains 100 seeds or more, was written, and based on that, from the perspective of the Qur'an, giving in the way of God, trading with God and investing is safe, profitable, and wise, and it leads to the spiritual growth of man.

In the conceptual metaphor of verse 264 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the destination field; The truth of the act of charity with blessing and torture is like hypocritical charity without faith in God and the Day of Judgment and hypocritical hypocrisy over the origin field; Planting seeds in the soil sitting on a smooth stone that has been washed away due to heavy rain, soil and seeds and nothing but hard stone remains, was written, and based on that, from the perspective of the Qur'an, hypocritical giving: An unreasonable act with a reverse effect is associated with loss and damage, and investing in an economic bubble is an obstacle to the spiritual growth of man.
In the conceptual metaphor of verse 265 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the destination field; The truth of the actions of those who spend only for the pleasure of God and to reach a position of stability, and stability means sincere hypocrites, over the origin field; The high and fruitful garden that produces crops in any condition, was written and it was determined that from the perspective of the Holy Quran, sincere giving; It lays the groundwork for the individual and the community to benefit from the fruits of charity and causes spiritual growth and stabilization of self, peace, and mental security.
In the conceptual metaphor of verse 266 of Surah Al-Baqarah, the destination field; Destruction and suppression of the fruits of charity with curses, torture, and hypocrisy over the origin field; A garden full of crops with palm and grape trees and flowing streams, and an old and infirm owner with young and weak children, which a strong pressure like burning winds, will tear it apart and set it on fire, was written and it was achieved that almsgiving with begging, torture, and hypocrisy causes a lot of regret and deprives the heart of a hypocrite from spiritual growth in the light of almsgiving.

In Uthulujiyya, " thought " and "gaze" are discussed in different topics. Every thought needs a subject of thought and also an object of thought and " theory " usually means "practice". The problem is, what is the definition and position of " thought " and " gaze " in Uthulujiyya, and are " thought " and "gaze" one and the same, or are they two separate things and related to different domains?
Therefore, in this article, we reread "thought" and " gaze "in Uthulujiyya with approach of epistemology with a descriptive-analytical method and answer the questions raised in the form of analysis.
In this article, two definitions of "thought" and the duties of the soul are presented, according to its first relation, that is, thought in relation to its place, namely, the soul and the intellect. The one is "rational understanding of the soul" and the other is "thought" which means "organization of the body"; But in the second relation, that is, thought in relation to God, thought means "movements from premises to results", and thought is deprived of God for some reasons. But the discussion of "gaze" also has the same meaning in God, intellect and soul different from the thought of the predecessors, which was opposite to "practice".
In Uthulujiyya, "thought" is examined in terms of the subject of thought and its belonging in two fields: "mind and soul" and "God". Thinking is related to both practical science and theoretical science. In this sense, in the face of tangible things and the material world, on the one hand, to get rid of it and return to the world of reason, and also to remember what was taken from the world of reason, a kind of practical exercise to plan and control the body to rid oneself of pains and dependencies. to the world of matter and freedom from it. From this point of view thought is the source of action. But thinking in the sense of "synthesizing sensations" and making general concepts has an epistemological and theoretical and is deprived of God.

Thinking " in Uthulujiyya in one way means "mind" and "awareness. in another sense means "prudence" and a kind of "controlling", the soul needs more effort and suffering to keep the busyness away from itself. “gaze” also carries the meaning of creative reasoning and action. The difference between “thought” and “gaze” is that action in thought is action and a kind of movement; But gaze is a creative act.
Therefore, “thought” and “gaze” in have both practical and current aspects; But thinking has a theoretical aspect in addition to the practical side. The origin of action and being a verb is different in both thinking, planning and organizing and controlling. In view, it is creation. Therefore, thoughts and opinions in Uthulujiyya do not coincide with each other due to their different meanings and applications in different fields, and for this reason, they are not mutually transferable.