مجله فلسفه علم
سال سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 6، پاییز و زمستان 1392)

Popper believed that Heisenberg misinterpreted the theory of indeterminism، since the limits of attainable precision asserted by Heisenberg is not a logical consequence of the formula of the theory but rather، a separate and additional assumption. Popper believed that Heisenberg’s explanation of uncertainty principle includes metaphysical elements rendering it non-falsifiable. By proposing ‘statistical scatter’، Popper offered a new interpretation of uncertainty principle in order to show this additional assumption، prove that the possibility of observations more exact than what Heisenberg thought، is consisted with the formulae، and if formula of quantum be statistically interpreted، the additional metaphysical assumption actually contradicts them.

At the outset of the 20th century، the received formulation of empiricism، as it was endorsed in logical empiricism، began to sound problematic، in a way that the system seemed to be in need of some revisions and amendments. Carnap endeavored to fix the gaps by his proposals in his Logical Syntax of Language (1934/37). In spite of some lasting merits، the approach was not left totally uncontroversial; therefore in 1940s Carnap went to do some further revisions in his so called semantic period. In this paper، I will show why the failure of Carnap’s program even in the semantic period does not lead to the total destruction of empiricism.

From centuries ago، Muslim scholars and philosophers، by inspiration from luminous verses of holy Quran and with strong rational reasons، have proved that science and awareness flow in all levels of existence، particularly in material things. The experimental scientists also have pointed to the possibility of presence of a kind of consciousness and awareness in matters and apparently non-living things. Science extension in the whole existing world، even in material particles، brings physics to the discussion too. In quantum theory، there are some phenomena (e. g. delayed choice experiment) which show that particles are aware of their surroundings and thus choose the suitable behavior correspond to their environment; also، in some alternative models of the standard quantum theory (Bohm-de Broglie model)، there are some concepts such as ‘pilot wave’ or ‘information field’، which may be considered as the reasons of the particles’ sensitivity (consciousness).

In the light of the analysis of Avicenna’s definition of “nature” we can discover the main principles of his physics، which are: ‘The agency of the nature’، ‘the directness of this agency’، ‘the natural object’، and ‘the essential agency of the nature’. One of the main consequences of this analysis is that the nature could be considered as the direct cause of the motion، immobility and spatial balance of the material objects. Moreover، it shows that natural objects are essentially capable of possess natural properties. Accordingly، Avicenna considers that the natural properties are the same as the essential properties، which material objects have them necessarily.

Multiverse and resorting to anthropic principle or reasoning within the multiverse scenarios has recently appeared in some physical contexts. In this paper، we first distinguish three kinds of multiverse paradigms in Lagrangian formulation for physical systems. We argue that multiverse can be a classical effect، like the one appearing in string landscape، or a quantum effect، like the one in chaotic inflation models. We then critically review two arguments suggesting the necessity of abandoning the observability and/or testability criteria in the multiverse. We argue that such a viewpoint is not justified، as the characteristic feature of scientific knowledge is its experimental/observational confirmation. Therefore، multiverse scenarios can enter the realm of scientific theories only after becoming a testable theory. We also introduce a criterion for testability.

Medicalization is a term for the process by which medical definitions and practices are applied to behaviors, psychological phenomena, and somatic experiences which previously were not within the conceptual or therapeutic scope of medicine. There have been two distinct main approaches to medicalization. The first was a Marxist critique of medicine as authoritarian and imperialistic, while the second was a critique of the expanding role of medicine in the social control of deviant behavior. This article contends that none of these approached could explain medicalization comprehensively. The main thesis of this paper is that medicalization as a technology could be an alternative. In this paper, this thesis will be examined in the light of Heidegger’s, Bergmann’s and Feinberg’s philosophy of technology.