فصلنامه آیین حکمت
پیاپی 21 (پاییز 1393)

Philosophically and theologically speaking, the embodiment of deeds implies the fact that the punishments and rewards of good and evil deeds of human beings are not separate from the deeds themselves. For there is an ontological relations between our deeds and their consequences and there is not any chastisement foreign to the human acts. This ontological relation is but an expression of Divine promise of rewards and His warning of punishments in holy Quran. Whatever we human beings are doing in this world will be embodied in the world to come in the forms appropriate to the true nature of the deeds. That is to say all rewards, punishments, blessings and joys, pains and tortures in hereafter are the very nature of deeds in this world that appear as reward or punishment. Each man will be brought to life in accordance with the virtues and vices acquired in this world and they will be embodied in forms of various species ranging from angles to animals. So each act and behavior of individual human beings is potentially a ground for appearance of another species as his constitutive part of his nature in hereafter. Cruelty and violence will turn man to wild animals just as piety and integrity yield felicity and blessing to man. Therefore appearance of individuals on the day of Judgment in forms of animals are nothing but the internal forms of this worldly beliefs, intentions, qualities and character traits of human beings.

The problem of good and evil is one of the profound issues in philosophy and theology that continued to draw the attention of thinkers and has been subjected to critical examination. Islamic philosophers particularly advocates of Sadra’s theosophy, among others, endeavored to deal with the problem rationally and justify the sufferings and evils of the world on well-established arguments. Depending on three bases of fundamental reality of being, privation of evil and the idea of the best possible world Mulla Sadra attempted to give response to the problem. Since the notion of privation of evil has serious critics among western philosophers as well as Muslim thinkers, the present article tries to respond the related objections and defend the nature of evil as privation by explaining the relation of good and evil with fundamental reality of being in the eyes of Sadra and such followers of transcendent philosophy as Hakim Sabzawari and Javadi Amoli providing sound arguments for privation of evil through new method and by consulting the main references such as Asfar and Masha`r and other works by Mulla Sadra.

Every believer has reasons, however week they may be, for his beliefs on basis of which he has developed them. Religious beliefs are among the most important ones that are examined in various academic fields and argued for or against their epistemic support. In the introduction of their books, Muslim theologians as exponents of faith have discussed as “rules of reflection” the epistemic requirements in demonstration of religious beliefs including Unity of God. They have dealt with definition, divisions, requirements, rulings and arguments for reasoning the comprehensive research of which would be too extensive and detailed to be examined here. According to Muslim theologians consideration and reflection is obligatory though Ash`arites and Adliyyeh [upholders of divine justice] are divided over the nature of the obligation. The former holds it to be revealed while the latter take it to be rational. Each has its own direct or indirect arguments in favor of the chosen view which are going to be reviewed in the present article.

Divine foreknowledge is aong important problem of kalam, philosophy and mysticism. The present article is an attempt to make a comparison between views of Ibn Sina and Qunawi on the problem of foreknowledge. Ibn Sina offered demonstrations for this attribute of God as eternal, essential, and as act attribute which is posterior to the Divine Essence. But he could not envisage clearly a place for representational forms outside of the Essence. Qunawi however acknowledged the same characteristics of this divine attribute and managed to present a peculiar status for representational forms as well as immutable archetypes and quiddities not in Divine Essence but in realm of the second delimitation. Hence both philosophers share the view that foreknowledge is not identical to the Essence of God but it is posterior to it.

After Ibn Tofeil and Avempace, Ibn Rushd an Andalusian polymath, continued the crucial task of philosophy in the west of Islamic territory in 12th century. By studying his works one is led to his novelty and interesting thought in both of theoretical and practical philosophies. Using descriptive method, the present article is to draw attention to one issue in his practical thoughts namely felicity as an important problem in the domain of normative ethics. To this end it is essential to explain the characteristics, components, presuppositions and types of felicity. Ibn Rushd lists three qualities of goodness, supreme good and self-sufficiency for felicity. It seems that the nature of felicity is of several ingredients oriented toward single inclusive purpose. To him felicity presupposes purposefulness of acts, unity of ends, its relation with perfection and the theory of virtue. On the basis of these considerations, Averroes held felicity of various types such as theoretical, practical, metaphysical, individual, social, worldly and otherworldly, certain and conjectural, innate and volitional sorts of felicity.

The history of the problem of right is arguably said to be as long as the life of human being. Adam believed in the right of God as the object of worship and Cain in his illusion seemed to have right to murder Abel. The Noble faith of Islam and its authorities have recognized and emphasized on different rights as in the west where the problem of right is the most applicable right issue particularly for modern man. Rights which man may claim for himself or other beings are various, two of which are fundamental namely legal rights and natural rights. The meaning of right and its legal and ontological divisions and care for their implications play a leading part in knowing the most applicable issue in ethics, law and politics. The present article is thus to explain the meanings and implications and main characteristics of conventional rights and ontological ones.