مقالات رزومه عباس مهدوی

Arguments in favor of dualism (and against materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's (1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s conceivability argument. According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers" are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers" occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity. According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the (metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility. Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics for the connection between epistemological and modal premise.

In this article, first-hand and original sources have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the conventional method of philosophical reasoning.

In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2) Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes this transfer for granted.

Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of separating physical states from phenomenal states. Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.

In this article, I examine Fodor's modal argument for individualism and for narrow content. Fodor's modal argument wants to show that my twin-earth and I have thoughts with the very same causal powers; XYZ-thoughts and water-thoughts are not different causal powers with respect to water- behaviors and XYZ-behaviors. If this is so, Fodor argues, then my twin and I do not differ in any psychological state, and individualism is true. Fodor examine his argument by “no-conceptual-connection test” or “New Logical Connections Argument”. Therefore To see whether causal powers are the different, there must be the no-conceptual connections between cause-properties and effect-properties. Fodor argues that the difference between my water-thoughts causing his intentional water-drinking behavior and my twin's XYZ-thoughts causing his XYZ-drinking is a conceptual difference. Hence, the water/XYZ thoughts are not different causal powers. finally, I show that Fodor’s version of the New Logical Connections argument or Fodor’s no-conceptual-connection test don’t work. If this is so, Then Fodor's defense of narrow content and individualism does not sufficient.

In this article, we review the translation of Mullah Sadra's Kitāb al-Mas̲h̲āʿir; The Book of Metaphysical Penetrations. In this article, in addition to the introduction, we emphasize three basic points. First, we want to show in which cases the translation of the Arabic text into English is explicitly incorrect. The translator, Nasr, in some of the sections for the sake of misunderstanding did not succeed in translation of the Arabic text into English. Second, we will show that the translator has dropped some Arabic phrases and did not translate. Finally, we show that some of the English equations are not appropriate. The method we used in writing this article is to begin by introducing Sadra's Arabic text and related English text. Then, we describe both the Arabic and English text, thereby show difference between the text of Mulla Sadra and the translator. Finally, by getting the proposed translation, we will finish the discussion of that section.