Comparison of Chalmers and Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism (Theory of Identity)

Arguments in favor of dualism (and against materialism) typically seek to move from the epistemological distinction of physical facts and the facts of consciousness (conscious mental states) to the metaphysical distinction of physical processes and consciousness. These arguments often accept that epistemological premise requires ontological results. The idea of conceivability is one of these types of arguments. According to this argument, it is conceivable that there is an organ called a zombie that is the same as the conscious being in all physical matters, but is completely devoid of conscious mental states. In this article, I intend to compare Kripke's (1980) conceivability argument with Chalmers' (1997; 2010)'s conceivability argument. According to Kripke's argument, if "pain" and " the firing of cfibers" are the same, then this identity must be necessary. But this identity is possible, so one can imagine a possible world in which pain occurs without any brain state at all (the world of pain apart from the body), and one can imagine a possible world in which " the firing of cfibers" occurs without any pain (zombie world). As a result, in those possible worlds, " the firing of c-fibers" is not. One of the objections to Kripke's argument is that the principle of conceivability is incompatible with the phenomenon of Kripke's posterior necessity. According to the objection through a posteriori necessity, there is a difference between the conceivable (logical possibility) and the (metaphysical) possibility. The conceivability argument merely shows that the zombie world is logically possible, but the logical possibility of the zombie world is quite different from its metaphysical possibility; For conceptual possibility, mere conceptual coherence (or impossibility) suffices, but we need something more to show that the zombie world has a metaphysical possibility. Chalmers seeks to respond to this objection with the idea of twodimensional semantics. Chalmers, of course, tries to formulate the same Kripke's conceivability argument against materialism based on the idea of two-dimensional semantics. He argues that we can go from epistemological premise (logical possibility) to ontological conclusions (metaphysical possibility). To do this, we need an intermediary. We must first infer justified epistemologies (ideas of conceivable things) from epistemological premise (ideas of necessary and possible things), and then arrive at ontological conclusions from justified premise. He clings to the idea of two-dimensional semantics for the connection between epistemological and modal premise.

In this article, first-hand and original sources have been used and an attempt has been made to obtain the desired results by using the method of conceptual analysis and the conventional method of philosophical reasoning.

In this article I have shown that 1) Chalmers formulates Kripke's argument based on the idea of two-dimensionalism. 2) Kripke's argument was based entirely on the identity of conscious states and physical states, while Chalmers relied on the concept of supervenience of facts about consciousness on physical facts. 3) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, does not rely on essentialism about phenomena. 4) Chalmers argues that Kripke's arguments against token identity are not conclusive, but that arguments against type identity work. 5) Chalmers, unlike Kripke, tries to justify the transition from the primary conceivability to the primary possibility. But Kripke takes this transfer for granted.

Both Kripke (1980) and Chalmers (1997; 2010)'s argument are based on the assumption that conceivability requires possibility. In other words, both resort to the logical possibility of separating physical states from phenomenal states. Keywords: Kripke, Chalmers, The Idea of Two-Dimensional Semantics, conceivability Argument, Dualism, and Materialism.