جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « نظام راهبری شرکت » در نشریات گروه « حسابداری »

In this study، we investigate the effect of corporate governance attitudes on financial information quality in the firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during 2001 to 2010. To calculate corporate governance، we used seven governance attributes including ownership concentration، institutional ownership، dominance of chief executive officer، duality task of chief executive officer، board size، board independence، and chief executive officer tenure. To calculate the quality of financial information، we used the FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 8 for measuring the latent variable. 125 firms are selected as sample. Sample data was analyzed by structural equation modeling and Partial-least-squares (PLS) software. Our findings show that ownership concentration، chief executive officer dominance، board independence، chief executive officer tenure have positive and significant effects on the quality of firms'' financial information. On the other hand، we have not found meaningful relationship between any of four variables of institutional ownership، duality task of chief executive officer and board size and the variable representing firms’ quality of financial information.

Throughout the recent decades, the issue of capital structure and the factors effective on it has been increasingly taken into consideration by the researchers working in the area of finance literature. One of these effective factors, to some researchers, is Corporate Governance. Therefore, the present study wants to investigate whether there is a relationship between some specific features of Board of Managers which is by itself considered as one of the mechanisms of firm's Corporate Governance and firm's capital structure. To do so, the number of 90 firms was selected from those which were listed in Tehran's stock exchange during the period of 1383 until 1387 to work as the sample of the study. The independent variables of the study included 'board size', 'CEO duality' and 'proportion of outside director's while the dependent variable was decided to be 'debt ratio' (as a measure of capital structure). The variables were empirically tested by multiple regression analysis. The results obtained from testing the research hypotheses indicate that in firms where the duties of the chairman of the board is separated from those of CEO and also in firms the benefit from fewer members of the board, the tendency to utilize debt increases. However, no significant relationship was found between 'proportion of outside director's and 'capital structure'.

This study explores the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure of listed non-financial companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. In the other words the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the capital structure is investigated. The research sample consists of 80 firms listed in Tehran Stock exchange for the period of 2001 to 2008. The multivariate regression analysis under panel data approach is used to examine the hypotheses and signification of the model is examined by T and F statistics. Measures of corporate governance employed are proportion of non-executive directors, CEO/Chair duality and institutional shareholding. The results consistently produce strong support for the existing a positive and meaningful association between institutional shareholding as a n outsider corporate governance mechanisms and capital structure. However capital structure is not found significantly influenced by CEO/Chair duality and the presence of non-executive directors on the board.

The relationship between firms leading mechanisms and agency costs in Tehran stock exchange firms was revised in this research. Data was gathered from 51 firms during the period of 1380-1387 . for hypothesis testing used panel analysed. The results showed that with 95% of confidance there are negative and significant relation between percentag by institutional investors, percentage of shares owned by managers, percentage of board members of non author and short – term debt to total debt ratio and agency cost. The result of this research did not adopt with the firms dept ratio by agency costs.