Otherism and Social Criticism

Most writings on Orientalism and differentiating the Orient from the Occident are based on the contrast among the others. Therefore, for any identification, a relationship of otherness should be established among the others. The question this paper raises is, how we can consider the other as “the other self” not identity other? Using Michael Walzer’s three methods of discovery, innovation and interpretation for studying ethics, the positions of the cognition of the others are analyzed. Although in the process of identification we have to see the differences between self and the other, we should note that in “the other self”, we need to pay attention to similarities prior to differences. This necessitates social criticism, in which we and the others keep the critical distance, and we neither dissolve in each other, nor stand in contrast to each other. In social criticism, unlike Orientalism, the cognition or criticism of a society or culture is not wholly based on external standard; neither is it based on defying all the common standards, as it said in some anti-Occidental trends in the Orient. The two issues of keeping the critical distance and not adopting wholly external standards cause the inequality between the critic and the subject of criticism to reduce. leading these two points undermines the role of power in social criticism. Therefore, in the cognition of other which is based on social criticism the Orient and the Occident play no role, and the other self gains importance, which is similar to us in may ways. Also, our criteria are not the only one in assessing its differences. The importance f power is undermined in this method of cognition and criticism, as well. This way of dealing with the other can be called otherism.