The Possibility of Reflective Judgment in Critique of Pure Reason

In the [Critique of the Power of Judgment], Kant introduces a new division of judgments. After dividing judgment into determinative and reflective judgments, he says that in the first we have a concept to subsume the particular under it while in the second we do not have such a concept. This definition of reflective judgment is not obvious. Most of the interpreters think that we cannot understand such a judgment,especially in accordance with Kantian principles in the first Critique. In this article we try to understand what constitutes a reflective judgment and what it would mean in the light of Critique of Pure Reason. First, we look at the definition of judgment, reflection and transcendental reflection in the first Critique. Transcendental reflection, as we will see, is only a necessary part of what we can call it now "determinative judgment". Then in the third Critique we find that not only the reflective judgment is not consistent with first Critique`s principles but also its meaning is not fully intelligible. However, it has an important and functional role to play in the third Critique.