A Jurisprudential Study of the  Enjoining the Good and  Forbidding the Evil in the Cyberspace

Given the fact that there occur massive illegal and forbidden (abominable) acts in the cyberspace which extend far beyond of what we can call the forbidden acts of a traditional kind, it seems necessary to attach great importance to the [religious] obligation ‘enjoining the good’. In this research work, having made clear the necessity of the obligation ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’ in cyberspace and in the Internet, the following questions have been scrutinized: ‘Can ‘enjoining the good’ pose the requirement that the access to the Internet has to be forbidden?’ Can ‘efficacy’ condition which is missing in many cases be a contributing factor in collapsing the obligation ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’ in cyberspace? Are the triple levels of enjoining the good and forbidding the evil in cyberspace obligatory as their traditional counterpart? Given the supposition that enjoining the good in cyberspace is obligatory, is the fulfilment of the obligation ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’ peculiar to the real and traditional context? Is it possible to put to use the triple levels of the obligation ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’ in cyberspace or the Internet? Some answers can be given to the questions above. First, disconnecting the Internet or forbidding access to the Internet by way of the performance of the obligation ‘enjoining the good and forbidding the evil’ seems to be in contradiction to the purport of certain verses and traditions, the wise course of action and the encouragements to seeking knowledge. Second, though enjoining the good is conditioned by the possibility of efficacy, but the instant nature of possibility of efficacy is not a condition. Third, reason dictates that enjoining the good and forbidding the evil is obligatory and given the supposition that enjoining the good is an obligation is substantiated only by textual proofs and given the applicability of the arguments and refinement of the basis of the ruling (tanqiÎi manÁt ), is an obligation. Fourth, putting the triple levels of enjoining the good to use in cyberspace is possible as it is the case with filtering which is an instance of the third level of the obligation ‘enjoining the good’.