The Meaning and the Nature of Action according to Ibn Sina's Moral Middle Term

The main question in this paper is the meaning and the nature of moral actions for Ibn Sina. What are the requirements of a moral action that is, for Ibn Sina, the result of observing the middle path between two opposing temperaments? And under what conditions can an action count as a moral middle term? What are the epistemic prerequisites of a moral action? And what are its ontological features? In order to answer these questions, we should first discuss the significance of cultural and ethnical requirements in providing a meaning for an action as a middle term in Ibn Sina’s moral system, and we will then analyze how the action can turn into a habit or a temperament. We then go on to show that the epistemic nature of a moral action is formed for individuals in the society as a matter of reliance on what mystics and the rulings of sharia say. The ontological nature of a moral action will be elucidated in terms of the addition of a certain form to the forms already existing in the world.