Explaining combined incentive contract's choices: Clawback contracts
Author(s):
Article Type:
Research/Original Article (دارای رتبه معتبر)
Abstract:
This study explains the individuals behavior toward profits and losses contained in differently framed combined incentive contracts. Individuals risk preferences and loss preferences are measured using Holt and Laury (2002) measure of risk aversion and Brink and Rankin (2013) measure of loss aversion, respectively. The last measure was adjusted with compensation characteristics in Iran. The relationship between these preferences and individuals behavior under economically equivalent contracts of different frames is examined using experiment. Participating 92 subjects as well as conducting four separate experiments, the result indicated that there is a negative relationship between loss aversion and accepatance of contracts which have penalty component. Also, subjects preferred the first clawback contract (bonus>penalty) rather than the second clawback contract (bonus
Keywords:
Language:
Persian
Published:
Management accounting, Volume:11 Issue: 37, 2018
Pages:
29 to 40
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