Investigation of Interactions between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance Using the Simultaneous Equations System (Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange

The interaction of managerial ownership and corporate performance in accordance with their endogenous nature is studied in this research. In other words, interrelations of mentioned variables along with some relevant variables of using three stage simultaneous equations and panel data are inquired. To do this, quasi-research method is used for 134 listed companies of Tehran Stock Exchange during period of 1380 to 1389. Results of testing research hypotheses indicate positive significant effectiveness of performance on managerial ownership. The most important factors of making managerial ownership which lead to better performance are considered as bonus shares of management bonus plan and information asymmetry problem. Moreover, results of research do not confirm performance effectiveness from managerial ownership. Thus, research findings do not verify this predicate that “due to coordination of management and tockholders’ interests increasing managerial ownership causes agency expenses decreases and increases in stockholders’ interests.