Designing an incentive - Compatible contract to reduce the moral hazard problem in the Partnership Contracts (Islamic view)

Surveys show that the moral hazard problem caused by failure to properly report a profit by The recipient funds in the PLS Contracts, is the most important problem banks (or financier) at the failure to implement these conventions. Therefore, the success of the financing of profit-sharing practices, is depends on to solve the asymmetric information problems related to its use. In this regard, this study discussed on the relationship between the parties in financing deals to profit and loss methods and its planed features of an Incentive-compatible contract that controls the problem of asymmetric information arising in this regard stems. What distinguishes this study with previous research that The contract discussed in this study, Following the Islamic verses and traditions, is based on encourage and reward if the recipient of the funds exposure the correct information, unlike the previous research. the random auditing, along with increase in the profit share of recipient of the funds for the correct reporting (as a reward honesty) yields an incentive structure that reduces the moral hazard problem, is the result of this study.