The relationship between necessity conditional and value of its antecedent and consequence in Avicennian logic

In Muslim’s logic of conditionals there is a consensus that the value of necessity conditional is defined by relationship between antecedent and consequent and not by the value of antecedent or consequent. However, in their opinions there are discussions on possibility of truth or falsehood based on value of antecedent and consequent. In some of the Muslim logicians’ texts beside of truth and falsehood a different status is mentioned with different terms such as probable false and true, unknown true and false, etc. Examining the nature of this status is the main question of the current text. In this paper, by reviewing different views of Avicennian logicians it’s shown that this classification is related to discussions on conditionals before introducing quantified conditional by Avicenna and Avicennian logicians attempted to accord it with quantified conditional, we showed that from the opinions of Avicennian logicians the opinions that don’t accept third condition as a participant of truth and falsehood are closer to the fundamentals of Avicennian’s logic.