The Effect of Financial Information Risk on Agency Relationship with Firms Capital Structure

This research investigates the effect of financial information risk on firms' capital structure with agency approach from 2004 to end of 2013 in 87 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. The conflicts of interests between managers and owners due to Information asymmetry, I ncrease the risk of financial information which is effective on capital structure. The pooled regression analysis is incorporated to test the hypotheses. The results show an increase in conflicts of interest between managers, the financing deficit increase and as a result, the financing of the debt increases, so there is a positive and significant relationship between the financing deficit and changes in capital structure. Also, the impact of financial information risk on the relationship between financing deficit and changes in capital structure is significant and negative. On the other hand, the impact of financial information risk on the relationship between financing deficit and changes in capital structure with intervention of asymmetry as a first agency proxy was confirm, but with the intervention of asymmetry as a second agency proxy was not confirm.