Redefinition of the Primary Intelligible on the Basis of the Concept of Existence

The main goal in the present article is an investigation of the classification of intelligible things into logical and philosophical primary and secondary ones as well as classification of the concept of existence under primary intelligible concepts. In this article, we have referred to the background of the issue of intelligible things in Islamic philosophy to scrutinize the argument for considering the concept of existence as the secondary intelligible concept, and to argue – assuming the principality of existence – that the concept of existence can be of the type of primary intelligible concepts.
This article, while using a fundamental method, is not a descriptive one; rather, it is a criticism and presenting a view. Here, we prove that conventionality of the concept of existence does not mean it is a secondary intelligible concept. In view of the various intentions of existence and separating them from one another, the selected view of the article is explained and, finally, considering the objections and problems stated in the article, a redefinition of the philosophical primary and secondary intelligible as well as logical secondary intelligible is presented.