فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال بیست و یکم شماره 4 (پیاپی 82، زمستان 1402)

In their discussion of knowledge (science) and the criticism of the philosophical traditions before them, both Shahabu al-Din Suhrawardi and Martin Heidegger argue that the authentic perception is a part of direct and intuitive knowledge of the truth and the very essences of things, rather than the impression of the form or concept of an object in the mind. Relying on the luminous-natured identity of self and knowledge, Suhrawardi considers the entire states and types of perception to be of direct and intuitive knowledge. With his theory of man (Dasein) as a "being in the world", while emphasizing the inherent openness of man, Heidegger holds that in the course of practical communication, man removes the veils from himself, the beings and the world and thus man's authentic understanding is of intuitive existence and of presence cognation. While both thinkers emphasize the pre-conceptual nature of the authentic perception, they also embrace conceptual (acquired) perception at a later stage. However, viewing the difference in culture and intellectual tradition of the two thinkers, there naturally are differences of opinion between them. Through an analytical-comparative method, this article has determined the similarities and differences of the two philosophers as to direct perception.

Despite the philosophers' definition of "motion" (the gradual departure of an object from potentiality to actuality and mobility or gradation in existence) and "incorporeal being" (an entity that is not an elemental or natural body, it can still remain there without an elemental body and material belongings), one can find some traditions suggesting the possibility of motion in incorporeal beings. There, prima facia, however, seems a contradiction in those traditions. A small number of traditions indicate the absence of motion in incorporeal beings. But those traditions are weak, ambiguous, conflicting with definite narrations that do not signify the absolute stability of incorporeal beings. In contrast, there are a lot of traditions indicating the possibility of motion in incorporeal beings; traditions that suggest motion in all contingent beings, that all creatures have time or appointed term or death, or the increase in the knowledge of the angels, or their getting closer to God, etc. From the overall implication of these narrations, the possibility of motion in incorporeal beings can be inferred.

After adopting a fundamental approach in epistemology, one important issue is to explain why basic and self-evident propositions are true. From among self-evident propositions, the first (analytical) theorems are of special importance. Referring to many problems and contrary to the approach attributed to the early philosophers, Allameh Misbah Yazdi does not embrace the possibility that first theorems should imitate the external instances and instead seeks for their referents in the relations between concepts in the mind. Despite mind's intuitive dominance over relations between the concepts in the first theorems and the fact that its explanation for the criterion of the truth of first theorems is provided through reference to the present knowledge, this theory still faces an important question. Assuming that first theorems indicate the relation between the concepts in the mind, how can these mental correlations be considered as a criterion for the identity of instances outside? How can we leave out mind's structure and intervention in the process of establishing such relations? How can we be sure that if our mind were created otherwise or if a different structure was defined for it like the artificial intelligence, it would not consider other propositions as first theorems? It goes without saying that the lack of a proper answer to the above question leads to relativism in the foundations of human knowledge and then to relativism in all sciences. In their article and through a descriptive method, the authors intend to first explain the foundation of Allameh Misbah Yazdi on how concepts express something and then their difference from how artificial intelligence data signify things. They then provide an appropriate answer to the aforementioned question through the analytical method.

The relation of science and practice is one of the most important questions in the field of anthropology. Dividing the agent into with knowledge and without and taking into consideration the role of knowledge in issuing an act, Muslim philosophers and theologians have explained it mostly with an ontological approach though and thus failed to explain how its role is. Along with his definition of the reality of free will basing it on the knowledge of the agent from one side, and his explanation for "practical knowledge" from another side, Allameh Tabatabai did not fail to explain how knowledge plays its role in issuing an act thus he proposed a fairly comprehensive analysis of the relation between knowledge and practice. He believes that free will, as the agent's knowledge, which is involved in the process of issuing an act, is of the "practical knowledge" type, and is concerned with the agent's benefits and harms. Knowing the benefits and harms of things is different from what they are (theoretical wisdom) and different from their intrinsic goodness and evilness (practical wisdom). This knowledge is rooted in the agent's inner feelings and emotions; these feelings and emotions may refer to the two states of agreeable and disagreeable. Therefore, practical knowledge is quite personal and may thus be different for every particular agent's point of view.

One of the most important topics of contemporary cognitive sciences is how "we know other minds" in other words, "social cognition". Cognitive sciences, chiefly with an analytical philosophy approach, have raised the issue of other minds and social cognition under the title of "theory of mind". "Theory of mind" is an important social-cognitive skill that covers the ability to think about mental states of oneself and others. In this paper and through library reference, we will describe and explain the theories proposed under this title, i.e. "theory of the theory of mind" and "simulation of the theory of mind" and their branches. Then through an analytical method, we will study their claims. Findings of the research are that the two mentioned theories, with all their branches, have taken a useful step in the field of artificial intelligence and computer sciences; nonetheless, they are facing a series of sub-structural and super-structural problems to be repaired and corrected merely with a profound and correct philosophical view. Failing to pay attention to the "direct and present perception of internal states in the very individual in TT", "the challenge of justification in the explicit version of simulation" and "the immateriality of the category of knowledge and perception in the implicit version of simulation" are among the sub-structural problems of the aforementioned approaches.

In his article, the author intends to examine the issue that God of religion (theistic God) is identical with God of philosophy (deistic God, the Necessary Essence). Perhaps, in the past, this identity between God of religion and the Necessary Essence of philosophy "Wajib al-Wujud" seemed self-evident, and thus, in the philosophical works of Muslims, after the term "Wajib al-Wujud" and the like, they used the expression "Ta'ala" (Almighty) and the like, and no one questioned this usage. This means that everyone has accepted that the philosophical term "Wajib al-Wujud" refers to the same God of religion, and it was taken for granted that the study whether God of religion was identical with "Wajib al-Wujud" was regarded unnecessary. Today, however, viewing the translation of works of Western thinkers who insist to separate of discussions about God of religions from those of "Wajib al-Wujud" in philosophy, this issue demands an examination. One cannot make use of the philosophical achievements on "Wajib al-Wujud" in order to prove the theological issues, and thus important religious beliefs will be left without philosophical and rational support, unless one demonstrates the identity of God of religion with "Wajib al-Wujud". The most important part of this article is to examine the attributes and acts that are attributed to God in religious texts; although, it may be regarded as an evidence for the difference between God and Wajib al-Wujud" in philosophy. The method adopted in this article is library reference, and the issue is investigated by referring to reliable philosophical and theological sources.

Allah's exclusive agency from one side and the simultaneous causation of things on the other side is one of the most profound and difficult theological issues for thinkers to face. Commentators, theologians, philosophers and mystics have tried to analyze the issue in one way or another. The complexity of this question has made some who defend Allah's efficiency attribute the agency exclusively to Him denying the causality of things. On the contrary, some others have delegated the efficacy and agency entirely to things and human voluntary acts abandoning or denying Allah's efficiency completely. Relying on intellectual proofs and benefiting from revelations and mystical visions, Mulla Sadra considers Allah's efficiency to be compatible with that of things. In his paper, the author has explained the issue through two philosophical and mystical approaches. In the philosophical approach, he has adopted a realistic attitude, based himself on the principle of causality, that the system of causes and effects is hierarchical and separated the real agent from preparing causes. In the mystical approach, having related the principle of causality to manifestation and state theory (i.e. effect is a manifestation or state of the cause) and based himself on the principle of "There is no active agent in existence except Allah", this issue has been investigated, without involving the idea of dualism or polytheism in creation. The examination of this subject in Sadra's theosophy leads to a profound and accurate understanding of many disciplines, such as: ontology, how the world is created and managed, the problem of evil in the world and how to attribute it to God, anthropology, especially human free will. In addition to these cases, such an attitude can be regarded as one of the epistemic foundations for exegeses in understanding verses of the Qur'an as to creation, efficacy, unification of Divine Acts and unity of Lordship. Adopting such an attitude to the agency of Allah Almighty, in addition to the cognitive and theoretical aspects, plays a significant role in wiping polytheism off the globe and training monotheists.

Shahid Mutahhari holds that abjad is not real arithmetic but fiction and it can thus not show any truth. Ayatullah Javadi Amoli also argues that the category of quantity exclusively belongs to the material and imaginal worlds and its lasso does not reach the intelligibles. It seems that the two philosophical and arithmetical approaches are apparently not related to each other; they actually deny a mutual correlation, though; because if abjad arithmetic were a real and true "numbering", its "enumerated thing" would be nothing but of "intelligibles" and "abstract meanings", their enumeration is in terms of letters and words, though. Apparently, to enumerate concepts and "intelligibles" is not impossible as such. What is impossible is the enumeration due to the shape and weight and the like, which, of course, concepts are stripped of. The definitions and applications provided by masters of philosophy and wisdom such as Ibn Turkah and Mirdamad show that this enumeration is not only possible, but also, thanks to the calculation of "abjad", has occurred. Because it leads to the discovery of the phrases "sharing in quantity and meaning"; phrases different in terms of the combination of letters, nonetheless common in terms of quantity and quality (spirit of meaning); and because the mentioned double sharing, as a design, is of the same cognation of knowledge and will of Allah, rather than those of him who coins the terms or uses the phrases, it can be proved by a priori proof (ratio esendi). Abjad arithmetic is also true and divine, along with enumerated entities of the cognation of meanings. The ambiguity of such major terms can be resolved by means of the movable and concrete minor terms mentioned in the text.