Dispute over "norm", in naturalized epistemology

Quine emphasizes the exclusion of non-scientific questions, which have important role in traditional epistemology, from his naturalized epistemology. He presents his epistemology as a science or as a chapter of empirical psychology, so to speak. Jaegwon Kim raises the objection to Quine's epistemology: Quine's approach requires losing every normative elements from epistemology, which in turn requires, since according to Kim the very concept of knowledge -and also belief- is a normative concept, losing knowledge from epistemology, that is Quin's naturalized epistemology could not have knowledge -and also belief- as a subject matter. Here I argue that two meanings of normative element are defendable in accordance with Quine's naturalized epistemology, but this defense seems incompatible with Quine's verificationism. Finally, I try to construe Quine's verificationism in such a way that this incompatibility disappears.