DESIGNING OF INCENTIVE CONTRACT FOR VENTURE CAPITAL UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WITH AN EMPHASIS ON AMBIGUITY AVERSION OF PARTIES

One of the important issues between venture capital and entrepreneur is the challenges posed by asymmetric information and benefits' contrast between them. The main target of this research is to design a contract not only reduces benefits' contrast between the parties but also creates an interactive incentive for each of them. In some countries such as Iran, contract parties are facing with decision making under ambiguity. In this study, while presenting different models for measuring ambiguity and the effect of active investment, an optimal mathematical model has been proposed in order to maximize the venture capitalist and entrepreneur's profit. Eventually by using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker method, an optimal value for each variable has been determined. The results show that the level of entrepreneur effort, directly affects on the final revenue of the project. Also, increasing the level of entrepreneur ability increases his effort level and ultimately increases the profit of the incentive contract for venture capitalist.