Moderating Effect of Industrial Auditor Specialty on Relation between Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Information Asymmetry

Information asymmetry, in the line of corporation governance and being affected by agency theory, makes demands for auditing. In capital markets, information is considered as an important factor which is qualified by auditors. The main objective of this study is to investigate the effect of industrial auditors' specialty on the relation between governance mechanisms and information asymmetries. The sample consists of 173 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange during the period from 2010 to 2017. To test the hypothesis, data is analyzed using panel data analysis method. CEO's responsibility duality, institutional ownership, board of directors size, and board of directors independency criteria are used in order to investigate the corporation governance mechanisms and also the average bid and offer price difference is used to measure the asymmetric information. The results suggest that industrial auditor specialty has a moderating effect on the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and information asymmetry